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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

From the Papers of One Still Living: Kierkegaard and British Literature: 1932-1995
by
Asher Gelzer-Govatos
Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020
Professor Vincent Sherry, Chair

This dissertation traces the impact of the life, work, and thought of the nineteenth-century Danish
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard on British authors of the mid-twentieth century. Following the
translation of Kierkegaard’s writings into English in the mid-1930s, British intellectual life
underwent a Kierkegaard boom, but Kierkegaard’s impact lingered long after his initial
introduction in the build up to World War II. In sketching Kierkegaard’s importance to a handful
of midcentury authors – Aldous Huxley, Graham Greene, Muriel Spark, Flann O’Brien, W.H.
Auden, and R.S. Thomas – I show that Kierkegaard remained connected to a sense of “crisis” in
British life, even after the abatement of the crisis of war. Tying these various crises to shifts in
British life, I show the significance for these authors in pursing a form of literature that I dub the
“maieutic,” a term used by Kierkegaard to denote the work of a midwife in indirectly bringing
about the birth of truth in individuals. After unpacking “maieutic literature” in the body chapters,
I trace its decline in the epilog, showing how the midcentury interest in Kierkegaard as a
resource for developing individual readers gave way to a reading of Kierkegaard indebted to
therapeutic practice, a use which emphasized self-revelation and acceptance over ethical or
religious growth.
vii

Introduction: Preface(s) – Kierkegaard in Britain
If this were my last word, I know it is the truth in me: Everyone who really wills
something will always find an admirer in me, or if necessary, support; -- but these fools,
the masses, the whole conglomeration of men and women who only want to waste their
lives and other people’s lives: they will find their match in me – 1846 entry in
Kierkegaard’s journal1

In 1932 T.S. Eliot faced a difficult decision. In his professional role as editor for Faber
and Faber, he received a proposal from T.F. Burns, of the Catholic publishing house Sheed and
Ward, that Faber and Faber consider releasing a series of English translations of the work of the
nineteenth century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. Eliot expressed hesitation in his
initial response to Burns, noting that “Some of us talked of the matter some time ago and came to
the conclusion that it was not likely to be a success.”2 Doing his due diligence, however, Eliot
wrote to Herbert Read, his main assistant in publishing his little magazine the Criterion, seeking
Read’s advice on the matter, since Read was one of the first Englishmen to read Kierkegaard’s
works in their German translations. Read replied enthusiastically, comparing Kierkegaard to
Pascal in terms of importance, and strongly encouraged Eliot to push for publication.3 This
prompted Eliot to respond positively to Burns, promising that “We are… quite seriously, going
into the question of Kierkegaard.”4 Despite this promise, the proposal fizzled, and Faber and

1

Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. and trans. Alec Dru (London: Oxford University Press,
1939), 167.
2
T.S. Eliot, The Letters of T.S. Eliot Vol. VI: 1932-33, ed. Valerie Eliot and John Haffenden (London: Faber and
Faber, 2016), 315.
3
In his response to Eliot, Read writes: “The more I know about him the more I want to know, and I feel pretty sure
he is the most important writer of his kind still to be translated into English. And the tide is with him… I think in a
way it is a good enterprise for an English publisher. There is not the slightest doubt of his permanent value: I should
put him… as high as Pascal, though that sounds like a rash statement… I strongly recommend you go ahead” (Eliot,
Letters, 332).
4
Eliot, Letters, 350.
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Faber passed on the risk involved in bringing a relatively unknown figure before the British
public. It would be four more years before the first complete work of Kierkegaard got translated
into English, and another six before Oxford University Press began its ambitious project to bring
most of his works into English.
Fourteen years later, Evelyn Waugh offered a window onto Kierkegaard’s changed
fortunes. The Loved One, Waugh’s 1946 satire of British expatriates in Hollywood, mentions
early on a list of intellectual fads sweeping over the educated sectors of the British public.
Heading a list that includes figures like Kafka and Sartre? One Søren Kierkegaard, a figure
familiar to Waugh through his brother-in-law Alexander Dru, translator of some of
Kierkegaard’s key texts, but also a name on the lips of enough Britons to make the sharply
observant Waugh take notice. “Kierkegaard, Kafka, Connolly, Compton-Burnett, Sartre… Who
are they? What do they want?” inquires one character, to which his conversation partner, more
recently arrived from Britain, replies, “I’ve heard of some of them. They were being talked about
in London at the time I left.”5 The sense of Kierkegaard as a figure in the air, recognized by
name if not understood in substance, permeated England during the 1940s, such that Rachel
Wetzsteon has suggested that admitting an admiration for Kierkegaard during this period was
akin to confessing that you drank several cups of coffee a day, or enjoyed going to the movies.6
The story of how, in the span of a decade and a half, Kierkegaard went from publishing
liability to popular sensation forms the background to this study. In one sense this history
matters, as it uncovers a fact not often discussed in intellectual or literary histories of Britain: the
moment, coincidental with World War II, in which Kierkegaard fever swept across the British

5
6

Evelyn Waugh, Four Novels (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2003), 403.
Rachel Wetzsteon, Influential Ghosts: A Study of Auden’s Sources (New York: Routledge, 2007), 83.
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intelligentsia.7 On the other hand, such a foregrounding of this Kierkegaardian moment risks
sidelining Kierkegaard’s reception in Britain as a brief spot of time, just another forties fad, like
zoot suits or the Jitterbug. The truth is more complex: while Kierkegaard never became as
common a figure in British intellectual life as other continental imports like Freud or Nietzsche,
his impact lasted long after his initial introduction to Great Britain. While never, in W.H.
Auden’s words concerning Freud, “A whole climate of opinion,”8 Kierkegaard’s impact on
British thought and literature lingered in subterranean ways. His impact may be compared to that
of an earthquake, with early tremors foretelling an epicenter of impact in the war period, but with
aftershocks lasting for decades after. This dissertation, then, though it begins in the crisis time of
war, traces Kierkegaard’s lingering influence well after Hitler’s defeat.
Beginning in 1932 – not only the year of Eliot’s decision, but the year that Aldous
Huxley, one of the subjects of Chapter One, began reading Either/Or in French and German –
this dissertation charts traces of Kierkegaard as he appears over the course of what I will term the
long midcentury. This period, very roughly stretching from the late interwar period through the
ascent of Margaret Thatcher, proved one of marked transition and change in British public life,

7

There are only two major attempts to wrestle with Kierkegaard’s impact in Britain. One, George Pattison’s essay
“From Prophet of Now to Postmodern Ironist,” acknowledges the popular impact of Kierkegaard but focuses
primarily on his reception in the worlds of academic philosophy and theology. The other, a dissertation by Peter A.
Schilling, looks at Kierkegaard in both America and Britain, but focuses on a narrow period (right around the war),
and, though a work of literary criticism, discusses in depth only two figures: Auden and Eliot. See George Pattison,
“From Prophet of Now to Postmodern Ironist,” in Søren Kierkegaard’s International Reception Tome I, ed. Jon
Stewart (London: Routledge, 2009); and Peter Schilling, Søren Kierkegaard and Anglo-American Literary Culture
of the Thirties and Forties (Dissertation, Columbia University, 1994). An even more diffuse attempt to wrestle with
Kierkegaard’s legacy in Anglo-American literature can be found in Hugh S. Pyper, “Kierkegaard and English
Language Literature,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. John Lippitt and George Pattison (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 570-89. Pyper’s essay is clearly designed as a brief summary of some major figures
who interacted with Kierkegaard, including several (W.H. Auden and R.S. Thomas) who I examine in this
dissertation. Each author’s interaction with Kierkegaard is given no more than two pages, and Pyper’s remarks are
summative rather than critical.
8
W.H. Auden, Collected Poems, ed. Edward Mendelson (New York: Vintage, 1991), 275.

3

both literarily and socially. Throughout this work I connect the aesthetic and social, showing
how Kierkegaard left his marks not only on the level of ideas, but on the level of style.
As I shall explore later in this introduction, Kierkegaard was from the first associated
with a sense of crisis in British life, and I have traced in my chapters a series of crises into which
his works spoke. Though the particular crisis into which Kierkegaard spoke changes from
chapter to chapter, a common thread connects the uses to which the various authors put
Kierkegaard: his idea that literature presents an opportunity to nurture change in individual
readers even in times of crisis. Kierkegaard, who owed a huge intellectual debt to Socrates,
developed the Socratic idea of “maieutic” communication, a form of communication where the
author acts as midwife for the reader – present at and assisting in the “birth” of truth in the
reader, but only indirectly responsible for this birth, the main impetus for which must come from
the reader. Like his hero Socrates, Kierkegaard viewed himself as just such a midwife.9 More
importantly, he believed that God himself utilized maieutic communication, and that no truth of
religious importance could be communicated directly.10 Though Kierkegaard scholars more
commonly refer to Kierkegaard’s broader idea of “indirect communication” – a formulation he
himself used quite often – I have adopted the more evocative “maieutic literature” throughout

9

“[My original idea was] that Christianity required a ‘maieuticer’ and that I understood how to be one… The idea of
proclaiming Christianity, of confessing Christ, does not fit in with Christendom – that is exactly where the maieutic
attitude fits in, which begins by assuming that men are in possession of the greatest good and only tries to make
them aware of what they have” (Kierkegaard, Journals, 199).
10
In a fascinating passage from Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard compares the work of God in
nature to the act of the elusive author, strongly suggesting that Kierkegaard viewed his own indirect authorship as
modeled on divine precedent: “For no anonymous author can more cunningly conceal himself, no practitioner of the
maieutic art can more carefully withdraw himself from the direct relationship, than God. He is in the creation, and
present everywhere in it, but directly He is not there; and only when the individual turns to his inner self, and hence
only in the inwardness of self-activity, does he have his attention aroused, and is enabled to see God… Nature is,
indeed, the work of God, but only the handiwork is directly present, not God. Is not this to behave, in His
relationship to the individual, like an elusive author who nowhere sets down his result in large type, or gives it to the
reader beforehand in a preface? And why is God elusive? Precisely because He is the truth, and by being elusive
desires to keep men from error” (Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical
Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941], 218).

4

this dissertation, since it is a type of indirect communication which focuses attention on the
relationship between author and reader.11 I will also use a series of terms which cluster around
the idea of the maieutic, speaking variously of literature that nurtures, develops, or provokes the
reader.
I find the concept of maieutic literature invaluable for this study, not simply for historical
reasons of faithfulness to Kierkegaard’s presentation of his own work, but also because indirect
communication restores a sense of risk to the writing of literature, a risk that Kierkegaard, along
with the authors in this study, valued. Kierkegaard balanced a firm sense of the core concepts
which shaped his writing with an acknowledgement that others might miss the point in their
reading of his works. Such a combination suggests that Kierkegaard scholars might err in two
ways, either by engaging in what Roger Poole describes as “blunt reading,” in which the how of
Kierkegaard’s rhetoric gets pushed aside in the hunt for the what,12 or by stressing the irony and
indirectness so much that the content disappears – a common error for Poole himself and others
who seek, in the name of deconstruction, to claim Kierkegaard as one who “Has made all
solutions impossible.”13 By focusing on the maieutic, I hope to preserve some sense of the

11

Maieutic communication would appear, in Kierkegaard’s mind, to be a subspecies of indirect communication.
After he had completed the pseudonymous phase of his career, he wrote in his journals about the limits of being a
maieuticer, and the need for the midwife to finally transform into the witness, a state of being connected to Christian
revelation. However, even this status as “witness” contains indirectness. See Kierkegaard, Journals, 259-60.
12
“The Unknown Kierkegaard: Twentieth-Century Receptions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed.
Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 58-66.
13
Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1993),
1. See also 1-27, 200-261 for a fuller explication of Poole’s post-structuralist indebted reading of Kierkegaard’s
indirect communication. For other poststructuralist readings, see Sylvia Agacinski, Aparté: Deaths and Conceptions
of Søren Kierkegaard (Tallahassee: Florida University Press, 1988); Pat Bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of
Writing (Tallahassee: Florida University Press, 1987); Kierkegaard and Literature: Irony, Repetition, and
Criticism, ed. Ronald Schleifer and Robert Markley (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984); and
Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, ed. Martin J. Matuštík and Merold Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1995). In this last volume, see especially John D. Caputo, “Instants, Secrets, and Singularities: Dealing Death
in Kierkegaard and Derrida,” 216-38. For a critical view of deconstructive takes on Kierkegaard, see Sylvia Walsh,
“Kierkegaard and Postmodernism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29.2 (April 1991): 113-122.
For a more positive assessment, see Steven Shakespeare, “Kierkegaard and Postmodernism,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. John Lippitt and George Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 464-83.
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ethical and religious charge behind the writing of Kierkegaard and his British heirs, while still
acknowledging the ways in which their style helped disguise intent.
Furthermore, the author-reader relationship plays a key role in my dissertation for two
reasons. First, midcentury British writers who engaged with Kierkegaard tended to do so in an
intensely personal way.14 Indeed, the title of this dissertation, “From the Papers of One Still
Living,” the name of an early Kierkegaard review of a Hans Christian Andersen novel, has been
chosen primarily because it expresses the sense shared by many of these authors that
Kierkegaard’s presence hovered around them in a very real and active way.15 This feeling of
close, personal connection to Kierkegaard also motivates my decision to quote from the first
English translations of his works: though the later Princeton translations spearheaded by Edna
and Howard Hong more accurately capture Kierkegaard’s words, the affective charge of the
original translations (most by Walter Lowrie, David F. Swenson, and Alexander Dru) give
insight into Kierkegaard’s ability to inspire feelings of kinship through his words. Second, the
ability of literature to reach and influence individual readers forms a core concern of each of the

14
Assessing Kierkegaard’s legacy in Anglophone literature, Hugh S. Pyper argues that “One of Kierkegaard’s most
significant literary legacies may be the identification of a particular character type: the reader of Kierkegaard…
There is an implication that Kierkegaard’s writings are not for everyone and act as their own gatekeepers. There is a
secret invitation that each reader may take as directed to him or herself and which can seduce the reader into a closer
engagement with the text, which is coupled to a self-questioning dialogue with it” (“Kierkegaard and English
Language Literature,” 571).
15
What would become one of the most important interpretations of Kierkegaard in the twentieth century, Jean-Paul
Sartre’s essay “Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal,” began life as a speech at a colloquium, hosted by UNESCO,
titled “The Living Kierkegaard.” Sartre begins his essay by struggling with the implications of this title, suggesting
that “If we cannot revive this martyr of interiority other than in the form of an object of knowledge, a determination
of his praxis will forever escape us: his living effort to elude knowledge through reflective life, his claim to be, in his
very singularity and at the heart of his finitude, the absolute subject, defined in interiority by his absolute
relationship with being… We shall ask ourselves whether the presence, that is the subjectivity of someone else,
always inaccessible to cognition in its strict sense, can nevertheless be given to us by some other means…. Either
Kierkegaard today… is dissolved by the enzymes of knowledge or he persists in demonstrating to us the still
virulent scandal of what one might call the transhistoricity of historical man” (Between Existentialism and Marxism,
trans. John Mathews [New York: Pantheon, 1974], 141-2). Likewise, W.H. Auden’s anthology of Kierkegaard
quotes bears the title The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard.
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authors studied, and every chapter takes as its aesthetic focus a different means by which these
authors sought to engage readers in such a way as to develop them as individuals.
Grasping the nurturing possibilities of literature does not only elucidate the importance of
Kierkgaard’s work to these particular authors; such an understanding opens up a new reading of
midcentury British literature, a contested period usually divided between late modernism,
realism, and postmodernism.16 The authors studied here, however – along with other major
midcentury authors, including Iris Murdoch and William Golding – fit into this tripartite schema
only uneasily.17 Recognizing the midcentury presence of maieutic literature, then, helps reclaim
a place for those midcentury authors who avoided equally the radical ideology and aesthetics of
postmodernism and what David Lodge identifies as realism’s “aesthetics… [and] ideology of
compromise.”18

16
Late modernism, a term coined by Tyrus Miller, denotes the writing of modernists in the late 1920s and 1930s that
felt some sense of its own impending decline. Miller argues that, as they examined modernism’s decline, late
modernists such as Wyndham Lewis and Djuna Barnes paved the way for postmodernism (Late Modernism:
Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the Wars [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999], 7). The essays in
Intermodernism: Literary Culture in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain, ed. Kristin Bluemel (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2009) seek to carve out a space for authors of the 1930s such as Storm Jameson and T.H. White
who do not fit the late modernist mold, but also do not predict postmodernism. For a standard evaluation of post-war
fiction that dichotomizes between realism and postmodernism, see Andrzej Gąsiorek, Post-War British Fiction:
Realism and After (London: Edward Arnold, 1995). For a more recent and more nuanced approach to post-war
fiction, see the collection British Fiction after Modernism: The Novel at Midcentury, ed. Marina MacKay and
Lyndsey Stonebridge (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
17
Murdoch is sometimes grouped with the Angry Young Men of 1950s realist fiction due to her creation of
alienated protagonists, but this label has been contested even by other members of that loose consortium. Colin
Wilson, for example, refers to Murdoch as a “frustrated romantic” (Introduction to Dale Salwak, Interviews with
Britain’s Angry Young Men [San Bernardino: The Borgos Press, 1984], 10). See also Humphrey Carpenter, The
Angry Young Men: A Literary Comedy of the 1950s (London: Penguin, 2002), 80-1.
18
David Lodge, “The Novelist at the Crossroads,” in The Novel Today, ed. Malcolm Bradbury (Glasgow:
Fontana/Collins, 1977), 108.
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Critical Contexts
I can only be understood after my death: I can, while I live, believe and be blessedly
assured that I will be understood, I myself can understand why I cannot be understood
before, and that such is my task, an act of self-denial: but it is indeed a tremendous work
– 1848 entry in Kierkegaard’s Journal19

Three major scholarly contexts weave their way through my story, fields for which the
rediscovery of the British Kierkegaard provides a helpful nuance to contemporary debates and
trends. Two are literary, one philosophical; two are broad, one more specific; together they form
the critical edifice on which this dissertation builds. The first important context is that of British
literature of the midcentury. In particular I am interested in the relatively recent spate of books
which focus on the response of British authors, starting in the 1930s, to the rapid shifts in British
social and imperial structure that occurred in the wake of World War I. The standard study here,
Jed Esty’s A Shrinking Island, traces in late modernist works a growing dissatisfaction with the
notion of “Britishness” – with its implications of imperial sprawl – and the attempts of some
authors to focus instead on “Englishness,” a recalibration in favor of domestic affairs and local
places.20 In the wake of A Shrinking Island scholars have grappled with other ways in which
shifting British social contexts influenced literary production, from the city/country divide and
the boom in rural tourism, to the epoch-shaking events of World War II.21
Recapturing Kierkegaard in the British context brings into focus another element of British
society rapidly changing during these same years: British religion, specifically Christianity’s

19

Kierkegaard, Journals, 233.
Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003). For an interesting forerunner to Esty’s book, see David Gervais, Literary Englands: Versions of
‘Englishness’ in Modern Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
21
See Peter Lowe, English Journeys (Amherst: Cambria Press, 2012). On World War II, see especially Marina
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decline as a dominant force in British life. Religion has been curiously absent from most
accounts of twentieth-century British literature, and though recent scholarly attempts have been
made to recapture religious traces in modernism, little has been done to extend this consideration
to the midcentury moment – a particular shame given that the midcentury featured robust public
debates about the role of religion in society, and important transformations in the practice of
Christianity in Britain.22 Throughout the dissertation, but especially in Chapter Two, I examine
how Kierkegaard offered to religious authors a new way of speaking about Christianity, one that
shied away from the assumed Christianity of “Christendom” and embraced Christianity as an
activity marginal to British society as a whole. Religious authors like Muriel Spark could then
wrestle over religious subject matter without assuming a shared base of knowledge or belief with
their readers. Rather than mourn the loss of Christianity’s social prestige, these authors,
following Kierkegaard, embraced the sidelining of religion as an avenue for making Christianity
fresh, stripped of the detritus of Christendom. As Douglas V. Steere, an early translator of
Kierkegaard, put it, Kierkegaard has the power to “Force us back upon the logic of commitment,
and make us return to that nodal point which a thin social religion so often blunts: the point of an
individual's irrevocable responsibility before God.”23 I read these authors as attuned to the
opportunities provided by literature to highlight the “individual’s irrevocable responsibility
before God.” In a way, these authors performed a redefinition of their horizons similar to that of
the move from Britishness to Englishness identified by Esty: they traded the vastness of
22
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Christendom for the smaller arena of Christian practice in a society dominated by religious
indifference.
This embrace of a more socially marginal Christianity points toward the second critical
context for this dissertation, the emergent sub-field of post-secular studies. Rising largely out of
the work of Talal Asad and Charles Taylor in challenging traditional narratives of secularization,
post-secular studies in its literary form looks for traces of religious belief in supposedly secular
works of literature.24 Until now, the locus of post-secular literary studies has resided in
contemporary American literature, thanks to early works by John McClure and Amy Hungerford
which outlined the strong affinities of works of contemporary American authors like Thomas
Pynchon and Toni Morrison for a fragmented spiritual practice, one that defies both secularity
and traditional religion.25 In the accounts of McClure and Hungerford, religious belief survives
the supposed secularization of American life and literature, but pokes out only in fragmented
forms, what McClure identifies as “Religiously inflected disruption” of secular norms, and the
“rearticulation of a dramatically ‘weakened’ religiosity with secular, progressive values and
projects”.26 Other scholars of post-secular literature have noted the desire of post-secular
scholarship to “Resist any master narrative” – secular or religious – and have argued that in postsecular literature “The religious is not reaffirmed so much as it is engaged.”27 Of late, however,
several scholars, most notably Tracy Fessenden, have challenged the aims of post-secular studies
precisely on the grounds that the field cannot adequately account for traditional religion, or any
24
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sort of belief that deviates from the generalized, politically progressive spirituality studied by
McClure and Hungerford.28
One of the implicit arguments of this dissertation is that Kierkegaard provides a bridge
between the post-secular emphasis on fragmented religion and the practice of more unified
traditional religion. Not only do I move the post-secular into Britain, I show that traditional
religious belief itself may be subject to the uncertainties and fragmentations of post-secularism.29
This is a point recognized by Charles Taylor in his conception of the “fragilization” of belief;
that is to say, even devout religious believers, in the context of modern society, experience their
beliefs as something chosen, not given, and thus subject to possible further change.30
Kierkegaard, however, had already made this observation a century before.31 His descriptions of
the life of faith portray such faith not as a source of complacent obedience to dogma, but as a
wellspring of anxious activity. He does so most evocatively in a phrase that reappears throughout
his work, and which will crop up often in this dissertation: his description of the person of faith
as living out over seventy thousand fathoms of water. Attempting a definition of faith in
28
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Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard says: “Faith is precisely the contradiction
between the infinite passion of the individual’s inwardness and the objective uncertainty… If I
wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast the objective
uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water, still
preserving my faith.”32 By seeing the life of faith – even the faith of a Christian who adheres to
traditional doctrinal positions – as living constantly out over seventy thousand fathoms,
Kierkegaard suggests that believers always experience faith as fragmented and difficult, a
struggle for survival. That the authors studied in this dissertation – all of whom except Aldous
Huxley practiced some form of (relatively) traditional Christianity – experienced this
fragmentation in their own writing about faith, a fragmentation perhaps heightened by the
knowledge of Christianity’s lessening hold on British society, opens a new window on postsecular literature, a scholarly approach that allows the post-secular to encompass forms of belief
that are at once coherent in concept and still fragmented in practice.
The final context considered throughout this dissertation moves us from a consideration
of the texts and authors it discusses to an examination of Kierkegaard himself and his reception
in the twentieth century. Anchored as this dissertation is in literary studies, I hope to offer an
alternative perspective on the field of Kierkegaard studies that recaptures the distinctly literary
aspects of his work. Scholars writing on the aesthetic dimensions of Kierkegaard’s writing have
often observed that these aesthetic dimensions have been shunted aside in favor of theological or
philosophical treatments of his work. Though scattered academic treatments of Kierkegaard’s
aesthetics have been written in English over the past half-century, most notably by Louis
Mackey, George Pattison, and Sylvia Walsh, it is only in the last decade that interest in
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Kierkegaard’s status as literary artist has begun to pick up scholarly momentum.33 Much of this
interest comes thanks to the writing of Eric Ziolkowski, whose work tracing literary influences
on Kierkegaard in The Literary Kierkegaard has served to flesh out the literary figures floating
in the background of Kierkegaard’s words.34 The recent essay collection Kierkegaard,
Literature, and the Arts, edited by Ziolkowski, presents the most comprehensive account of
Kierkegaard’s interaction with various aesthetic forms and his subsequent influence on artists.35
As valuable as this recent work has been, it rests on a historically dubious narrative of
recovery: the aesthetic Kierkegaard had long been lost but has now been found.36 Louis Mackey
asserts that, even as they acknowledge the unavoidably aesthetic nature of Kierkegaard’s
writings, most scholars go on to treat him “As if he were a straightforward philosophical or
theological writer”.37 The assumption of a non-existent aesthetic reception of Kierkegaard has
been especially strong with regard to English language interaction with his work. George
Pattison’s overview of British reception focuses primarily on philosophers and theologians,
giving the impression that these were the British figures most invested in Kierkegaard’s ideas.38
Roger Poole goes farther, asserting that because the original English translators of Kierkegaard
were clergymen and theologians, “There was from the first a remarkably impoverished
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awareness of Kierkegaard as a writer, as a stylist, and as a rhetorician” in Britain and the United
States.39 These accounts of the non-existent aesthetic Kierkegaard rely on an incomplete
understanding of his importance in midcentury Britain. By focusing on the writers, as opposed to
philosophers and theologians, who studied Kierkegaard’s writings in this period, I aim to show
that, far from being an afterthought, Kierkegaard’s aesthetics loomed large in the British
assessment of his legacy. Furthermore, by detailing the close connection between how these
authors valued Kierkegaard’s ethical and religious claims and how they imitated his aesthetic
methods, I show that the aesthetic and religious elements of Kierkegaard’s authorship cannot
easily be prized apart. Rather than treating Kierkegaard the religious thinker separately from
Kierkegaard the literary experimenter, his British literary heirs intuited the ties between his style
and his message and applied his lessons to their own works.

Prehistories: From a Market Town to the Marketplace of Ideas
In relation to the present age my talents are like a lovely little place which is too far to go
on foot and too near for a day’s expedition and is therefore neither visited nor known;
and so I do not rise upon the horizon of every day, nor upon the telescopic horizon of the
century – 1839 entry in Kierkegaard’s journal40
“It is a miserable existence… to be a genius in a provincial town.”41 So Kierkegaard
summed up his life as a member of Copenhagen society. Though he saw some advantage in his
geographical marginalization, it also caused him no end of consternation to be trapped in a nation
dominated, in his view, by dull, officious bureaucrats and merchants (his other favorite epithet
for Copenhagen was to deride it as a “market town”).42 The son of a wealthy merchant,
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Kierkegaard utilized his inheritance not only to live the life of a dandy, but to finance the
publication of his books, which were treated with indifference by the Danish public.43 The failure
of the Danish public to receive Kierkegaard’s works is not too surprising given that he
consistently attacked his fellow citizens for what he saw as their bourgeois mediocrity. Styling
himself after Socrates, Kierkegaard sought, both in pseudonymous works like Either/Or,
veronymous essays like Two Ages, and his numerous religious discourses, to rouse his fellow
Danes from their sluggish acceptance of received wisdom. His rhetoric turned especially
withering when aimed against what he called “Christendom,” the official form of Christianity
sanctioned by both the state and middle-class practice. Kierkegaard’s attacks on the reading
public and on official Christianity constituted a major source of his appeal for his midcentury
British readers, faced as they were with both the challenges of mass media and the lingering
specter, however weakened, of political and social Christianity. By attacking his contemporaries,
Kierkegaard simultaneously ensured that his immediate public would reject him, but that future
generations would find his bromides valuable resources in their own struggles – a future
Kierkegaard predicted for himself repeatedly.44
Despite his own confidence that he would be remembered posthumously, for the first
half-century after his death Kierkegaard remained sealed in the tomb of Scandinavian
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obscurity.45 Even in his own country, he remained largely a marginal figure, ignored by major
authors like Hans Christian Andersen and misinterpreted by his opponents in the Danish state
church. For the first twenty five or so years after his death in 1855, Kierkegaard’s work
underwent what Habib C. Malik refers to as a “prolonged period of hibernation,” with occasional
lone figures “nibbling” at his works, but usually devoting themselves to a single theme, at the
expense of Kierkegaard’s overarching concerns.46 The two most important of these nibblers,
however, would have a long-term effect on Kierkegaard’s international reception. Henrik Ibsen,
the Norwegian playwright often considered the most consequential Scandinavian author of the
nineteenth century, wrote several plays that dabbled in Kierkegaardian thought, most notably
Brand, about a Pietist minister convinced of his calling from God. Ibsen’s play explores the
Kierkegaardian concept of religious authority, a theme that would prove important in British
receptions of Kierkegaard’s work.47 Though Ibsen’s seal of approval did not immediately launch
Kierkegaard into prominence, the playwright’s soaring reputation by century’s end helped raise
Kierkegaard’s own reputation as well.48 Equally significant was the praise of the Danish critic
Georg Brandes, who gained a following in the German-speaking world, and who praised
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Kierkegaard as “An enormous genius, one who comes once every hundred years.”49 Brandes,
despite his praise, may actually have done Kierkegaard more harm than good, as he initiated a
strain of biological-psychological criticism, privileging a morbid interest in Kierkegaard’s
personal life over elucidation of his works, which has continued down to the present.
In part thanks to Brandes, Kierkegaard’s major international breakthrough happened at
the beginning of the twentieth century in Germany. The man largely responsible for this
breakthrough, Christoph Schrempf, started as a theology student, but became disillusioned with
Christianity. His interest in Kierkegaard survived his loss of faith, though he swung back and
forth between admiration for and resentment of Kierkegaard throughout his life. Schrempf led
the way in translating Kierkegaard into German, eventually overseeing a twelve-volume edition
of his works. But his method was distinctly idiosyncratic, as he often deliberately edited,
abridged, or mistranslated Kierkegaard’s works according to his own impulses. Later scholars
resented Schrempf’s freewheeling approach to translation, but his edition had an enormous
impact in Germany nonetheless, such that the Kierkegaard who had cemented his place in
Weimar Germany bore the marks of Schrempf’s proto-existentialist approach to Kierkegaard,
one that downplayed the religious aspects of Kierkegaard’s writings.
German appreciation for Kierkegaard accelerated rapidly during the early years of the
twentieth century. Students of his work included major intellectual figures like Rudolf Kassner
and Georg Lukács, and writers like Rainer Maria Rilke and Franz Kafka. Most significant for
Kierkegaard’s later reception into English, however, was the German Catholic Theodor Haecker,
who worked to counteract Schrempf’s influence by revealing a very different Kierkegaard to the
world. Presenting a “many-sided” Kierkegaard, one at once a poet, a prophet, and a satirist,
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Haecker not only interpreted Kierkegaard but imitated him, producing critical works with “an
audible ring of existential urgency.”50 The urgency present in Haecker’s critical work on
Kierkegaard extended to his translations as well, the first of which, a translation of the fiercely
polemical essay “The Present Age,” appeared with impeccable timing on July 1, 1914, on the eve
of World War I. An eventual Catholic convert, Haecker gave the world a fully religious
Kierkegaard, a picture of the philosopher that would find sympathy with the two men most
responsible for bringing Kierkegaard to Britain: Walter Lowrie, a retired American Episcopal
priest, and Alexander Dru, like Haecker a convert to Roman Catholicism. Haecker became
important in the British reception of Kierkegaard not only indirectly through his mentoring of
Dru, but directly, thanks to the publication of Dru’s translation of several critical essays on
Kierkegaard written by Haecker. Because Haecker, not Schrempf, served as the main channel
through which Kierkegaard came to Britain, the Kierkegaard encountered by British writers was
at once deeply religious and aesthetically adventurous. In addition, Haecker’s use of Kierkegaard
to critique the rising power of the Nazi party lent an urgency to Kierkegaard’s thoughts on crisis,
an urgency that would carry over to Kierkegaard’s initial British audience.
Though a few attempts had been made to translate Kierkegaard into English before the
mid-thirties, 1935 marks the true beginning of Kierkegaard studies in English.51 That year saw
the release of E.L. Allen’s Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought, the first major anglophone
critical study of Kierkegaard, with David F. Swenson’s translation of Philosophical Fragments,
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the first translation of a complete work by Kierkegaard into English, following close on its heels
in 1936. Swenson, an American of Scandinavian descent who had discovered Kierkegaard in
Danish thanks to a proliferation of Kierkegaard’s works in libraries in the upper Midwest, might
have played a more significant role in the translation of Kierkegaard into English had he not died
in 1940, leaving several translations unfinished.52 The gap left by Swenson was filled largely by
the combined efforts of Lowrie and Dru. Of the two, Lowrie was by far the more prolific,
translating twelve volumes of Kierkegaard’s works, as well as penning a long biography that
contains extensive quotations from Kierkegaard’s writings. Lowrie brought to his work on
Kierkegaard the religious interests of a retired minister, but also the personal zeal of a true
disciple, and the prefaces and introductions of his translations repeatedly emphasize the
importance of Kierkegaard for the individual reader – an emphasis that British readers picked up
on. Dru, though he translated far less, was almost as important as Lowrie in bringing
Kierkegaard before the English-speaking public: he produced a massive (though still heavily
abridged) translation of Kierkegaard’s Journals, the work that above all others resonated with
English readers. The urgency and intimacy of the Journals shines through in Dru’s translation,
which pulses with a Kierkegaardian sense of crisis. He also translated Haecker, provided
biographical and theoretical introductions to Kierkegaard, and generally acted as a networker
connecting those interested in the philosopher’s work.
In that pivotal year 1935, Lowrie and Dru independently converged upon the third person
who would prove essential in bringing Kierkegaard into English: the novelist and poet Charles
Williams, perhaps best known for his association with J.R.R. Tolkien and C.S. Lewis, but
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primarily important here in his role as an editor at Oxford University Press. Each unaware of the
other, Lowrie and Dru wrote to Williams proposing a multi-volume release of Kierkegaard’s
works in English. Though, like Eliot, initially hesitant – he worried over committing to a project
with no actual translations to examine – Williams quickly got on board, and proved a strong
advocate for the series up until his death in 1945.53 He also helped navigate the strong
personalities involved in the work, especially Lowrie, who had to be placated at various times
due to creative and economic differences with Oxford’s decisions. Though Lowrie did eventually
break off publishing with Oxford, choosing to publish the rest of his translations through
Princeton University Press, Oxford continued to release the books in Britain. Beyond Williams’
influence in bringing the translations to press, he plays a significant role in the story of
Kierkegaard for another reason: it was he who introduced W.H. Auden – at the time tentatively
making his way back into the Church of England under Williams’ influence – to the works of
Kierkegaard. Williams’ book of church history, The Descent of the Dove, prominently features
Kierkegaard near its end, where he called Kierkegaard the 19th Century’s closest equivalent to
Calvin, Dominic, and Augustine.54 Williams’ Kierkegaard was both religious and paradoxical, a
figure who “Coordinated experiences in a new manner… [who] caused alien and opposite
experiences to coinhere”.55 Auden would go on to become the most consistent and vocal British
advocate of Kierkegaard’s writings, and the version of Kierkegaard Auden engages with follows
in Williams’ mold. Of course, by the time The Descent of the Dove piqued Auden’s interest in

53

Responding to Dru in 1935, Williams noted that “Kierkegaard is no doubt frightfully important but we would not
promise to publish a manuscript by St. Thomas or Socrates without seeing it.” In early 1936, however, Williams
seemed more optimistic, noting that “I think myself that sooner or later Kierkegaard will have a pretty good vogue
for some time” (Quoted in Paulus, Jr., “From a Publisher’s Point of View,” 24).
54
Charles Williams, The Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit in the Church (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1939), 212.
55
Ibid.

20

the philosopher, the world had conspired to thrust Kierkegaard into the zeitgeist as the prime
explicator of impending international crisis.
A Fundamental Metaphysic of Life: Kierkegaard and Crisis
Geniuses are like a storm, they come up against the wind; terrify men; clean the
atmosphere – 1849 entry in Kierkegaard’s journal56

That the Kierkegaard who emerged in the British consciousness was tied inextricably to a
sense of crisis can be seen by examining one of the first British books to engage with his thought
– a book largely forgotten today, but popular on its release, and representative of the general tone
in which British writers discussed Kierkegaard at the time. Written under the pseudonym
Nicodemus, Midnight Hour comprises the personal diary of a man in crisis during six months of
the year 1941. One of the low years of the British war effort, 1941 presented ample opportunities
for dire proclamations – the term “Midnight Hour” is not misapplied. Yet Nicodemus’ own
midnight hour does not only concern the hardships of life during World War II; his diary
repeatedly connects the fight against Hitler to a more personal crisis, the battle within his own
self. He sees these two struggles as intimately intertwined: “In fact the terrible and terrific drama
of the war is, point by point, an apocalypse of this war in my soul and I am obsessed with the
thought that this inner will in the end decide that outer war… that we fight in our own hearts, not
merely for our own salvation, but for that of the world.”57 To Nicodemus, Nazism is but one
symptom – though to be sure the most terrible – of a deeper crisis that has its roots in the
abandonment of true religion. Christianity, especially the Church of England to which
Nicodemus belongs, has compromised itself, embracing the way of the flesh rather than the way
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of spirit. Only a regeneration of spirit – the kind promised by Jesus to Nicodemus’ New
Testament namesake – can revive Christianity among individuals, the nation, and the world.
Written with the immediacy one might expect from a diary composed during a six month
long dark night of the soul, Midnight Hour proved popular, even as the tide of war turned: in a
1943 letter to POW Montgomery Belgion C.S. Lewis called it “The outstanding [Christian] book
of the moment.”58 As personal as it remains, however, Midnight Hour also engages philosophical
and theological matters, and when it does so it channels these energies largely through the person
of Kierkegaard. Beginning on the title page, which bears as one of its epigraphs a Kierkegaard
quote that gives resonance to the book’s title,59 Kierkegaard’s presence ripples through the book
as Nicodemus engages in the struggle of becoming a self. Nicodemus confesses that he has found
the height of religious ecstasy in the writings of the Danish philosopher and his contemporary
German disciple Karl Barth, painting a picture of the sublime worthy of Turner.60 “To read him
is like rock-climbing,” Nicodemus proclaims, after having devoured Kierkegaard’s essay The
Present Age in one sitting, “One ascends the craggy paradox of his thought painfully, inch by
inch… till, suddenly, some rugged self-evident truth breaks on the view, in a high, thin pure air
and a bare world of elemental thought.”61 Though he recognizes the difficulty in sustaining such
heights, Nicodemus finds tamer versions of belief ruined for him, and braces himself to remain
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in Kierkegaard’s rarified air, though few come with him.62 If Nicodemus wishes to channel to his
readers the electrical charge of a Christianity made spirit, then Kierkegaard serves as his
lightning rod, drawing around his person all the energies of twice-born belief.
Nicodemus was, in fact, the pseudonym of Melville Chaning-Pearce, a sometime author
and amateur theologian who would engage with the work of Kierkegaard throughout his career.
Two years earlier, at the beginning of the war, Chaning-Pearce had published, under his own
name, one of the first studies of Kierkegaard written in English, The Terrible Crystal, a
collection of essays that meditates on the religious and existential ramifications of Kierkegaard
on modern thought, including a consideration of Karl Barth. The Kierkegaard of The Terrible
Crystal emerges like a bas relief of anxiety, etched from the negative space of crisis. In the
prologue Chaning-Pearce describes his project as follows: “This book consists in studies in a
certain type of modern Christian thought and feeling deriving from and attuned to conditions of
terror and catastrophe… Here is a type of thought about religion for which crisis and catastrophe
are the very stuff of religious reality. It is a thinking conceived in, interknit with and oriented
toward catastrophe. Catastrophe is the magnetic north of its needle.”63 He goes on to assert the
relevance of such a study for the modern consciousness, and to state his hope that the book will
reach, not the theologian or traditional Christian, who will not have ears to hear his message, but
“those for whom the conviction that both reality and religion alike are fundamentally
catastrophic cannot be escaped… the great and growing multitude who are as sure that traditional
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religion is not enough, as that, by a real and reborn religion alone, can the ruin of our world be
averted.”64
Though especially florid in their rhetoric, Midnight Hour and The Terrible Crystal are
quite typical of works of their time in their treatment of Søren Kierkegaard. The initial AngloAmerican reception of Kierkegaard cannot be disentangled from the deepening sense of world
crisis building from the Great War and reaching its zenith at the start of World War II. That the
two world wars occasioned a sense of crisis in Western countries is of course well-known, but
recent scholarship has shown that this sense of crisis went beyond lingering aftershocks from the
Great War and the creeping threat of fascism in Europe to create, in Britain especially, a wideranging feeling of impending catastrophe. Historian Richard Overy has detailed the pressures at
play in interwar British society even before Hitler’s shadow fell across Europe; the various
anxieties of British society in this period combine to form what Overy has piquantly dubbed “the
morbid age.”65 The British social fabric stretched under various pressures: economic catastrophe
and the rise of socialism, technological efficiency and its backlash, and concern over the
destruction of traditional, rural England.66 Contra the popular narrative, this sense of unease did
not dissipate in a grand swell of unity following the invasion of Poland. Indeed, as Marina
MacKay has shown, leading literary figures of the war expressed a deep ambivalence – reflecting
the wider ambivalence of the British public – toward a war that, while fought against an
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inarguably evil foe, entailed a horrific loss of domestic liberty: a necessary but odious
compromise.67
For some Anglo-American intellectuals, this pervasive sense of crisis burrowed down
even deeper, moving from anxiety over the fate of the nation to an existential panic over
humanity itself. As individuals confronted the large-scale machinations of mass society in its
political and technological manifestations, intellectuals sought to halt the destabilization of
individual personhood. The human became an increasingly fraught category, with theologians,
philosophers, and humanists all vying to resuscitate its seemingly lifeless corpse. Mark Greif has
analyzed this discourse – primarily in an American context, but with a steady eye toward Europe
– in his recent book The Age of the Crisis of Man, and others have followed in his wake to study
this humanistic sense of crisis in its British version.68 What has been largely missing from this
analysis is a sustained study of the role played by the works of Kierkegaard in this AngloAmerican discourse of crisis, an omission worth correcting, given the high place accorded
Kierkegaard by thinkers of the time.69 Though his entrance into the English speaking world was
highly mediated by better known figures, whether those who appropriated his works, like Kafka
and Barth, or those who merely formed a complement to his thought, like Dostoyevsky and
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Nietzsche, by the time of World War II British and American writers increasingly recognized
Kierkegaard as “not only the fons et origo of [this] type of religious thought… but also still [one
surpassing] his successors and disciples in the profundity and suggestiveness of his thought.”70 It
helped that Kierkegaard identified himself as a thinker aligned with societal crisis, noting in his
journal that “There is a bird called the stormy-petrel, and that is what I am, when in a generation
storms begin to gather, individuals of my type appear.”71 Just as Kierkegaard wrote his fiercest
attacks against complacency on the cusp of the European revolutions of 1848, his first British
readers found in his writings an analysis of complacency and crisis that resonated with their own
sense of national and international turmoil. If, as George Pattison suggests, Kierkegaard is a
figure who most fully blossoms when religious, social, and individual identities are all “stretched
to their breaking point,” then the Anglo-American cultural sphere in the buildup to and waging
of World War II provided a most fertile ground for his emergence.72
Even in the first year of his new life in English, Kierkegaard became associated with
crisis. The first book length study of Kierkegaard in English, E.L. Allen’s Kierkegaard: His Life
and Thought, highlights Kierkegaard’s centrality to contemporary crisis, looking backwards and
forward in placing him in context. Though much derided by critics, the book nevertheless
captures something of the spirit of the age in dealing with Kierkegaard: “The World-war wrote in
blood its commentary on his writings… For this man, more than any other in his day, saw and
felt in advance the crisis that was to light on our own. The New Testament and modern life, the
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democrat’s faith in human nature and the dictator’s scorn for the mass – these are our
oppositions, but they were his first.”73 His intuitive feel for the contours of crisis – honed in his
attacks on bourgeois society and the Danish state church – became Kierkegaard’s calling card to
his new Anglo-American acquaintances, the sine non qua of his thought and his point of greatest
intersection with the contemporary world.
One explanation for Kierkegaard’s sudden popularity, and the sense that he represented
modern humankind in a unique way, lies with Kierkegaard’s ability to turn anxiety at the level of
society into an existential prodding of the individual, a provocation to choice and action in the
face of complacency. If interwar Europe at all conformed to Yeats’ grim pronouncement that
“The best lack all conviction, while the worst are filled with passionate intensity,”74 then
Kierkegaard, agent provocateur against indifference, called individual Britons to the cultural
field of battle, where they could take up arms against ennui and rescue the human. In a review
essay for The Observer, Basil de Selincourt captures this sense of personal responsibility
provoked by Kierkegaard: “If there are any who feel that one of the chief dangers of our time is
its complacency, its easy goingness, they will surely be grateful to a writer who expressed with
genius the sense of an eternal spiritual crisis. Here are you and I, my reader, at this moment, at
every moment of our lives, called to act, to act responsibly.”75 Perhaps the most striking thing
about early discussions of Kierkegaard in Britain is the highly intimate tone writers take in their
reactions, as if Kierkegaard were their personal confessor rather than a philosopher separated
from them by a whole century. The doyen of Anglophone Kierkegaardianism himself, Walter
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Lowrie, admits in the preface to his translation of several of Kierkegaard’s later religious works
that “The works which are here presented supply us with all the buffeting we can bear or profit
by… I cannot read them without feeling that they are addressed principally to me.”76
The hope of many of these pioneers of Kierkegaard was to translate or interpret
Kierkegaard’s works in such a way that they did not become merely one more scrap in the
dustbin of history, but would act as catalysts for individual readers to change their lives.77
Kierkegaard’s talent for sharply drawn distinctions, his demand for readers to wrestle with the
either/or of existence, certainly evoked strong reactions from early British readers, both positive
and negative. Lowrie argues that one hallmark of Kierkegaard’s greatness is the defensiveness he
provokes in those who wish to retain their own beliefs in the face of his persuasiveness.78 The
poet Laura Riding, in an editorial letter to the Times Literary Supplement, exhibits this strong
negative reaction: “The clue to ‘insuperable subjectivity’ in Kierkegaard’s philosophy is to be
found in the insanity of egoism on which his philosophy is based… [his exalted reputation] is
proof not of spiritual greatness, only of the furious energy of his egoism… For me a forbidding
shadow of evil hangs over his work.”79 Devotion and hatred were equally likely responses to
Kierkegaard’s philosophy: the one reaction not possible for early British readers of Kierkegaard
was indifference.
Such a highly charged reception of his works would have pleased Kierkegaard, who selfconsciously embraced the role of Socratic gadfly in the Copenhagen of his day, and who, like
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Karl Marx, a fellow rebel against the cult of Hegel, wished not merely to analyze the world but
to change it.80 For Kierkegaard’s early Anglo-American adopters this reception was equally to be
expected and embraced. Figures as different as the clergyman Lowrie and the anarchist man of
letters Herbert Read exulted in a vision of Kierkegaard as a “dangerous author,” one liable to
disrupt the complacency of those who read him.81 For Melville Chaning-Pearce, meanwhile, the
stark choices presented by Kierkegaard cut to the heart of the notion of crisis itself. In an essay
discussing Barth and Brunner, two key theological descendants of Kierkegaard, Chaning-Pearce
argues for the divisive nature of crisis, a sorting function that Kierkegaard’s oppositional style
constantly aims at: “[Crisis] connotes at once the turning-point of an illness, reorientation of a
movement of thought or life, logical discrimination between conflicting ideas, moral decision in
ethics and, supremely, the demand made upon man by the ‘Word of God’ which is, in itself, both
a separating, a ‘dividing asunder’ and a judgement.”82 In a world quickly approaching a crisis of
division, then breaking itself upon that crisis, Kierkegaard clarified for his British readers the
opportunities for positive change afforded by crisis: the chance, primarily, to reshape society
without losing sight of the individual.
Beginning in the crisis of World War II, this dissertation traces the trajectory of that
Kierkegaardian sense of crisis – and its aesthetic effects on writers – forward from the war
through other crises of the midcentury. In Chapter One, I focus on two novelists of the war
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period, Aldous Huxley and Graham Greene, whose wartime novels tapped into a Kierkegaardian
sense of crisis. Reading four novels of the war period – Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza and Time Must
Have a Stop and Greene’s Brighton Rock and The End of the Affair – I examine the way these
books instantiate a Kierkegaardian critique of societal complacency in their very narrative
structures. Turning away equally from modernism’s static characterizations and the gradualism
of traditional realism, Huxley and Greene adopted a method of narrative structure inspired by
Kierkegaard’s idea of the stages of life. Beginning in the “aesthetic stage” of selfish immediacy,
Huxley’s and Greene’s protagonists face the choice of entering the “ethical stage” of universal
duty and, in Greene’s case, the “religious stage” that embraces paradox. For Huxley and Greene,
as for Kierkegaard, the transition between these stages cannot happen gradually: the next stage
must be chosen by the individual in a moment of crisis. By embracing Kierkegaardian crisis in
the narrative structure of their novels, Huxley and Greene challenged both the social and
aesthetic norms of wartime Britain, creating works that sought to bring individual readers to their
own moments of crisis and choice.
Chapter Two moves beyond the war years and into a time when the sense of crisis
pulsing through British life during the war seemed to subside. Still, drastic changes loomed for
British society in the aftermath of war – in religious life no less than other areas. As the
complacent postwar public Christianity of British society neared its end, some authors felt its
demise before that death had become common knowledge. The two Roman Catholic novelists at
the center of the chapter, Muriel Spark and Flann O’Brien, brought a Kierkegaardian sense of the
crisis of religious life before a public that largely viewed religious choice as a matter of
indifferent custom. Connecting Spark’s early novels and O’Brien’s later novels to Kierkegaard’s
idea of “Christendom,” or the practice of lackluster official Christianity, I show how Spark and
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O’Brien wrote satirical novels which blended sharp critiques of Christendom with a commitment
to authorial detachment, resulting in satires that work indirectly to provoke individual readers.
While O’Brien used near-complete detachment in his last two novels, The Hard Life and The
Dalkey Archive, to lampoon the stifling effects of Irish Catholicism in its most inert and
hidebound forms, Spark took up the position of the outsider to undermine both the state religion
of Anglicanism and her co-religionists in the Catholic Church. Her debut novel The Comforters,
and her third novel, Memento Mori, both use the concept of hidden voices to create narratives
where complacent characters are roused by mysterious intrusions, and where in turn the reader
must confront his or her own complacencies. Understanding these novels as satires invested in
the indirect communication of stable ethical and religious messages clears the air surrounding
critical reception of O’Brien’s and Spark’s novels – especially the question of whether or not
either can be categorized as postmodern– and provides a fresh perspective on the works of two
hard to classify authors.
Turning from fiction to poetry, Chapter Three unpacks the Kierkegaardian legacies of
two of the best-known literary heirs of Kierkegaard, the British poet W.H. Auden and the Welsh
poet-priest R.S. Thomas. Though many scholars have written on the very publicly acknowledged
debts of both poets to Kierkegaard, none have yet illuminated the ways in which they drew on
Kierkegaard to withstand what they saw as a crisis of poetic vocation in the midcentury. Chapter
Three ties Auden’s and Thomas’s reception of Kierkegaard closely to the philosopher’s notion of
literary vocation – both its limits and its opportunities – and sees in their respective mid-career
shifts in style an attempt to recapture a place for poetry that attempts to speak to the individual
reader. Both men found themselves confronting what they saw as the decline of poetry in the
face of mass media and the loss of an attentive audience; both tied this decline to a similar
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decline in the practice of Christianity. Their mid-to-late poetry – Auden’s following his move to
America and return to Anglicanism, and Thomas’ move from pastoral to reflective poetry –
attempted to resist declining attention to poetry and religion by working on the individual reader
to rouse his or her interest through difficulty. Though Auden and Thomas differed markedly in
their style, Auden embracing a rococo flair for excessive verbiage and Thomas opting for a
gnomic minimalism, both poets used their style as a means of making their poetry difficult,
forcing the reader to engage in sustained acts of interpretation.
While the midcentury saw a robust form of indirect literature flourish in the work of the
authors studied here, by century’s end the maieutic seemed to have crumbled in the face of a new
form of literature, what I identify as the therapeutic. In the epilog to this dissertation, I lay out the
ways in which therapeutic literature, which seeks to console readers rather than challenge them,
began to overshadow literature aimed at provoking the reader to growth. Reading David Lodge’s
novel Therapy, which engages repeatedly with Kierkegaard as a person and a thinker, I show
how a therapeutic approach to literature changes the ways in which authors and readers view
Kierkegaard, religion, and even the act of writing. Moving away from the sense of crisis which
permeated midcentury encounters with Kierkegaard, Lodge embraces a version of Kierkegaard
who consoles readers rather than challenging them. Putting Therapy in conversation with two
other contemporary utilizations of Kierkegaard – Jacques Derrida’s book The Gift of Death and
Zadie Smith’s essay “Some Notes on Attunement” – I trace possible future paths for the use of
Kierkegaard in British literature, a future that, I argue, will tend away from the maieutic and
toward the therapeutic.
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Chapter 1: Stages on Life’s Way -- Kierkegaardian Narrative in the
Novels of Aldous Huxley and Graham Greene
If I have proved nothing else with Either-Or at least I have proved that a work can be
written in Danish literature without the warm embraces of sympathy, without the
incitement of expectation, that one can work against the current, that one can be
industrious without showing it, that one can collect one’s thoughts in silence while almost
every duffer of a student considers one an idler. Though the book itself were meaningless
its genesis would be the neatest epigram I have composed on a garrulous philosophic age
– 1842 entry in Kierkegaard’s journal1

While literary scholars have long studied the impact of the Great War on British literature
of the 1920s and 30s, in recent years interest has increased in what role a sense of foreboding
about a looming future war played in the literary production of the period.2 Paul K. Saint-Amour
has convincingly argued for a revised understanding of high modernist novels such as Ulysses
and Parade’s End in light of what he sees as a proleptic sensing of future war contained within
them.3 This sense of crisis only increased in the 1930s, as future war transformed from vague
notion to impending reality.4 As this sense of crisis spread throughout Britain, it extended its
reach from the concerns of international diplomacy to the domestic sphere, creating an
atmosphere of dread, what Richard Overy calls “the morbid age”.5
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Utilizing Mary A. Favret’s theorization of wartime as more than a contained period, as
rather a zone of affect that characterizes modernity in general, this chapter explores how the
ideas of Kierkegaard provided a way of navigating the crisis of wartime for authors caught in its
grip.6 At the same time, I resist too much historical condensation, arguing that the buildup to
World War II filled authors with a different sense of crisis than the aftermath of the Great War.
Indeed, on my reading, the rejection of modernist aesthetics by authors following in the wake of
high modernism can be explained in part by their sense that the quest for the self-contained,
irresolvably ambiguous literature prized by many modernist authors – bound up with the
rejection of traditional normative ethics – could not withstand the pressures of the rising tide of
war. Reading a cluster of novels by Aldous Huxley and Graham Greene from the period
stretching from the Spanish Civil War to the immediate post-war period (1936 to 1951), I show
how Kierkegaard’s concept of the stages of life, and the crisis of transition between them,
animates the narrative structure of these novels, providing a sense of form that avoids both the
ethical refusal of the modernist novel and the ethical optimism of Victorian and Edwardian
realism. These are novels bound up in crisis that nevertheless see ethical and religious growth as
potential outcomes of that crisis, yet this hope for change remains fraught with the possibility of
failure. In utilizing crisis-inflected narrative forms, Huxley and Greene take up Kierkegaard’s
challenge of creating maieutic literature: novels that, like a midwife, push the reader towards a
crisis of his or her own, a crisis that can only be navigated via an act of the will.
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Huxley, Greene, and Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic, the Ethical, the Religious
One should be so highly developed aesthetically that one can appreciate ethical problems
aesthetically, or it’s a poor look out for ethics… How many who understand the problem
of ethics feel the dread and trembling? – 1843 entry in Kierkegaard’s journal7
In their life and work, Aldous Huxley and Graham Greene reverberated with the tremors
of crisis throughout the 1930s and 40s. Though different in many ways – one a wavering
Catholic, the other a mystical agnostic; one committed to England’s war cause, however
ambivalently, the other an absolute pacifist; one a writer of thrillers, the other a purveyor of
satires – Greene and Huxley both navigated the various crises of the interwar and war periods,
illustrating in their novels the sense of catastrophe that drew so many to Kierkegaard’s work.
Both men read and admired Kierkegaard, but beyond this direct connection participated in the
wider cultural discourse surrounding his philosophy. Taken together, they provide a valuable
illustration of Kierkegaard’s impact on the various crises of the 1930s and 40s – not just the
political, but the humanistic, religious, and aesthetic crises of the day.8
Having both found success in the preceding decade – Huxley as the premier satirist of the
Bloomsbury set, Greene as a writer of tough but thoughtful thrillers – the two men found
themselves, by the middle of the 1930s, experiencing a series of personal and professional
changes, transformations pitched in the key of crisis.9 Ironically, these upheavals – Huxley’s
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adoption of a mystical pacifism, Greene’s emotional and literary embrace of Catholicism – have
often served to isolate the two authors from the bigger sense of crisis fomenting in Britain during
the decade. Their chosen paths, though eccentric by the standards of the day (and perhaps
distasteful to later critics), were active responses to the national crisis catalyzed by the
encroachment of war, not retreats from the challenges of international instability. Far from
quietist endeavors to remain undisturbed by wider society, Huxley’s pacifism and Greene’s
Catholicism constituted attempts to wrestle with both the ascendancy of obvious evil abroad and
the more subtle, but perhaps equally dangerous, deadening complacency of their domestic British
society. Marina MacKay has identified a definite ambiguity among late modernists regarding the
waging of World War II; wary of the encroaching powers of the British state, writers like Eliot
and Woolf nevertheless made the odious compromise of supporting the war effort in the face of
German aggression.10 Though she does not use this language, MacKay in fact identifies
something of an ethical turn in late modernism, a realization that definite choices must be made
in life and worked through in literature.11 Greene and Huxley anticipated this turn among the late
modernists, reviving the ethical thrust of their fiction several years before the war, but neither
accepted the reluctant compromise of Woolf or Eliot. They differed also from the politically
engaged young poets of the Auden circle, for whom mass politics must be opposed by mass
politics. Instead, both sought to preserve the privileged place of the individual while engaging
society, seeing in the single subject a source for the reform or rebuke of society; in this, they
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found a fellow traveler in Kierkegaard, defender of the individual against the modern push
toward mass culture.
The ethical concerns of Huxley and Greene spilled over into worries about aesthetic
value as well. For both men, their rejection of modernism contained conjoined ethical and
aesthetic critiques of the novelistic aims of writers like Forster and Woolf, aims they portrayed as
lacking something essential – what they described as a thinness or emptiness.12 In a 1930 letter to
Robert Nichols, Huxley boldly contrasts Woolf’s To the Lighthouse with Greene’s first novel,
The Man Within, and finds Woolf wanting in comparison: “It’s the difference between something
full and something empty; between a writer who has a close physical contact with reality and one
who is a thousand miles away and only has a telescope to look, remotely, at the world.”13 While
that particular literary judgement seems eccentric in retrospect, it captures something of
Huxley’s growing dissatisfaction with modernist interiority, which for him led to a distancing of
the author and reader from reality. Greene launches a similar critique in his 1945 essay in praise
of François Mauriac, novelist of the French Catholic literary revival.14 Tracing the decline of the
English novel to the death of Henry James, Greene maintains that “With the death of James the
religious sense was lost to the English novel, and with the religious sense went the sense of the
importance of the human act. It was as if the world of fiction had lost a dimension: the characters
of such distinguished writers as Mrs Virginia Woolf and Mr E.M. Forster wandered like
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cardboard symbols through a world that was paper-thin.”15 For both men, then, the turn to
interiority ironically leads to a loss of the subject – with no outer world, no possibility of
meaningful moral choice, the subject of the modernist novel disappears into unreality. Fair or
not, this critique of interiority drives the reactions of both authors to modernism, leading them to
seek other means of reconciling life and art.16
Critics have long recognized the disconnect between modernist writers and the novelists
who came of age in the 1930s. But a standard account like Michael Gorra’s, that emphasizes the
fragmentary nature of these later novels, and argues that the authors avoided ideas of the soul
and interiority entirely until the pressures of World War II forced them to reconsider, fails to
recognize the sustained interest in subjectivity in novelists like Huxley and Greene.17 Despite the
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apparent paradox that a philosopher best known for his defense of subjectivity should fuel the
critics of interiority in the novel, I argue that Kierkegaard’s philosophy provided an important
way out for Greene and Huxley as they wrestled with the dual crises of humanism and the novel.
In particular, Kierkegaard’s notion of the stages of life – the aesthetic, the ethical, and the
religious – and the possibility of passing from one stage to another, gave them a means to
critique what they saw as the emptiness of their contemporaries without artificially resolving the
inner tensions of their work. What emerges thematically and, ultimately, narratively in the work
of Huxley and Greene in this period is a Kierkegaardian dialectic that both provides for and
complicates the development of the individual subject.
While it is true that Kierkegaard relentlessly stresses the primacy of the individual, his
vision of inwardness and subjectivity meshes poorly with the modernist sense of aesthetic
interiority. Kierkegaard in fact outlines more than one type of interiority, an aesthetic interiority
and the superior interiority of the religious – and for him only religious inwardness will do. This
distinction sets him in stark contrast to the philosophy of Nietzsche, who became perhaps the
signal philosopher of British modernism, and whose emphasis on a mysterious, almost mystical
sense of the individual appealed to authors like D.H. Lawrence and Woolf.18 For the modernists
following Nietzsche, inwardness was always aesthetic, and as a result static and mysterious.19
According to Kierkegaard, however, true inwardness must be developed in the individual, and
this premise suggests different stages of human life. In his work, Kierkegaard labels these stages,
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or spheres, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.20 The aesthetic stage – the beginning
stage, and the one most people remain in throughout their lives – features the inwardness of
immediacy, a sensuality driven by egoism, and a sense of disconnect from others. It is this
inwardness that Huxley and Greene detect in their modernist forbearers. The ethical stage moves
outward, subsuming inner life within the dictates of the universal, and stressing a sense of duty.
Finally, the religious stage involves a reclaiming of inwardness through embrace of paradox and
the absurd; the religious person becomes a stumbling block to those who live life by the external
light of the ethical or the inner glow of the aesthetic.
Unlike other divisions of life, however, such as Shakespeare’s seven ages of man, no
inevitable movement between the three spheres exists, and Kierkegaard does not envision an
organic development or progression from one to the other. Instead, the spheres are paradoxically
marked by both simultaneity and rupture: a person might incorporate elements of multiple
spheres at once, though one will dominate; yet the movement from one to another comes not
through the gradual building of habits or character, but in a momentous leap taken in “the
instant”. Walter Lowrie lays out these distinctions very clearly in his introduction to Stages on
Life’s Way, one of Kierkegaard’s works that deals with the stages in detail, and a similar sense of
Kierkegaard’s stages permeates early scholarship in English.21 Nearly every early critical work
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on Kierkegaard discusses the stages, regarding them as a key contribution of Kierkegaard’s
thought.22 As he emerged in Anglo-American intellectual discourse, then, Kierkegaard became
associated closely with this idea of the stages of existence, as well as two related concepts: the
instant and the leap. The instant, for Kierkegaard, constitutes a slice of eternity intersecting the
temporal, and is the moment when the individual freely chooses to move between stages – or
remain where they are. The leap is that action taken whereby the individual moves from one
stage to another, especially between the ethical and the religious stage, and does so through an
act of will, rather than reasoned contemplation. To complicate matters, however, neither the leap
nor the instant exists as a single point of time. Rather, each presents to the religious individual a
continuous series of choices; every moment the religious individual must choose to remain in
faith.23 Indeed, the leap, as figured in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, is not the singular leap
across a chasm, but rather the dancer’s repeated leap into the air, from which the dancer lands
again without wavering. Faith, then, for Kierkegaard, is regarded as a “task for a lifetime,” not a
single choice followed by the inertia of belief.24

require, for they represent the existential possibilities which lie between immediacy and spirit. The logical
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Without the instantaneous leap, humans cannot, in Kierkegaard’s view, become truly
individual, something T.H. Croxall noticed in an early essay interpreting Kierkegaard for the
British public.25 This leap, though sometimes subject to distortion, became embedded in the
public’s conception of Kierkegaard, inspiring, among other artifacts, W.H. Auden’s 1940 poem
“Leap Before You Look.”26 The stages, the instant, and the leap were all prevalent enough in the
cultural discourse of the time to be available to Huxley and Greene, regardless of how much – or
how carefully – they read Kierkegaard’s actual words. And it was the powerful broad strokes of
Kierkegaard’s way of thinking, rather than the minute details, that mattered most to the two
authors as they pursued their work of this period. Both men, I argue, were indebted to
Kierkegaard’s conception of ruptured personal development, seeing in it a way out of the
impasses of contemporary malaise and modernist aesthetics.27 While they both resisted what they
saw as the thin interiority of writers such as Woolf, they also knew they could not return to the
tenets of realism. Instead, Kierkegaard provided a way forward by pointing to the power of
dialectic as a novelistic tool. Avoiding both the natural progression of realism and the pessimistic

faith” is deceptive, because despite an outer appearance of tranquility, “Every moment of his life he purchases his
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anti-climax of modernism, Huxley and Greene utilized Kierkegaardian dialectics to move their
characters through stages of life; these are narratives rife with crisis, but crisis that provides a
way out through deliberate choice.
The characters in their novels of this period instantiate – like Kierkegaard’s own fictional
authors – the different stages of life. Both Huxley and Greene create characters who embody the
selfish complacency of the aesthetic stage and the dutiful steadiness of the ethical stage; Greene
also provides several characters who embrace the paradox of the religious stage. In building a
sense of the three stages of life into the narrative structure of their novels, Huxley and Greene
avoid the modernist preference for circumscribed character development and impressionistic
portraiture; not for them the novel of the single day, a la Ulysses or Mrs. Dalloway. Their
characters can and do change, become better, even, through deliberate choice. At the same time,
Huxley and Greene avoid the granular gradualism of the realist novel. In a sense, they agree with
modernist critiques of the falsity of realism, most famously put forth in Woolf’s essay “Mr.
Bennett and Mrs. Brown”. To the extent that these characters are able to move from one stage of
life to another, they do so in single “instants” of crisis, moments where reality slows down and
dilates, rather than undergoing a natural development over a long period. Huxley and Greene
thus reject both sides of Woolf’s assessment that “Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically
arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning
of consciousness to the end.”28 The symmetrical progression of realist narrative will not do, but
neither will the hazy halo of modernist consciousness.
Their embrace of crisis narrative suggests another way in which Huxley and Greene
reject both realist and modernist aesthetics regarding the aim of literature itself. In her essay
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“Character and Fiction” Woolf criticizes the Edwardian novelists for producing works that do
not exist as self-contained aesthetic objects, books that require “That the reader should finish
them, actively and practically, for himself” – in Woolf’s view, by engaging in some act of social
reform.29 In contrast, Woolf praises Sterne and Austen as creators of self-contained works, and
aims to create fiction of this kind. As we shall see, the novels of Greene and Huxley reject this
view, where the reader merely admires a polished object d’art, instead crafting texts where the
reader must become an active participant. While on occasion Huxley’s books especially seems to
conform to Woolf’s description of the Edwardian novel as prompting direct social action, on the
whole the novels of these two authors during this period elicit a response of a different kind: an
intense personal wrestling with ethical ideas. Whereas Woolf sees aesthetic self-sufficiency as a
means for novels to avoid provoking social action, Greene and Huxley employ a deliberate
insufficiency in their novels to elicit from readers not the comparatively easy action of “join[ing]
a society or, more desperately, [writing] a cheque,”30 but the more difficult task of selfexamination.
In arguing for a Kierkegaardian understanding of the work of Huxley and Greene in this
period, I push back against the merely biographical readings of these novelists that would see
their work during this decade as the straightforward expression of eccentric personal interests –
Huxley’s mystical pacifism or Greene’s burgeoning Catholicism – and instead see their novels
expressing a broader view that works through the aesthetics of crisis. No less than the political
poets of the Auden circle, or the late work of Eliot and Woolf, Huxley and Greene responded in
their fiction of the 30s and 40s to the pressures of wartime imminent and wartime immanent.
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That they did so in the language of Kierkegaard – with instants of crisis provoking their
characters to leap between stages – suggests the deep receptiveness of British culture at this
moment to a thinker who identified the crisis conditions of modernity with a gimlet eye, yet did
not despair of escaping crisis, but found in crisis time hope for growth at the level of the
individual.
Wartime Imminent: Huxley and Greene in the late 1930s
When the truth conquers with the help of 10,000 yelling men – even supposing that that
which is victorious is a truth: with the form and manner of the victory a far greater
untruth is victorious – 1848 entry in Kierkegaard’s journal31

In their novels that immediately precede World War II, both Huxley and Greene exhibit a
keen awareness of the feeling of wartime, despite a lack of real-world conflict. Both, in fact, link
this wartime feeling to a struggle within British society for a new way forward. Unsatisfied with
the easy complacency of popular culture, and the exquisite despair of writers like Woolf, Greene
and Huxley seek to articulate a vision of society and literature that rejects both the myopic
pleasures of the masses and the cultivated nihilism of the Bloomsbury set. While Greene seems
content, in his 1938 novel Brighton Rock, to etch with careful detail the picture of an age trapped
by its own dread and despair, Huxley’s 1936 novel Eyeless in Gaza holds on to the hope that
individuals might halt society’s plunge toward destruction. Both novels engage in a
Kierkegaardian attempt to turn the reader’s attention away from externals and toward internal
ethical struggle, using their characters as a mirror for the complacency of British society in the
1930s.
To this ethical end, both novels utilize narrative techniques that respond to but deviate
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from the tenets of both realism and modernism. In mixing realist narrative progression with the
modernist dilation of individual moments, Huxley and Greene craft narrative structures capable
of showing the reader how characters might, in the “instant” that marks the intersection of linear
and non-linear time, make the leap between stages of life. Brighton Rock places its realist and
dilated strands in dialectic juxtaposition with each other, in the process revealing the irony that
realism contains some of the formlessness of modernist technique, while moments of dilation
supply their own accelerating progression toward an end. Huxley, meanwhile, utilizes anachrony
in Eyeless in Gaza to undermine what he sees as the purposeless parataxis of writers like Woolf;
the protagonist of the book moves from understanding his life as a series of random moments to
grasping the ethical shape, or lack thereof, of his past. By emphasizing crisis at the level of
narrative structure, Huxley and Greene avoid direct, didactic communication about ethics or
faith, crafting instead fiction that prompts the reader to consider ethical or religious change
indirectly.
What distinguishes Eyeless in Gaza and Brighton Rock from the novels Greene and
Huxley wrote in the midst and aftermath of World War II – novels that equally engage with the
intellectual inheritance of Kierkegaard – is the sense these earlier novels capture of hovering at
the edge of crisis. While the later books capture the feeling of wartime thrust upon their
characters, for the protagonists of these 30s novels war remains only a possibility, however close
and real. This sense of possibility heightens the ethical stakes of the books. For Huxley, pacifism
in Eyeless in Gaza represents a distinct path for avoiding war; though he thinks change must
begin at the level of the individual, he hopes that individuals might inspire a rising tide of peace
through the example they set of ethical choice. Brighton Rock eschews optimism in favor of
close observation, sketching a picture of pre-war Britain that emphasizes the inability of
46

individuals to escape their moral torpor. These books are, as Kierkegaard once described his own
life and work, stormy-petrels that gather as the clouds of international crisis reach critical mass;32
the anxiety found in them will reach its breaking point in the war, pouring forth in the novels of
the war period.
Going too Far: Brighton Rock
“One sometimes chances upon novels in which certain characters represent opposing
views of life. It usually ends by one of them convincing the other. Instead of these views
being allowed to speak for themselves, the reader is enriched by being told the historical
result, that one has convinced the other. I regard it as fortunate that these papers contain
no such information” – Victor Eremita, Either/Or33

Greene’s connection to Kierkegaard during the pre-war and wartime years is somewhat
hard to trace. Though in later life Greene frequently references his admiration for Kierkegaard, it
is unclear at what stage he actually read the philosopher’s works.34 Indeed, in a 1949 interview,
he dismisses any direct influence from Kierkegaard, among others, saying that any confluence of
his work with Kierkegaard’s came about only as a result of the charged atmosphere of wartime
Britain.35 There are reasons to doubt the veracity of this statement,36 but again, Greene’s direct
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interactions with Kierkegaard in this period matter less than the ways in which Greene expresses
a sense of crisis, and of movements through the stages of life, that illustrate the broader
resonance of Kierkegaard’s work in this period, as well as demonstrate the existing affinities
between his fiction and Kierkegaard’s philosophy, affinities that drew him more explicitly to
Kierkegaard later in life. Other critics have noticed the shared interests and sympathies of
Kierkegaard and Greene, but little work has been done to connect this overlap with the broader
sense of cultural crisis rippling through pre-war and wartime Britain.37 Greene’s 1938 novel
Brighton Rock captures the structure of feeling of perpetual wartime crisis, and portrays a stark
contrast between the indifference afflicting society and the potential for individuals to escape
through deliberate choice. In doing so, the book provides an insightful characterization of life
lived in Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage of sensual immediacy, while hinting at the superiority of
the religious embrace of the absurd.
Brighton Rock has proved to be one of Greene’s most enduring, and most controversial,
novels.38 Part of the book’s success lies in the way it bridges Greene’s generic interest in thrillers
with the philosophical ruminations of his more serious works. The book follows Pinkie, a young
gang leader in Brighton responsible for the murder of Hale, a journalist, during a turf war with
another gang. Ida, a woman who met Hale just before his death, becomes obsessed with hunting
down his killer, and gradually narrows in on Pinkie, simultaneously trying to break Pinkie’s spell
over Rose, the innocent young waitress whom Pinkie marries to cover his tracks. Greene toggles
37
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between Ida’s quest for justice and the battle within Pinkie’s own soul, creating the most
complete marriage between inner and outer conflict of his career. This narrative dialectic exposes
the inadequacy of both characters, satirizing Ida’s concern with externalities while
simultaneously critiquing Pinkie’s destructive selfishness. In fact, though opposed in many ways,
Pinkie and Ida are united in their limited vision of life; they both remain in the immediacy of
Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage, while expressing its different sides – Ida the sensuous immediacy
of the un-self-aware aesthetic, Pinkie the despairing boredom of the self-aware.
A clearer understanding of the very Kierkegaardian dialectic at play between Ida and
Pinkie helps clarify longstanding critical ambivalences regarding the novel’s stance toward its
characters. Brighton Rock has proved controversial for its depiction of Pinkie, who seemingly
exists in a plane beyond that of other characters by virtue of his attachment to Catholicism. This
has sometimes been put forward as evidence of Greene’s partisanship, most famously by George
Orwell.39 The contrast between Pinkie, who negatively illustrates the power of Catholicism
through his rejection of it, and Ida, an incarnation of bourgeois values, does suggest that Greene
sees a stark bifurcation between the world and the church, but this divide does not fall as neatly
as critics like Orwell suggest.40 Put another way, the main difference between Pinkie and Ida is
not so much their particular religious beliefs as their attitude toward crisis. Pinkie lives his whole
life in crisis but remains unable to make the decisive change that would pull him out, while Ida
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floats through life in a complacent haze, until the crisis of Hale’s death motivates her to action. It
is not so much that Pinkie’s attitude to life is superior to Ida’s as it is more expressive of
contemporary pressures. Ida’s sense of uprightness, her chumminess, even her languidly
hypocritical dalliances with married men, seem almost Victorian next to the raw nervous energy
of Pinkie, who recoils in disgust at sexual intercourse while dispensing violence and cruelty with
a manic glee. Here the age gap matters: the warm, comfortable world of middle-aged Ida appears
unreal next to the hardness of life experienced by Pinkie and his rising cohort.
At the same time, Pinkie never comes across as superior to Ida. Here the biographical
reading of Greene’s fiction proves especially misleading: it is a mistake to assume that, simply
because Pinkie is a lapsed Catholic, Greene sets him out as an exemplar of any sort. Rather,
Pinkie is an instantiation of a worldview, of a structure of feeling, one Brighton Rock examines
without endorsing. He is, in fact, an analogue to A, the Aesthete who writes part one of
Kierkegaard’s Either/Or – a character able to critique the shortcomings of his culture without
being able to escape them.41 Rather than advocating for the superiority of evil Catholics over
virtuous pagans, Brighton Rock opposes two characters with irreconcilable worldviews – each
indecipherable to the other – while revealing the futility of both. In an act of narrative sleight-ofhand, Brighton Rock’s final chapter exposes the responses of both Pinkie and Ida to life in a
fallen world as inadequate, instead suggesting the religious embrace of absurdity as a way out of
the inertia of the aesthetic. This narrative twist aligns the structure of Greene’s novel with
Either/Or, where the dialectic between the aesthetic and the ethical gets undermined at book’s
close by a sermon bearing the title “The Edifying in the Thought that against God We Are
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Always in the Wrong”. Though it is highly unlikely Greene had encountered Either/Or at the
time of writing Brighton Rock,42 his novel’s affinity for the contours of that work points to
Greene’s sensitivity to the vibrations of crisis – a crisis which, as we have seen, Kierkegaard
helped give a vocabulary to in the build up to World War II.
Greene’s Kierkegaardian sympathies emerge clearly in Brighton Rock through the
novel’s contrast between the individual and mass society. At the book’s beginning, Hale watches
as a crowd of tourists “Uncoil[s] endlessly past him, like a twisted piece of wire.”43 For Hale the
crowd provides cover, the ability to disappear as an individual, an asset as he attempts to evade
Pinkie and his henchmen; yet the current of the book as a whole strains against the crowd as an
enervating force.44 Hale represents the modern constituent of mass society, an almost featureless
cipher floating from town to town without attachment in his role as a clue planter for a
newspaper contest. His brief connection with Ida matches like with like, as she self-describes as
a “Woman of the people” who cries at the movies and feels moved by the very word tragedy.45
The various men Ida entertains throughout the book share Hale’s nonentity, their lack of genuine
passion marking them as interchangeable faces in the crowd. Ida herself exists in a perpetual
middle, not experiencing highs or lows, but only the small comforts of “The soft gluey mouth
affixed in taxis, the warm handclasp in cinemas, the only reward there was,” pleasures to which
she adds the act of vengeance, which she categorizes as “fun”.46 A little bit of fun: this is the best
Ida hopes for in life – never doing anything too bad, never experiencing anything too grand. Ida
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sounds a great deal like the bourgeois citizens A attacks in Either/Or, bemoaning the lack of
willingness for anyone to commit a great sin or take a big risk.47 Though Ida is the most fully
sketched example of this lack of passion in Brighton Rock, the same malaise afflicts many of the
characters. As one of Pinkie’s associates sums up, “The world’s all right if you don’t go too
far.”48 These characters, Ida especially, resemble protagonists of modernist literature such as
Leopold Bloom and Clarissa Dalloway. They live life day to day, with no inkling of any bigger
stakes. In the book’s attack on Ida’s lackadaisical approach to life, Greene unites an ethical and
aesthetic critique: Ida’s lack of ethical vision marks her as a caricature of the “flat characters”
Greene derides in the work of Woolf and Forster.
If Ida resembles the bourgeois materialists derided by A for having thoughts that are
“Thin and flimsy… too paltry to be sinful,”49 then Pinkie behaves suspiciously like A himself,
able to detect the malaise around him but unable to escape from it. Pinkie inherits from his
religion a sense of perpetual crisis, a world in which heaven and hell (or at least hell), good and
evil have the weight of reality. Critics like Orwell have chafed at this depiction of Catholicism as
somehow more alive than “virtuous paganism,” but given the book’s relative disinterest in
theological minutiae, Greene’s sketch focuses not so much on Catholicism per se as on the
phenomenological experience of crisis that it allows.50 While attempts to dismiss the Catholic
elements of Greene’s fiction as mere plot devices go too far, the raking through of his Catholic
novels for detailed theological material misses the main thrust of Catholicism’s presence in the
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novels, as an occasion for crisis, and the forcing of choices upon characters.51 Hence the
opposition Brighton Rock sets up between right and wrong (embodied by Ida) and good and evil
(Pinkie and Rose).52 What critics like Orwell miss in the book’s depiction of Pinkie is that
Brighton Rock does not elevate Pinkie for choosing evil, but rather for his recognition of his own
impossible situation. Pinkie, in choosing despair,53 awakens to the reality of contemporary life,
which demands paradoxical choices at every turn. While characters like Ida float along with the
deadening currents of modern mass society, Pinkie recognizes the reality of crisis in the midst of
the “morbid age”; this is why Rose describes Ida as “ignorant” in her unrecognition of spiritual
realities, and the book’s narration compares Ida to “The typical Englishwoman abroad,”
uncomprehending as she bumps up against the real material of life.54
The novel’s boldest upending of convention, then, involves its suggestion that belief in
supernatural ethics and eternal punishment, far from idealism, might in fact be the most realistic
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viewpoint of all, in light of the crisis-plagued reality of life in the interwar period. The gang wars
of Brighton – with Colleoni’s rival gang slowly crowding out Pinkie’s for operational
lebensraum – microcosmically portray the turmoil of British and international uncertainty, a
turmoil from which, as the war would soon demonstrate, it proves difficult to escape unscathed.
Pinkie does not transform into a hero; he makes the choice available to him, hampered as he is
by his own lack of imagination, and his sinking into despair, but makes it with open eyes.55 His
constant refrain to himself, “Between the stirrup and the ground,” drives home the choice
available at any moment: even in the “instant” before death he might reject evil and choose the
good, but he cannot bring himself to do so. To use Kierkegaardian language, Pinkie is “better
off” than Ida insofar as he recognizes his own continually bubbling crisis, and can therefore – up
to his death, or perhaps even beyond – make a choice to become a self, to leap in the instant
beyond immediacy. Significantly, however, he never makes this leap over the course of the
novel. Instead, he repeatedly bumps up against small moments that afford him the opportunity to
leap, but remains imprisoned by his own indifference. Little bursts of conscience that form
moments of narrative crisis impede on Pinkie throughout the book, often prompted by the
presence of music. Sitting in a movie theater, he experiences one of these crisis points:
Suddenly, inexplicably, the Boy began to weep. He shut his eyes to hold in his tears, but
the music went on – it was like a vision of release to an imprisoned man. He felt
constriction and saw – hopelessly out of reach – a limitless freedom: no fear, no hatred,
no envy. It was as if he were dead and were remembering the effect of a good confession,
the words of absolution: but being dead it was a memory only – he couldn’t experience
contrition – the ribs of his body were like steel bands which held him down to eternal
unrepentance” (196)
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Like Moses glimpsing Canaan, Pinkie can see a life for himself freed of fear, hatred, and envy, a
life removed from the despair of the aesthetic, but it remains “hopelessly out of reach,” because
he himself cannot dare to hope in the absurd. Even at book’s end, as he prepares to trick Rose
into committing suicide, he feels the “prowling presence of pity” that might pull him back from
despair, but he cannot bring himself to step back from the edge.56 In these and other moments of
crisis Pinkie hangs suspended, between the stirrup and the ground, and the reader can see, as in
slow motion, the agonizing unrealized possibilities of choice. It is this despair in the face of
possibility that links Pinkie most closely to A, that implicates him as a character enmeshed in the
snares of aesthetic inwardness.57
Ida, by contrast, recognizes no such crisis for herself, and remains anaesthetized by her
sensuous immediacy.58 At the level of form, Greene enacts the struggle between despair and
complacency by juxtaposing Ida’s progress in her investigation of externals (proving Pinkie’s
guilt) with Pinkie’s gradually more frantic internal state, forming each into a different narrative
shape. While Ida’s investigation undergoes the rational progression of realism, Pinkie’s internal
battles emerge as a series of crisis moments, dilated “instants” where he can always choose the
good, but never does. But Greene adds a narrative twist through the shape of these competing
plots. While Pinkie’s internal struggle moves forward at breakneck speed, propelled by his inner
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turmoil, Ida’s investigation lacks form. She spends her days “entertaining” various random men,
drinking in pubs, and stumbles on most of her important clues by chance, overhearing snippets of
conversation or bumping into key witnesses. After she has saved Rose’s life and ended Pinkie’s
by alerting the police, Ida returns to her normal life, apparently unchanged. In her last chapter
she consults a Ouija board about her ex-husband, an appropriate analog to her treatment of the
investigation. The afterlife, like a murder case, matters to her only as an item of entertainment, to
be woven into the fabric of daily life without disturbing the other threads. Because of the
lackadaisical narrative approach to Ida’s investigations, the reader’s attention gets diverted
constantly away from the book’s genre elements, the external mystery, and toward the more
narratively gripping inner struggles of the murderer. In the end Brighton Rock suggests that
Hale’s murder matters less as a procedural matter, a whodunit, than as a stage for the individual’s
struggle to realize ethical choice, a howdoit.59
If the bulk of the book’s narrative presents two unsavory options for approaching life,
and refuses to choose between them, the final chapter sneakily undercuts this unresolved
dialectic by providing a third option, a Kierkegaardian embrace of religious absurdity embodied
in Rose’s continued belief in Pinkie’s love.60 Meeting with a priest following Pinkie’s death,
Rose seeks not absolution – she refuses to ask forgiveness for her sins, preferring to join Pinkie
in damnation – but guidance. Her priest presents to her the case of the French poet Charles

59

In a 1949 interview, Greene asserts that the modern interest in detective type stories (he prefers the term thrillers)
lies not in “Who the criminal is, but rather to what state of abandon a man hunted down for a crime can be reduced”
(Conversations with Graham Greene, 25).
60
A, bemoaning his empty existence, wonders if anything might pull him out of despair: “Is there anything that
could divert me? Aye, if I might behold a constancy that could withstand every trial, an enthusiasm that endured
everything, a faith that could remove mountains, a thought that could unite the finite and the infinite. But my soul’s
poisonous doubt is all-consuming. My soul is like the dead sea, over which no bird can fly; when it has flown
midway then it sinks down to death and destruction” (Either/Or, 30). Pinkie experiences a similar reaction to Rose
throughout the book, a combination of fascination at and desire of her faith in him, and a repulsion at her simplicity
driven by his own “poisonous doubt”.

56

Péguy, who refused the sacraments but was considered by some a saint, since he wished to suffer
for the sins of others; the priest then admonishes her to remember that she cannot comprehend
the “Appalling… strangeness of the mercy of God.”61 Rose, maintaining hope for Pinkie’s
eternal soul even after his death in a state of mortal sin, goes home to listen to his voice on a
phonograph record, believing Pinkie to have testified to his love for her with a tender message.
The reader, however, knows that earlier in the novel, when Rose asks Pinkie to make this
recording, he instead records himself cursing her and denying his love; she walks home, then, to
(according to the novel’s closing line) “The greatest horror of all.”62
Rose, however, embraces the absurd, both in her devoted love to a man who clearly
despises her, and her cherished hope that Pinkie might be saved from damnation, even beyond
the grave. Recognition of this embrace gives a radically different meaning to the book’s ending,
which it is tempting to dismiss as one last cruel joke of fate. A surface reading of this ending
assumes that Rose will hear the recording and be crushed, but given her response throughout the
novel to Pinkie’s abuse, it makes more sense to believe that her faith in Pinkie will continue even
after she hears the message – she is able to make the leap of faith necessary to maintain
equilibrium, even in the face of great horror.63 The choice to end here shows Brighton Rock’s
subtle narrative structure, which weaves back and forth between Pinkie’s despair and Ida’s
complacency, only to dismiss them both with a brief but powerful coda. Like the closing sermon
of Either/Or, which cuts through the bluster of A’s aesthetic indifference as well as the pomp of
B’s ethical musings, Rose’s resolution of the dialectic is no Hegelian synthesis, no adopting of a
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middle ground; neither is it the modernist dissolve into irresolution. Rather, she continues to
make the jump into the absurd within herself, remaining a cipher to those around her, but an
exemplar to those who can detect her leaps of faith. The subtlety of this depiction places the onus
of interpretation on the reader, who must embrace the absurd just as Rose does, trusting in the
inner faith of the character instead of the external signs that point toward despair.
Elements of Conversion: Eyeless in Gaza
As for the relationship of the subject to the truth when he comes to know it, the
assumption is that if only the truth is brought to light, its appropriation is a relatively
unimportant matter, something which follows as a matter of course. And in any case,
what happens to the individual is in the last analysis a matter of indifference. Herein lies
the lofty equanimity of the scholar, and the comic thoughtlessness of his parrot-like echo
– Johannes Climacus, Concluding Unscientific Postscript64

If Brighton Rock illustrates the difficulty of escaping Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage,
especially in the context of an anxious modernity, then Huxley’s pre-war novel Eyeless in Gaza
offers a hope that the leap to the ethical remains possible.65 Given Huxley’s newfound interest in
moral development in the wake of his discovery of Kierkegaard and embrace of pacifism, it’s
unsurprising that Eyeless in Gaza belongs, broadly speaking, to the category of the
bildungsroman. Anthony Beavis, protagonist of Eyeless in Gaza, undergoes maturation, moving
from aesthetic existence into the realm of the ethical. This process, however, does not progress
naturally along with age or seem inevitable given Anthony’s circumstances. He must make a
willed choice to embrace change and does so only after undergoing personal crises. Even as
64
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Huxley continues the modernist experimentation with the form of the bildungsroman, he pushes
his book away from the modernist preoccupation with the aesthetic, as seen in the most famous
modernist bildungsroman, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.66 As he does so, he also
breaks with the form of his earlier novels. Point Counter Point, the summative novel of Huxley’s
early career, employs a dialog-driven dialectic that presents the radically different views of life
held by its large cast of characters, most of whom have been held to be modeled on real life
correspondents. Huxley’s own fictional counterpart, the novelist Philip Quarles, espouses a
cynical view of human nature as he toils away at his latest novel of ideas. Yet not even Quarles
has the final word; the book’s various voices struggle against each other without reaching
resolution, creating for the reader a sense of the irreducible polyphony of modern ideas.67 As
Daniel Aureliano Newman has shown, however, Point Counter Point’s polyphony gives way, in
Eyeless in Gaza, to anachrony as the guiding formal principle.68 Here past and present converge
to present a summative view of human character as it writhes toward development. The child, for
Huxley, is not so much the father of the man as the raw material out of which he must carve
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himself.69 And while the polyphony of Point Counter Point allows the cynic to evade ethical
responsibility by pointing to the irresolvable ambiguities of modern thought, Eyeless in Gaza’s
turn to anachrony forces both its protagonist and its reader to confront the ethical mistakes in
their past in order to leap into a more ethical future.
At the same time, under the influence of Kierkegaard, Huxley works to cover his own
tracks, not allowing a straightforward, didactic interpretation of the book. Jerry Wasserman has
made a convincing case for Either/Or’s direct influence on Eyeless in Gaza. He presents as
evidence links between the two texts, noting that the protagonist’s name, Anthony Beavis, gets
shortened throughout the text to A.B. (the two fictional authors of Either/Or); that Anthony’s
diary begins one century to the day after the “Diary of the Seducer” in Either/Or; and that the
chapters of Eyeless in Gaza, ordered as if shuffled out from a pack of cards, resemble in this the
papers of A, which Victor Eremita claims he has let chance determine the order of.70 What is
most interesting in Wassmeran’s argument is not the particular details, but his claim that this link
should reorient the critical view towards Huxley’s presentation of his pacifist views in the text.
In Wasserman’s account, Huxley works to ironize his own sincere beliefs, presenting them
indirectly, not propagandistically, and leaving them in tension with Anthony’s previously held
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aesthetic views of life.71 Wasserman overstates his case somewhat, but he is right to resist the
critical consensus that sees in Dr. Miller, the sage of Eyeless in Gaza, a magic wand that resolves
Anthony’s issues through the power of pacifist thinking, and in the novel more generally a direct
prescription to be swallowed whole.72 Though the book undeniably has an interest in the
intellectual attractions of pacifism, its primary interest in conversion is a phenomenological one:
it seeks to capture the difficulty of achieving sufficient willpower to change one’s life, and the
pain involved when one finally does take a leap into the ethical.
Anthony Beavis is trapped in the despair of the aesthetic stage. This might come as news
to him at the beginning of Eyeless in Gaza: in 1933, he finds himself content with his apparent
freedom in middle age, at work on a large tome titled Elements of Sociology, enjoying the
benefits of a prolonged affair with the wife of a friend without any of the entanglements of
marriage. Yet the memories of Anthony’s past, which creep up on him with increasing
frequency, tell a different story. In the major relationships of his life, he has failed through a lack
of active will. Essentially passive, he lets life develop around him but always holds himself at
arm’s length, much like A in Either/Or. This passivity leads to his gradual isolation from his
equally passive father following the death of Anthony’s mother; it also causes Anthony the
young man to betray his best friend, Brian, and compound that betrayal by not having the
courage to admit his wrongdoing to Brian. Even Anthony circa 1933 remains dominated by
passivity, unable to offer his lover Helen the commitment and support she craves. Like A,
Anthony lives a life of indifference, refusing to make choices that might alter his even-keeled
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existence.73 Singling out a defect for correction in his post-conversion diary, Anthony chooses
indifference: “That which besets me is indifference. I can’t be bothered about people. Or rather,
won’t. For I avoid, carefully, all occasions for being bothered.”74 At a point later in the plot
(though earlier in the story), the narrator compares college-aged Anthony to a fish in an
aquarium, distant and alienated from real life.75 Anthony seeks to reverse E.M. Forster’s plea:
only disconnect. This indifference links him directly to A from Either/Or, who advises against
both friendship and marriage. Tellingly, A connects the ability to regulate relationships before
they reach the stage of intimacy to the ability to remember and forget at will.76 For Anthony too
this dual act of remembering and forgetting – of being able to regulate the flow of one’s memory
– helps him stay anchored in indifference. His ability to block out the past, especially his moral
responsibility regarding Brian’s suicide, helps maintain his illusion of absolute freedom.77
The narrative structure of Eyeless in Gaza, long a source of confusion for critics, comes
into focus when considered as a Kierkegaardian parody of modernist jumbling and a subtle
rebuke of the aesthetic understanding of life in favor of the ethical.78 Though each storyline
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progresses linearly on its own, the seemingly random distribution of chapters jostles the different
eras of Anthony’s life against each other. Despite 1933 Anthony’s insistence that his memories
come at random, shuffled out like playing cards by the lunatic dealer of the subconscious,79 a
close examination of the juxtaposition of the book’s 52 chapters reveals clusters of crises, where
Anthony’s life across various periods aligns, allowing the reader to examine his move from the
aesthetic to the ethical. These clusters constitute a major resistance to the paratactic approach
taken by many modernist novels, and invite the reader to interpret Anthony’s actions against the
grain of his own preferred interpretation.80 Though Anthony, trapped in the aesthetic, regards the
items of his past like a modernist would – a random jumble void of significance – the novel
brings these disparate items together in such a way as to illuminate the underlying unity of
Anthony’s life.81 Here Huxley pushes back against Woolf’s assertion of life as a luminous halo;
while neither is life a series of symmetrically arranged parts, a pattern does emerge, one that
spells out either ethical refusal or ethical choice. Unlike the memories of Clarissa Dalloway,
which do float in and out of Mrs. Dalloway mysteriously, the fragments of Anthony Beavis’ past
enter Eyeless in Gaza in such a way as to teach the reader how to interpret his life: as one where
ethics has been avoided, but can still be chosen.
By bringing together crisis points from various times in Anthony’s life, Huxley creates a
more complex dilation of Kierkegaard’s “instant” than Pinkie’s slow-motion choices in Brighton
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Rock. Past (Anthony as a boy and young man), present (the Anthony of 1933, poised on the edge
of the ethical), and future (Anthony after his leap into the ethical, working as a pacifist speech
writer) converge to break down for the reader the movement of the leap, a progression from
indifference to anxious crisis to ethical choice. The first major crisis cluster has its nexus in
Chapter XII, where a dog falls from an airplane, splattering Anthony and his lover Helen with its
guts as they lie in post-coital bliss on Anthony’s roof. In the book’s overall plot, this downward
falling dog marks a turning point, since Anthony’s indifferent reaction prompts Helen to leave
him, resulting in Anthony’s initial crisis, which compels him to confront his own indifference.
The chapter immediately before the dog falls, Chapter XI, details Anthony’s work, seven years
earlier, on the Elements of Sociology, his major pre-conversion work, a book that reveals
Anthony’s commitment to indifference and passivity.82 Chapter XIII, immediately post-dog,
comprises a selection from Anthony’s diary that records the beginning of his new occupation as
a pacifist speech-maker. Events from three distinct points – 1926, 1933, and 1934 – converge to
reveal the vast difference between Anthony the aesthete, bound by indifference, and Anthony the
ethical thinker, committed to moral choice. Narratively, his change of writing hinges on the crisis
occasioned by the dog, though of course temporally the three chapters are separated by a space
of many years.
The second major cluster, which propels Anthony from the edge of the ethical into the
ethical realm proper, occurs from Chapters XLVI through LII, which toggle back and forth
between Brian’s suicide and Anthony’s conversion. In fact, Brian’s discovery of Anthony’s
deception and his running away in Chapter XLVIII get sandwiched between an account of the
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gruesome injury of Anthony’s friend Mark in Mexico, and Anthony’s first meeting with Dr.
Miller – two temporally connected events, as it is on the way to get help for Mark that Anthony
stumbles across Miller. Huxley juxtaposes Anthony’s greatest ethical failure – his inability to be
honest with and help Brian – with his encounter with the man who will catalyze his eventual leap
into the ethical, creating the sharpest contrast in the book between the sensuous immediacy of the
aesthetic and the selfless duty of the ethical. Immediately before these conjoined narrative crises,
the book gives another excerpt from Anthony’s diary of 1934, in which he meditates on the
potential usefulness of literature, but finds contemporary literature lacking in its ability to portray
real life – digestion, random events, and all. What is needed, Anthony thinks, is “a form that
would have power to bring the facts home to the whole mind, not merely to the intellect.”83 In
both clusters of narrative crisis, then, Huxley connects Anthony’s personal struggles with the
struggle to create meaningful literature, and attempts to bring home the facts of Anthony’s leap
at the level of form, not merely content.
But he also hints at the broader social struggle to achieve an ideal form for communal
life, a theme underlined by the shadow of war subtly hanging over the book. It is no coincidence
that Brian’s suicide takes place in late July 1914, mere days before the outbreak of the Great
War, or that Mark goes to Mexico to start a revolution. Even the dead dog on the rooftop
gestures toward war; dropped out of an airplane, it is a gruesome reminder of the cruelties of
aerial bombardment. Eyeless in Gaza, then, creates what Favret, following Raymond Williams,
describes as a structure of the feeling of perpetual wartime;84 Anthony’s personal struggles form
a microcosm of societal discord. Yet Anthony’s case shows the way out, an escape route Huxley,
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through subtle positioning, extends to society as a whole. The moment of crisis faced by Western
Europe in the buildup to World War II provides the European nations themselves the opportunity
to move from “aesthetic” sensuous immediacy – the short term political planning that considers
only immediate gain – toward the ethical behavior of nations that consider the big picture and
work toward international cooperation and peace. Huxley does not explicitly state this
connection, instead letting the dialectic narrative structure of Eyeless in Gaza suggest it
indirectly to the reader. Even if the critics are correct, then, and the didactic elements of Eyeless
in Gaza come on too strong, the real force behind Huxley’s arguments for the ethical lies in the
form of the book itself. Its indirect, anachronous structure acts obliquely, forcing the reader to
confront the incompatibility of the aesthetic and the ethical, and perhaps, like Anthony, make a
reckoning with his or her own past, and leap into an ethical future.
War Immanent: Huxley and Greene’s Fiction of World War II
One man alone cannot help or save the age in which he lives, he can only express the fact
that it will perish – 1849 entry in Kierkegaard’s journal85
If Eyeless in Gaza and Brighton Rock succeed in conveying the feeling of crisis building
to a fever pitch in the years before 1939, Huxley’s and Greene’s later novels show the change of
feeling that occurs in the shift from war imminent to war immanent. While war remains
something avoidable, if just barely, in Eyeless in Gaza, and something operating only on the
personal level in Brighton Rock, war becomes inescapable in Huxley’s Time Must Have a Stop
and Greene’s The End of the Affair, written at the end of the war and in the years just after,
respectively. Unlike the transformations noted by MacKay among later modernist writers,
however, the shifts in Huxley and Greene feel more fully connected to their pre-war work, less a
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change in kind than in degree. Huxley’s pacifism remains unchallenged in the face of Nazi
horrors – he still believes that war must be avoided. But the onset of actual war drains him of
some of the optimism found in Eyeless in Gaza, with the result that the actions available to the
ethical actor narrow in scope. Huxley had challenged the vigorous pro-Republican stance of the
Auden circle during the Spanish Civil War in a pamphlet entitled What Are You Going to Do
About It?, a provocation to which the communist poet C. Day Lewis responded in his own
pamphlet We’re Not Going to Do Nothing.86 Huxley fights back against this implied charge of
inaction in his fiction, but while in Eyeless he answers his own question of what’s to be done
with an affirmation of the value of pacifist speechmaking, the answer he gives in Time Must
Have a Stop is more modest: in the face of great evil, the ethical person suffers alongside those
who suffer.
Greene, meanwhile, while he supports the British war effort, reinterprets the meaning of
wartime crisis in The End of the Affair. Rather than the full out resistance of Huxley, or the
reluctant compromise of Woolf, Greene embraces wartime conditions not from an outsized sense
of nationalism, but for the heightening sense of crisis they bestow on the individual, and the
stripping away of society’s detritus, what he calls in an essay on the Blitz the “old dog-toothed
civilization” breaking up like a cracked cup put in boiling water.87 The physical ruins of bombed
cities play a large part in Greene’s war output, from the burned over remains of Vienna in the
film The Third Man to London’s Blitz-wearied buildings in The End of the Affair, but these
physical tokens point to the underlying spiritual reality of a culture done in by its own failures.
The Blitz, for Greene, brings the crisis rhythm that should pulse through the lives of all people
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inescapably to the forefront, creating moments of catastrophe that create the conditions necessary
for individuals to leap between the stages of life. Nowhere is this confluence of wartime feeling
and Kierkegaardian crisis narrative more evident than in The End of the Affair, Greene’s most
narratively complex exploration of the individual’s choice of faith.
While the actual experience of war shifts the Kierkegaardian elements of their novels,
Greene and Huxley remain indebted to the stages of life as a narrative tool for exploring
character development. Huxley’s Time Must Have a Stop offers an even clearer division between
the aesthetic and the ethical than Eyeless in Gaza, creating characters who embody both stages,
while still retaining their individuality. Even though the ethical stage in Time Must Have a Stop
consists in suffering, rather than speech making, the suffering ethical agent still possesses more
active choice than the person cocooned in aesthetic indifference. Huxley’s vision of the ethical in
Time Must Have a Stop brings him closer to a Kierkegaardian embrace of the absurd: the ethical
is worth choosing even though it cannot halt the forces of evil in the world. Greene pushes this
notion of the absurd even farther in The End of the Affair. Whereas Huxley’s main interaction
with Kierkegaard came through Either/Or, with its emphasis on the aesthetic and ethical stages,
and Brighton Rock’s illustration of the aesthetic life lines up best with that book as well, The End
of the Affair owes an explicit debt to Fear and Trembling, where Kierkegaard moves beyond the
ethical stage into the religious. Greene’s vision of a leap into the religious absurd, activated by
the pressures of war immanent, provides the clearest fictional illustration of Kierkegaard’s
appeal to a British people embroiled in continual crisis. Critically, both Time Must Have a Stop
and The End of the Affair retain the narrative ambiguity of the earlier novels, an ambiguity
designed to prompt in the reader an active response of ethical or religious interpretation.
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Suffering as Ethics: Time Must Have a Stop
Christian suffering is really neither more nor less than the suffering of responsibility, that
and that alone; for outwardly one is victorious even though one is spat upon – 1848 entry
in Kierkegaard’s journal88
Time Must Have a Stop achieves a refinement of the anachronous, Kierkegaardian
dialectic technique explored by Huxley in Eyeless in Gaza, in the process providing an even
clearer instantiation of crisis-driven progression from the aesthetic to the ethical stage. Even at
the time of the writing of Eyeless in Gaza, Huxley seemed aware of its imperfections as a novel,
a testament to the difficulty he experienced in writing it.89 Time Must Have a Stop rewrites the
earlier novel’s theme of movement from the aesthetic to the ethical around a tighter story and
more fully drawn characters, resulting in a novel that Huxley himself considered his finest
balance between ideas and form.90
Huxley simplifies the technique of the jarring jump in time, reducing the constant
chronological shuffling of Eyeless in Gaza down to a single large gap between the book’s main
body and the lengthy epilog. This creates a juxtaposition in time more accessible to readers,
many of whom had puzzled over the seemingly random order of chapters in Eyeless in Gaza.
Simultaneously, Huxley creates characters who, while still embodying varying approaches to
life, feel more fully drawn, especially in the case of the book’s main interlocutors: Eustace
Barnack, uncle of protagonist Sebastian and representative of the aesthetic life, and Bruno
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Rontini, Sebastian’s Italian cousin who advocates for ethical existence. Eustace is an especially
good creation, a Falstaffian figure who, unlike the selfish Anthony or cruel Gerry from Eyeless
in Gaza, makes clear the appeal of the aesthetic life.91 Bruno too, though not quite so well drawn,
stands out from his analog in Eyeless in Gaza, Dr. Miller, largely because the reader sees him
practice his ideals, rather than just preach them, as he suffers at the hands of Mussolini.92 As
Sebastian remarks at the novel’s end, “Bruno could somehow convince you that it all made
sense. Not by talking, of course; by just being.”93 Huxley swaps Miller’s speechifying for
Bruno’s embodied ethical living, an echoing of Kierkegaard’s preference for creating characters
who incarnate the stages of life, rather than writing essayistic analyses of each stage. Time Must
Have a Stop thus corrects Eyeless in Gaza’s occasional drift into lopsidedness by investing more
fully in its characters, developing a fruitful tension between the aesthetic and the ethical that
clarifies the difficulties involved in moving from one stage to the other.
Only seventeen during the main portion of the novel, Sebastian faces the typical aesthetic
temptations of the adolescent: sex, vanity, and the lures of an idle existence, all of which his
uncle Eustace embodies to the impressionable Sebastian.94 Against these temptations stands
Bruno, who urges on Sebastian a reflectiveness that leads to self-improvement and, eventually, to
reforming the world for the better. Eustace’s battle with Bruno over Sebastian’s future comprises
the main internal struggle of the book’s narrative, a neat trick given that Eustace dies of a heart
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attack halfway through, and Bruno spends relatively little time in the actual narrative, existing
more as a figure spoken of than to. Huxley plays this struggle out at the level of narrative
structure: for most of the novel, a picaresque mode dominates, and Sebastian’s life of aesthetic
inwardness unfolds in a series of vignettes that connect only loosely. This is life viewed by the
aesthete, random occurrences devoid of ethical significance. Time Must Have a Stop’s final third,
however, rebukes such fluidity, cutting back and forth between the disastrous consequences of
Sebastian’s moral cowardice and Eustace’s own struggle, in the afterlife, to leap from the
aesthetic to the ethical, before jumping ahead, in the epilogue, to a Sebastian finally able to live
an ethical life. Life viewed from the ethical stage assumes a coherence beneath its scattered
surface: each choice, ethical or unethical, ripples outward in its effects.
At novel’s end Huxley narrows in on the reverberations of Sebastian’s choices, both
within his own life and outward. This narrative preoccupation with responsibility mimics
Bruno’s advice that Sebastian draw up a genealogy of his misdeeds, tracing them backward to
their origins and forward to their possible consequences.95 Hence the purpose of the epilog,
which seemingly has little to do with the plot of the rest of the novel but brings full circle
Sebastian’s youthful misdeeds. Viewed from the ethical stage, Sebastian’s life has a unity to it,
one that speaks to the destructiveness of aesthetic living, harmless as it might appear in the
moment. Sebastian’s small selfish choices – his inability to tell the truth, his continued affair
with the seductive but cynical Veronica Thwale – have not merely hurt himself, dulling him to
the call of the ethical. These choices have also widened out and hurt those around him
(Sebastian’s lies lead to Bruno’s arrest, while his affair with Thwale contributes to the death of
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his wife). The jump in time reveals the false promise of the aesthetic – that selfish actions have
no lasting consequences – by revealing Sebastian’s continued enmeshment in the unethical
choices of his past. Just as small unethical acts might have big consequences, however, the
reverse holds true: Sebastian’s modest attempts at ethical living in the epilog, though they seem
dwarfed by the huge atrocities of war, have the potential to positively impact the world.
If Time Must Have a Stop’s epilog compresses time in order to demonstrate the unity of
life as revealed by ethical judgement, Eustace Barnack’s struggle to attain the ethical even after
death dilates time, each instant comprising an eternity, in order to show the soul’s struggle to
leap between stages. As he floats through his Bardo-like existence, Eustace constantly faces the
choice to join the universal consciousness, but resists because to do so would require giving up
the memories of his sensuous past.96 Even within his atemporal existence, Eustace experiences
these moments of choice as Kierkegaardian instants, intersections of time and eternity, where the
possibility of the ethical stretches out limitlessly before him: “For an instant, for an eternity,
there was a total and absolute participation. Then, excruciatingly, the knowledge of being
separate resumed, the shamed perception of his own hideous and obscene opacity”.97 The
chapters that follow Eustace through the afterlife once more parody modernism, presenting his
disjointed thoughts through an especially incoherent instance of stream of consciousness
narration. Only when Eustance experiences these “instants” does the stream of his consciousness
ebb, leaving the reader to examine with clarity Eustace’s inability to leap into the ethical.
As with Sebastian’s life, the book’s treatment of the journey of Eustace’s soul widens out
to examine the effect of his ethical complacency on others. At certain points, Eustace gains a sort
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of clairvoyance, able to see proleptic flashes of future events, what the book describes as
“remembering events that had not yet taken place”.98 The two primary, harrowing instances of
this future memory involve Eustace gaining a glimpse of the atrocities of World War II,
including the death of his other nephew, the dull Jim Poulshot, at the hands of Japanese soldiers,
and the struggle of refugees to escape fascist violence. Eustace’s spirit watches in horror as the
Japanese soldiers drive their bayonets “In the face, in the belly, in the throat and the genitals [of
Jim] – again and again, until the screaming stopped”.99 Despite Eustace’s horror, this moment of
crisis does not rouse his spirit out of the aesthetic sphere, as his laughter, symbol of indifference,
battles back against his feelings of pity. Later, as Eustace gains a vision of a young boy
mourning the death of his mother at the hands of the fascists, he enters even more fully into the
pain of another person, but still finds himself unable to make the final leap into the universal
ethical by choosing to suffer alongside the boy:
The little boy crouched there, his face in his hands, his body trembling and shaken by
sobs. And suddenly it was no longer from outside that he was thought about. The agony
of that grief and terror were known directly, by an identifying experience of them – not as
his, but mine. Eustace Barnack’s awareness of the child had become one with the child’s
awareness of himself; it was that awareness… None of that, none of that. Firmly and with
decision, he averted his attention”100
Contrast these proleptic, distanced descriptions of death and mourning with the “Time Passes”
section of Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, which Eustace’s stream of consciousness calls to mind:
[Prue Ramsay died that summer in some illness connected with childbirth, which was
indeed a tragedy, people said, everything, they said, had promised so well.]… [A shell
exploded. Twenty or thirty young men were blown up in France, among them Andrew
Ramsay, whose death, mercifully, was instantaneous.]101
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Woolf’s passage utilizes distance in its description of the deaths of the Ramsay children –
notably the switch to omniscient narration and the closing off of the deaths through use of
brackets – creating an aesthetically polished and affective representation of death and
destruction. But there is no ethical charge to these descriptions; time simply passes and tragedy
unfolds, inexorable in its advance. As Michael Levenson argues, “Time Passes” enlarges its
background (the real world) to diminish the characters in the foreground; individual and world
remain irreconcilable.102 Hence the vagueness surrounding those who witness these events:
“people said” Prue’s death was a tragedy, and Andrew dies alongside “twenty or thirty young
men.” Huxley provides a similar sense of distance but focuses as much on Eustace’s act of
observation – and the ethical dilemma it calls forth – as on the death itself. If Woolf’s distance
suggests a helplessness in the face of inevitable death, Huxley counters that, even faced with
death beyond our control, individuals still have the ability to act ethically, by not refusing their
share of responsibility. Eustace does refuse, and remains trapped at novel’s end in a sort of
limbo, unwilling to embrace fully either darkness or light. Crisis cannot ensure ethical
development – the most it can do is provide the conditions under which ethical choice becomes
possible. By showing the deadening effects of selfish aestheticism, and the potential fruitfulness
of even small ethical choices, Huxley encourages the reader to embrace the ethical life even
when that life seems absurdly paltry when lived under the shadow of war.
Sebastian’s growth between the end of the main part of the book and the epilog provides
the positive example to balance out Eustace’s inability to progress ethically. Because of
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Sebastian’s status as poet manqué, his growth also allows Huxley to tie Sebastian’s ethical
growth to his move from purely aesthetic writing to an ethically aware authorship. Bruno
criticizes the young Sebastian for being enraptured by the aesthetics of poetry, to the neglect of
his ethical development, and asserts that this has been the common downfall of most literary
geniuses throughout history.103 Sebastian proves this assessment by his immature actions, his
inability to tell the truth leading indirectly to Bruno’s arrest by Italian fascists. The adult
Sebastian of the epilog, however, embraces the vocation of ethical author, producing a manifesto
that urges ethical choice. Sebastian’s mature thoughts on writing echo Kierkegaard’s; truth
cannot be directly communicated, only hinted at: “The best one could hope to do by means of
words was to remind oneself of what one once had unitively understood and, in others, to evoke
the wish and create some of the conditions for a similar understanding.”104 Like Kierkegaard,
Sebastian believes that literature should catalyze real change in the individual, but can only do so
indirectly.
Huxley builds this indirectness into the novel’s structure. Little insight is given into
Sebastian’s own leap into the ethical, or into his life in general in the decade in between the
novel’s main plot and the epilog. The reader only gleans that Sebastian, who could not heed
Bruno’s advice as a teenager, became converted to the ethical life while taking care of a dying
Bruno on his release from prison. The aesthetic and ethical stages in Sebastian’s life emerge
clearly – in the main plot and the epilog, respectively – but the leap between them remains
occluded, compelling the reader to fill in the gaps in the story. By meditating on Sebastian’s
ethical leap, the reader might in turn make his or her own leap.
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The wartime setting of the epilog punctures the false idyll of the main plot (already
deflated by Eustace’s proleptic visions of wartime brutality), raising the stakes of ethical choice
for the individual. Though he cannot stop the war himself, Sebastian finds himself in a more
hopeful position than others, including his father, a disappointed communist. His father might
laugh at his hope that the gradual spread of ethical awareness will stop future wars, but Sebastian
holds onto this “one in a million” chance because it offers the only sure ground for peace: “Peace
can’t exist except where there’s a metaphysic, which all accept and a few actually succeed in
realizing…By direct intuition… the way you realize the beauty of a poem.”105 Here the aesthetic,
the ethical, and the political come together; ethical intuition completes aesthetic intuition, leading
to positive political changes. Sebastian rejects the idea that the suffering of war automatically
makes people better, but he does recognize that the pressures of war allow for a heightening of
vision, a chance to see the dire consequences that follow the rejection of ethics. It is up to those
who have glimpsed the ethical, Huxley suggests, to pass on their vision, in bits and pieces, to
those around them.
No Ending or Beginning: Kierkegaardian Dialectic in The End of the Affair
The whole development of the world tends to the importance of the individual; that, and
nothing else, is the principle of Christianity… Christianity is certainly accessible to all
but – be it carefully noted – only provided everyone becomes an individual, becomes ‘the
individual’. But people have neither the moral nor the religious courage. The majority is
quite terrified of becoming each one of them, an individual – 1847 entry in Kierkegaard’s
journal106

Like Time Must Have a Stop, Greene’s The End of the Affair engages in a form of
Kierkegaardian indirect communication, using its narrative incompleteness to prompt the reader
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to wrestle with the absurdities of religious belief. Terry Eagleton has noted the paradoxical
nature of Graham Greene’s protagonists, trapped between humanism and orthodox Catholicism,
and sees in this paralysis a picture of the appeal of Catholicism by negative means – in rejecting
the rules of Catholicism, Greene’s protagonists reveal the strength of those rules.107 Eagleton’s
point clarifies part of the reason Greene’s protagonists tend toward a negative faith: in depicting
the crisis of life, Greene recognizes that posing the problem is much easier than providing a
solution; characters bewildered by crisis make for more interesting plots than those assuredly
navigating it. Greene’s subsequent biographical history as a wavering Catholic has made it
harder to read the specific direction of his fiction from the Catholic period, assumptions about
correlation between author and character clouding Greene’s more complex narrative strategies.
Careful attention to the actual texts – especially The End of the Affair, the final novel in the
Catholic sequence– reveals Greene’s concern with indirection, a narrative strategy – heavily
theorized and practiced by Kierkegaard – by which the novels prompt a response from the reader
without directly stating their point. This indirectness constitutes for Greene a main “technique for
manoeuvring” the reader.108 Greene, like Kierkegaard, finds it infinitely easier to show readers
what to avoid than to communicate positive ethical or religious content directly. Greene’s
characters of actual religious belief – Rose in Brighton Rock, but even more so Sarah Miles in
The End of the Affair – remain hidden, emerging only occasionally to provide glimpses of the
absurd. Paradoxically, their absence becomes more compelling than their presence ever could be.
Like the Abraham depicted by Johannes de Silentio in Fear and Trembling, the religious essence
of these characters cannot be grasped directly by the reader, but their very indecipherability gives
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them a charged attraction. This attraction prompts readers, as they attempt to fill in the gaps left
by the novel’s elliptical narration, to question whether or not they find themselves able to make
their own leap of faith.
While Brighton Rock engages with popular culture, both in its form as a thriller and its
thematic preoccupation with seaside carnivals and schlock films, The End of the Affair takes a
turn toward the literary, providing as protagonist Maurice Bendrix, a writer of self-consciously
literary fiction, and utilizing the most complex narrative structure of Greene’s career. The
anachronous presentation of plot, along with the interpolated text of Sarah’s diary (and the
metafictional element, since Bendrix writes the text of the book), seem out of place for a writer
most known for his plain style and lack of ornamentation.109 But the flurry of techniques serves a
purpose in the book, as the realist Bendrix bumps up against paradoxes he cannot explain. His
realist, materialist approach to life and writing fails to capture the complexities of the story he
has to tell of his love affair with Sarah Miles, her mysterious breaking off of the affair, and her
eventual death and possible sainthood. The miraculous, especially, finds itself fitting
uncomfortably into Bendrix’s account, as he can neither deny its occurrence nor find adequate
explanation for it. Within Bendrix’s book, words and narrative strategies constantly fail. He
notes the arbitrariness of beginnings, endings, character development, and the sorting out of
minor details from major developments.110 Bendrix experiences so much difficulty because he
sets out to capture the eternal moment – the instant – but cannot himself figure reality as
anything but a collection of facts, a summative approach that precludes the eternal.111 The
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novel’s structure implicitly rebukes this summative approach through its cyclical shape,
presenting events multiple times to reveal the inner truth behind them. Through this the novel
suggests that, as Victor Eremita puts in in the Preface to Either/Or, “The external is not the
internal.”112 Just as the actions of Judas and Peter during the Passion might seem
indistinguishable to the untrained eye,113 the meeting point of the eternal and the temporal goes
unnoticed by those wrapped up in the material world. It is in this rebuke of the summative
approach that Greene distinguishes himself most clearly from both realism (where a collection of
externals adds up to internal meaning) and modernism (where a collection of externals adds up to
nothing coherent). In the hands of modernists encyclopedic form, as Paul K. Saint-Amour
argues, resists totalizing statements about society,114 but for Greene this resistance itself acts as
an evasion of the unified spiritual truth beneath the cluttered material surface. By rejecting the
summative approach, The End of the Affair teaches its reader how to interpret itself: the novel’s
events only resolve through the active participation of a reader willing to leap to faith in the
book’s characters.
Like Johannes de Silentio, the fictional author of Fear and Trembling, who finds himself
undone by Abraham’s example of faith, Bendrix reaches the limits of language in his encounter
with Sarah’s newfound belief. The phrases Bendrix uses to describe this experience are eerily
similar to those employed by Silentio in Robert Payne’s 1939 translation of Fear and Trembling.
Noting that writing about unhappiness is much easier than writing about happiness, since
unhappiness entail an individualized sensation of pain, Bendrix claims that “Happiness
annihilates us: we lose our identity.”115 Compare this to Silentio as he mulls over Abraham and
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Hegel. Hegel, Silentio claims, he can understand easily, but “Whenever I try to think about
Abraham, I am as it were annihilated.”116 Both authors occupy the uncertain space of unbelievers
encountering powerful witnesses to faith’s absurdity; Silentio repeatedly claims to be without
faith, and while Bendrix moves from a complacent atheism to a grudging intellectual belief in
God, it is belief stripped of the animating power of actual faith.117 Bendrix moves by hatred, not
love: his account begins as one of hatred toward Sarah and her easygoing, cuckolded husband
Henry, but he eventually transfers this hatred toward God, for robbing him of Sarah’s love. Yet
he, like Silentio, finds himself drawn toward faith not so much by the notion of God, but by the
strong witness of another person’s leap.
It is in the book’s conception of the leap that The End of the Affair most clearly reveals its
debt to Kierkegaard. Sarah’s embrace of faith hinges on a moment of crisis, one that prods her to
take a leap in the dark. Sharing Bendrix’s apartment during a Blitz bombing, Sarah discovers
Bendrix, seemingly dead, under a pile of rubble. She prays to a God she does not believe in,
promising that she will sacrifice her affair with Bendrix if he can be brought back to life. When
he stirs, she begins a years-long, halting journey toward faith, one she only completes shortly
before her death as she seeks entrance into the Catholic Church. Though the completion of her
faith comes years after the initial promise, Sarah still considers, in retrospect, that moment of
crisis to constitute a radical break in her life.118 Bendrix himself views faith as a leap. Speaking
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to the memory of Sarah after her death, Bendrix clings to his own bitterness as a defense against
the pressure he feels to take his own leap in imitation of Sarah:
For if this God exists, I thought, and if even you – with your lusts and your adulteries and
the timid lies you used to tell – can change like this, we could all be saints by leaping as
you leapt, but shutting the eyes and leaping once and for all: if you are a saint, it’s not so
difficult to be a saint. It’s something He can demand of any of us, leap. But I won’t leap.
I sat on my bed and said to God: You’ve taken her, but you haven’t got me yet. I know
Your cunning. It’s You who take us up to a high place and offer us the whole universe.
You’re a devil, God, tempting us to leap. But I don’t want Your peace and I don’t want
Your love (159).
Bendrix recognizes the moment of crisis impending in his own life but struggles to preserve
himself from it. He is, in fact, akin to Silentio’s knight of infinite resignation, a figure who
almost ascends to the same heights as a knight of faith like Abraham, but cannot make the final
leap. A knight of infinite resignation willingly sacrifices his most precious possession, but in the
act of doing so considers it lost and resigns himself to a life of sorrow. If, Silentio claims,
Abraham had set out to sacrifice Isaac in the same way, he would be a great man, but not the
father of faith. Abraham, instead, like the knight of faith, simultaneously gives up his beloved
son and receives him back, trusting, by virtue of the absurd, that God will restore Isaac to him in
the present life. This ability to believe the paradox – to live it out – marks the knight of faith as
immeasurably greater than the still noble knight of infinite resignation. By book’s end, Bendrix
has reconciled himself to the loss of Sarah, but cannot make the movement of faith that would
claim back her love: he has lost, and God has won. Sarah feels differently, however: her doubtful
hope that “People can love without seeing each other, can’t they,” as she bargains with God to
bring Bendrix back to life has transformed by the end of her life into an assured, continuing love
of Bendrix that runs alongside her faith.119 It is the absurdity of this paradox, more than the
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unbelievable miracles Sarah might have caused (the healing of a man’s skin condition, the saving
of a boy’s life), that simultaneously attracts and repels Bendrix, bringing him to the precipice of
decision.120
The book’s ending leaves Bendrix with feet still planted on the ground, unwilling to leap,
but the novel’s elliptical structure forces the reader to the edge of his or her own decision. In a
remarkable bit of anti-climax Bendrix, now living in the same house as Henry, Sarah’s widower,
with whom he has struck up a friendship, closes his account with a Job-like prayer that God
leave him alone forever.121 This prayer marks a significant come down from the heights of
Sarah’s ecstatic belief, and apparently constitutes a final act of resignation on the part of
Bendrix. Yet this ending – like that of Brighton Rock – is not so straightforward as it first
appears. Bendrix has been concerned throughout his account with the arbitrariness of beginnings
and endings. Did he choose the starting point in his story, he wonders on the novel’s first page,
or was a providential hand guiding him?122 Later, as he finishes reading Sarah’s last letter, he
muses that “If I were writing a novel I would end it here: a novel, I used to think, has to end
somewhere, but I’m beginning to believe my realism has been at fault all these years, for nothing
in life now ever seems to end.”123 The seemingly arbitrary anticlimax of the novel’s last page,
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then, accords with the novel’s structure as an open system, where nothing can be finalized, at
least by Bendrix’s will alone.124
Greene cunningly brings readers up to the very edge of faith, a movement engendered by
crisis, but leaves them there. A Bendrix conversion scene, if one existed, would veer ineluctably
toward sentimentality and the saccharine. Something so individual can never be expressed
directly in meaningful terms; even the reader’s glimpse of Sarah’s leap comes in fits and starts,
sideways glances and multi-angle memories. The reader, then, must decide if Bendrix takes the
final leap that will complete his movement through the stages of life: from a cynical aesthete
who pursues his own pleasure, to an ethical man taking care of the widower of his lover, to a
knight of infinite resignation, convinced of the loss of love, to a knight of faith willing to
embrace the paradox of a love continued after the end of both the affair and Sarah’s life. Like
Bendrix, the book’s readers must wean themselves off of an addiction to evidence. For Bendrix
this occurs in part when he first reads the diary he has stolen from Sarah; expecting to see in it
evidence of a new lover in her life, he encounters instead the story of her bargain and subsequent
struggle toward faith, and her continuing love for him.125 Greene’s repetition of key moments
and passages likewise cues readers to abandon accumulation of facts in favor of adjusted
interpretation, where a deeper understanding of the real situation prompts an appropriate
response – a resolute claiming of the absurd. Though Bendrix foreswears any possibility of ever
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leaping into God’s love, the reader need not do the same: Bendrix’s arbitrary ending need not be
accepted as the real end of the affair of faith.
Greene, like Kierkegaard, is occasionally accused – especially in his Catholic novels – of
leaning too hard into the individual at the expense of broader social and political concerns.
Hence the hesitation of some critics to consider these religiously-infused novels to be of more
than limited interest; Greene’s religious eccentricities stand in the way of his communicating to a
wider audience.126 The End of the Affair, however, remains bound up in the national moment of
the war through its setting amidst the Blitz, especially the central crisis brought about by a
German bomb. Writer Elizabeth Bowen said, of World War II, that “What was happening was
out of all proportion to our faculties for knowing, thinking, and checking up,”127 and the frantic
mental arithmetic necessitated by war contributed to a sense of continual crisis. Greene, like
Nicodemus in Midnight Hour, creates a powerful account of wartime crisis through the very act
of connecting it to personal, religious turmoil. One expression of this wartime crisis lies in the
book’s treatment of time and eternity, which Greene frequently intertwines to create
Kierkegaardian “instants” in the narrative. As Bendrix prepares to go down to the basement, just
before he gets buried in rubble, Sarah begs him to stay: “‘I won’t be a moment.’ It was a phrase
one continued to use, although one knew in those days that a moment might well be eternity
long.”128 Just after this the lovers experience their own moment of eternity, as Bendrix lies
apparently dead on the stairs, and Sarah makes her bargain. The eternity of this moment for
Sarah, and the eternity the book builds around the moment through the continual narrative return
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to this same moment, become activated by the crisis conditions of the war. The sense of crisis
building before the war gets transformed here, under the excruciating pressure of bombardment,
into a moment that reflects, with diamond-like clarity, the internal and external pressures of the
age. Such crisis, that clears the way for a leap to faith, remains available to the reader as well: as
the stolid, straightforward cup of civilization cracks under the boiling pressures of war, the
individual reader can escape war’s absurdities by embracing them.
A Teleological Suspension of Admiration: The Limits of Kierkegaard
But just because I am a poet in that sense, one whose task is to raise the price and if
possible to whisper to every individual what the demands should be, I must take
particular care not to acquire any followers – 1847 entry in Kierkegaard’s journal129

Even as Kierkegaard became structurally important for Huxley the novelist in the mid30s, providing a conception of life’s development through crisis that sketched for Huxley a new
narrative form for his books, his importance to Huxley the man was fading. Initially intrigued by
Kierkegaard, Huxley found himself increasingly distant from him. An uncrossable chasm
between their systems of thought emerged as early as 1937’s Ends and Means. That text provides
a key to understanding Huxley’s quarrel with Kierkegaard. In it, Huxley remarks on a worrying
trend of within Christian theology of stressing the transcendence of God at the expense of
immanence; he links this to figures like Augustine, Calvin, Kierkegaard, and Barth. For Huxley,
this stress on transcendence has disastrous results, as it leads to – and here he quotes directly
from Fear and Trembling – “the most monstrous ‘teleological suspensions of morality.’”130 Even
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at the time, reviewers questioned Huxley’s grasp on the finer points of Kierkegaard’s
philosophy,131 but this quotation is important insofar as it demonstrates his reluctance to fully
embrace Kierkegaard, especially in Kierkegaard’s preference for the absurd, and the specific
content of traditional Christianity. The quote stays with Huxley, popping up again in The
Perennial Philosophy, where he ties teleological suspensions of morality to human sacrifice and
primitive religion.132
Huxley’s objection to this particular phrase of Kierkegaard’s makes sense against the
backdrop of his resistance to organized religion more broadly. Even as he came to embrace
mysticism more and more, he rigorously denied holding any system of dogma. Huxley’s
ambivalence toward religion comes across most clearly in his conflicted attitudes toward
Catholicism. Huxley greatly admired the mystical tradition within Catholicism but contrasted it
with what he saw as the wrong sort of Catholicism, the kind tied to sacraments and dogmas
rather than mental prayer and mystical meditation. He considered this distasteful form of
Catholicism as ascendant since the Baroque period, his meditative heroes like Francis de Sales
and Catherine of Siena swept aside in favor of more garish saints like Margaret Mary
Alacoque.133 In Huxley’s view, sacramentalism enables magical thinking, and encourages
sentimentalism, as shown in the character of Virginia Maunciple in his 1939 satire After Many a
Summer, whose devotion to the Blessed Virgin does nothing to curb her lustful appetites.134
Attachment to the particular prevents attainment of the universal, and for Huxley the point of
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religion as such is the universal. Though not a Buddhist in practice, he expressed consistent
admiration for the Buddhist practices of meditation that build up non-attachment in the
individual.135
There’s an undeniable element of the pragmatic in Huxley’s approach to religious and
mystical experience.136 Scholars tend to doubt he had much direct experience with mysticism;137
whether or not he felt, like William James, that he could only speak of mystical experience at
second hand, his treatment of mysticism bears a strong resemblance to that of James, searching
out the practical implications of mysticism without weighing in on the question of the truth of
mystical experience.138 Both James and Huxley also detected some universal impulse underlying
particular religious devotions, and it is this universal that they view as most beneficial to
humanity. Little wonder, then, that for Huxley the ethical stage – the proper home of the
universal – takes precedence over not only the inwardness of the aesthetic, but also the more
complete inwardness of the religious. Though Huxley values the individual, he also thinks the
individual must continually align his or her self with the universal; to supersede the ethical is, for
him, unthinkable.
If Huxley ultimately rejects the religious aspects of Kierkegaard as too individualistic,
Greene’s fullest embrace of Kierkegaardian individualism coincides with his loosening
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association with formal religion. The influence of Kierkegaard felt in later Greene novels like A
Burnt Out Case comes filtered through the isolated angst of French existentialism, Kierkegaard
emblemizing the necessity of choice in an absurd world stripped of the consolations of faith.
Whatever their reservations about or reinterpretations of Kierkegaard’s work, however, both
Huxley and Greene found his ideas of ruptured personal development, and the possibilities of
indirect communication, clarifying in the period surrounding World War II. Kierkegaard’s
analysis of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages, and the movement between them, provided
these two writers with a model for escaping existential and narrative paralysis.
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard considers all faith as a sort of
martyrdom: “The martyrdom which is always present, even if no persecution menaces from
without, even if the Christian is as unnoticed in life as if he had not lived… the martyrdom of
believing against the understanding, the peril of lying upon the deep, the seventy thousand
fathoms, in order there to find God.”139 Such martyrdom of faith becomes all the more real when
people find themselves threatened with physical death, brought terrifyingly close in the reality of
wartime. In the wartime feeling of their novels, Greene and Huxley embrace the ethical,
religious, and narrative uncertainty that might end in failure, turning aside equally from the safer
paths of realism’s gradual progress and modernism’s refusal to move altogether. Despite the vast
gap in their particular beliefs, Huxley and Greene agree with each other – and with Kierkegaard
– that to be free, in life and literature, one must first choose and leap.
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Chapter 2: The Attack Upon Christendom – Muriel Spark’s and
Flann O’Brien’s Maieutic Satires
[My original idea was] that Christianity required a ‘maieuticer’ and that I understood
how to be one – while no one understood how to appreciate it. The idea of proclaiming
Christianity, of confessing Christ, does not fit in with Christendom – that is exactly where
the maieutic attitude fits in, which begins by assuming that men are in possession of the
greatest good and only tries to make them aware of what they have – 1847 entry in
Kierkegaard’s journal1

“She would of been a good woman… if it had been somebody there to shoot her every
minute of her life.” So says The Misfit in Flannery O’Connor’s most famous short story, “A
Good Man Is Hard to Find.” He speaks of a woman known only as The Grandmother, a woman
he has just shot three times after encountering her with her family on vacation. Throughout most
of the story, The Grandmother dominates the narrative, complaining loudly about changing
customs and the bad manners of her grandchildren, and making herself out to be a real lady.
O’Connor’s understated, dry narration makes clear, however, that The Grandmother, far from
being the paragon of virtue she imagines herself to be, is in fact a pharisaical, deeply unpleasant
woman. Only her confrontation with death activates whatever grace exists within her, as she
comforts the scarred Misfit, murmuring “Why, you’re one of my own babies. You’re one of my
own children!” just before he shoots her dead.2 The story elicits a wide range of affective
responses: shock, horror, repulsion – but also laughter. It is the paradigmatic example of
O’Connor’s method of confronting complacent Christianity with the crisis of violence, painted in
a satirical mode.

1

Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. and translated by Alexander Dru (London: Oxford
University Press, 1951), 199.
2
Flannery O’Connor, The Complete Stories (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1971), 133-4.
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While O’Connor’s blend of Southern gothic, pitch black humor, and Catholic theology
marked her stories with an unmistakable imprimatur, her general approach – satirizing rote
religion through grotesque exaggeration – was quite typical of Catholic authors of the post-war
period. In fact, the midcentury saw the flourishing of a robust brand of Catholic satire; from
O’Connor and Walker Percy in the American South, to Heinrich Böll in Germany, to Muriel
Spark and Flann O’Brien in Britain and Ireland, Catholic authors sought to expose the follies of
contemporary society through satirical fiction. Aside from their religion, these writers shared a
basic sensibility of isolation – O’Brien excepted, they all lived in countries where a small
Catholic minority navigated a changing social status amidst broader, tectonic shifts in national
religious belief.3 They also all shared an unusual but important common reference point: the
work of Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s significance for Walker Percy has been well attested
by the author himself, and studied at length, but the Danish philosopher made a strong
impression on all of these authors.4 In particular, Kierkegaard’s critique of “Christendom”, his
term for the deracinated practice of state-sponsored, bourgeois Christianity, gave these Catholic
3

And O’Brien, though in the Catholic majority, experienced the social isolation endemic to Irish authors, what
Augustine Martin has termed “Inherited dissent” from mainstream Irish society (“Inherited Dissent: The Dilemma of
the Irish Writer,” in Bearing Witness: Essays on Anglo-Irish Literature, ed. Anthony Roche [Dublin: University
College Dublin Press, 1996], 81).
4
For a good summary of Kierkegaard’s influence on Percy, see Joseph Ballan, “Walker Percy: Literary
Extrapolations from Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Vol. 12 Tome IV,
ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 175-189. O’Connor’s relation to Kierkegaard is
underexplored, but a start exists in Christopher B. Barnett, “Flannery O’Connor: Reading Kierkegaard in the Light
of Thomas Aquinas,” in Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Vol. 12 Tome IV, ed. Jon Stewart
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 157-174. Barnett specifically connects the character of the Grandmother to
Kierkegaard’s description of the “philistine-bourgeois mentality” found in The Sickness Unto Death, a book
O’Connor had read the year before writing “A Good Man Is Hard to Find” (164). Heinrich Boll’s novel The Clown
references Kierkegaard several times in its satire of German Catholics in the wake of World War II. O’Brien read
Kierkegaard in his formative time during or just after his education at University College Dublin, and had a great
affinity for the Danish philosopher, though what specific works he read remains unknown. Given the timeline,
however, which places his encounter with Kierkegaard in the late 1930s, it seems reasonable to assume he had read
some combination of Philosophical Fragments, Fear and Trembling, Dru’s selection of the Journals, and Lowrie’s
biography, any of which would have introduced him to the key concept of indirect communication and the need for
detached derision. See Anthony Cronin, No Laughing Matter: The Life and Times of Flann O’Brien [London:
Grafton Books, 1989], 56-7. See also M. Keith Booker, Flann O’Brien, Bakhtin, and Menippean Satire (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1995), 125. For Spark’s interaction with Kierkegaard, see below.
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authors ammunition for confronting the rote practice of Christianity in their own day, while
Kierkegaard’s practice of irony as a means of indirect communication, and his insistent attempts
to disappear as author of his own work, demonstrated for them a method through which the
author as single individual might preserve his or her individuality through detachment, yet retain
a vantage point for critiquing society.
In this chapter I examine the Kierkegaardian contours of the satires written by Muriel
Spark and Flann O’Brien in the late 1950s and early 1960s, taking as case studies O’Brien’s final
two novels, The Hard Life and The Dalkey Archive, and two of the novels produced in Spark’s
initial creative burst, The Comforters and Memento Mori. Though O’Brien and Spark inhabited
radically different circumstances during this period – with O’Brien’s failed career drawing to a
bitter close just as Spark’s career as a critically acclaimed novelist was beginning – the two
authors produced novels in this period that resonate remarkably in terms of style, tone, and
purpose. By reading O’Brien’s and Spark’s novels of this period in conversation with
Kierkegaard’s ideas of ironic indirect communication, I show how their commitment to a
satirical method that was simultaneously detached in tone yet suffused with moral content
differentiated their work not only from the traditional modes of satire, but also from the “nonmoral” satire of modernism, the equally non-moral social commentary of a reemergent post-war
realism, and the ludic indifference of postmodernism. Instead, Spark and O’Brien were prime
exemplars of what I will call the practice of “maieutic satire”.
Maieutic satire allows authors to share important ethical and religious concepts with
readers, but to do so in indirect and aesthetically complex ways. A “maiueticer” – for
Kierkegaard, the primary examples are Socrates and Christ, though he considers himself to
follow in their path –has attained some truth, but avoids giving direct insights into this truth,
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using irony to push away would-be followers in the hope of making these followers selfsufficient. Maieutic satire, then, never loses sight of what it views as truth, but refuses to make
plain for the reader what that truth is, or how to access it. In doing so, this midcentury satire
charts a new path forward out of modernism, embracing neither of the options famously outlined
by David Lodge – neither the anti-modernism of the realists nor post-modernism adequately
describes its project.5 Instead, this satire utilizes experimental and off-putting aesthetics as a
means of occluding the truths it holds dear. Consequently, maieutic satire shifts the traditional
emphasis of moral satire away from large-scale social reform towards a confrontation with the
individual reader. By clearing away the detritus surrounding the bland practice of institutional
Christianity, whether Protestant or Catholic, while simultaneously satirizing the shortcomings of
secular materialism, Spark and O’Brien sketched in their work, in hints and guesses, an image of
what a living Christianity might look like. That they did this work of clearance from a position of
detachment allows readers to wrestle for themselves with the extent to which they, too, have
absorbed the indifference of Christendom. If the practice of this type of satire raises the
possibility that many will not understand, or will misinterpret its message, this is a risk that
Spark and O’Brien, like their forerunner Kierkegaard, were willing to take.
Kierkegaard is an especially apt conversation partner for Spark because his work, notably
the Journals, formed an early, important, and largely uncommented on source for Spark the
novelist. Though her writing style has often been described as sui generis, scholars generally

5

See Lodge, David, “The Novelist at the Crossroads,” in The Novel Today, ed. Malcolm Bradbury (Glasgow:
Fontana/Collins, 1977), 100-102. For an assessment of Spark as avoiding these two paths, see David Herman, “‘A
Salutary Scar’: Muriel Spark’s Desegregated Art in the Twenty-First Century,” Modern Fiction Studies 54, no. 3
(Fall 2008): 473-4.
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recognize a few key influences on her writing.6 In the realm of fiction, Evelyn Waugh sticks out
as an inspiration, along with the dry, spare writing of Ivy Compton-Burnett, and, in mid-career,
the novels of the French noveau roman movement.7 Most significant for Spark’s development as
a writer was the non-fiction work of fellow convert John Henry Newman, whose praises Spark
constantly sang. Scholars have long recognized Newman as a key influence on both Spark’s
understanding of Catholic practice and the clarity and simplicity of her style.8 The attention
rightly paid to Newman, however, has crowded out Kierkegaard’s influence on Spark.9

6

For references to Spark’s work as sui generis, see, for example, Herman, “A Salutary Scar,” 473, and John Updike,
“Stonewalling Toffs,” in Hidden Possibilities: Essays in Honor of Muriel Spark, ed, Robert E. Hosmer, Jr. (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 184.
7
As a note of interest, Spark greatly admired the work of Heinrich Böll, significant not only because of the
connections to Catholicism and Kierkegaard, but because Spark specifically admired him for “The variety and
steadiness of his vision and its extra-territorial dimensions; and for the stamina of his patient, almost documentary
style… Whatever pains he takes as an author, they do not show” (The Golden Fleece, ed. Penelope Jardine
[Manchester: Carcanet House, 2014], 155). Such praise speaks to Spark’s valuing of detachment and authorial
hiddenness.
8
For perhaps the best overall treatment of Spark and Newman, see Leon Litvack, “We All Have Something to Hide:
Muriel Spark, Autobiography, and the Influence of Newman on the Career of a Novelist,” Durham University
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Twentieth Century Literature 43, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 95. On this point see also Helena C. Tomko, “Muriel Spark’s
The Girls of Slender Means at the Limits of the Catholic Novel,” Religion and Literature 27, no. 2 (Summer 2015):
49. For Spark’s own thoughts on Newman’s importance to her life and work, see “My Conversion,” in Critical
Essays on Muriel Spark, ed. Joseph Hynes (New York: G.K. Hall & Co, 1992): 24.
9
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and Fiction of Muriel Spark (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 80-1. Gabriel Josipovici does bring up
Kierkegaard in relation to Spark, but only as a more general reference point for situating her work – and Josipocivi
seems dismissive of the specifically religious content of both authors (“The Large Testimony of Muriel Spark,” in
Hidden Possibilities: Essays in Honor of Muriel Spark, 19-21). For an interesting discussion of Newman and
Kierkegaard, see George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 194-8. Pattison argues that “Newman shared with Kierkegaard the view that Christian faith
was in certain key respects scandalous to the unregenerate human mind… he was equally clear that the kind of
reason appropriate to faith was very different from that found amongst adherents of modern, post-Enlightenment,
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Auden connects the two in his introduction to the Kierkegaard anthology The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard,
noting that “both men were faced with the problem of preaching to a secularized society which was still officially
Christian, and neither was a naïve believer, so that in each case one is conscious when reading their work that they
are preaching to two congregations, one outside and one inside the pulpit” (3). Nathan A. Scott, Jr. goes so far as to
assert that Kierkegaard and Newman alone among modern theologians have been “influenced in any decisive way
by poetic methods and modalities” (The Poetics of Belief: Studies in Coleridge, Arnold, Pater, Santayana, Stevens,
and Heidegger [Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985], 11). Theodor Haecker, so important to
Kierkegaard’s translation into English via his German translations, also translated Newman into German, a process
which hastened his own conversion to Catholicism. Haecker directly connects Kierkegaard and Newman as similar
types, figures who appear in defense of vigorous Christianity at the very time when “Christianity should long since
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According to her biographer Martin Stannard, Spark received from a friend a copy of
Alexander Dru’s translation of the Journals in 1953, a year before her conversion to
Catholicism.10 She mentions the Journals in her early short story “Bang Bang, You’re Dead,”
where a character with biographical parallels to Spark (as a woman immigrant to colonial Africa
trapped in an unhappy marriage) experiences a revelation while reading the book.11 Spark’s love
for the Journals continued throughout her life; in 1981 she mentions the book among a list of
“old favourites,” putting the book in the same company as Shakespeare’s sonnets and the dialogs
of Plato.12 Spark’s extended interaction with the Journals gave her a thorough exposure to
Kierkegaard’s disregard for complacent Christianity, as well as his ideas about the usefulness of
irony and indirect communication.13 She seems early on to have grasped Kierkegaard’s intention
to provoke the reader out of complacency; in 1956 (a year before her debut as a novelist),
reviewing an anthology of Kierkegaard selections put together by T.H. Croxall, she asserted that
“As was Kierkegaard’s way, partly his intention, these meditations provoke resistance,
reservations, qualifications, as well as assent or mere admiration; the main thing is that they do
not leave the reader indifferent unless he is indifferent to religion.”14 The transformation of

have become an archaeological question and a joke” (Søren Kierkegaard, trans. with a biographical note by
Alexander Dru [London: Oxford University Press, 1937], 57-8).
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Muriel Spark: The Biography (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 157.
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“Sybil lay in bed in the mornings reading the translation of Kierkegaard’s Journals, newly arrived from England
in their first, revelatory month of publication. She felt like a desert which had not realised its own aridity till the rain
began to fall on it” (Muriel Spark, All the Stories of Muriel Spark [New York: New Directions, 2001], 59.
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The Golden Fleece, 160.
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In September of 1953 Spark reviewed a memoir about Simone Weil, written by two of the thinker’s friends, for
The Observer. Discussing the fact that Weil almost converted to Roman Catholicism but did not, Spark assesses
Weil’s character as a sort of gadfly: “She was, in fact, of the order of independent Christians who seem expressly
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The Golden Fleece, 201.
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indifference into activity would prove equally important in Spark’s own novelistic technique,
and for similar reasons: she shared Kierkegaard’s distrust of complacent, assumed religion.
Key to Spark’s indirect communication in her early novels, as with O’Brien’s later
novels, is the sense of detachment that runs through them. Many critics would agree with John
Updike that “Detachment is the genius of her fiction,” and with Frank Kermode’s description of
her fiction as laid out from above, like a satellite image, providing a detached view of the
whole.15 But to what end does Spark employ this detachment? Some see her detachment as cruel,
but more sympathetic critics argue that her detachment nudges readers toward an unsettled state
where “What is required… is that the reader should be continually on duty.”16 Spark’s arousal of
the reader’s awareness involves a Kierkegaardian act of “taking away,” where she deprives the
reader of the traditional affective comforts of literature. Addressing the American Academy of
Arts and Letters in 1971, Spark laid out her vision of what literature should aim to accomplish,
decrying sentimental literature as a “segregated art” that cuts the reader off from reality, and
suggesting in its place:
A less impulsive generosity, a less indignant representation of social injustice, and a more
deliberate cunning, a more derisive undermining of what is wrong. I would like to see
less emotion and more intelligence in these efforts to impress our minds and hearts…The
art of ridicule, if it is on the mark – and if it is not true on the mark it is not art at all – can
penetrate to the marrow. It can leave a salutary scar. It is unnerving. It can paralyze its
object… To bring about a mental environment of honesty and self-knowledge, a sense of
the absurd and a general looking-lively to defend ourselves from the ridiculous
oppressions of our time, and above all to entertain us in the process, has become the
special calling of arts and of letters.17
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Quoted in Whittaker, The Faith and Fiction of Muriel Spark, 14; Frank Kermode, introduction, to Muriel Spark,
Four Novels (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2004), X.
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Spark, ed. Joseph Hynes (New York: G.K. Hall & Co, 1992), 184. See also Whittaker, The Faith and Fiction of
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To combine aesthetic pleasure with ethical content, a combination achieved through the via
negativa of derision: this is the goal of the artist, according to Spark. The unnerving, salutary
scars of satire push the reader, especially in early Spark novels like The Comforters and
Memento Mori, away from deadening complacency toward self-awareness and engagement with
reality. In employing this method, Spark heeded Kierkegaard’s advice in the Journals that
“Sometimes it is healthy to keep a wound open: a healthy open wound; sometimes it is worse
when they close.”18 That O’Brien’s late novels utilized a similar sense of detachment suggests
that both authors felt the need to respond to the social ills of Christendom with a clear,
unsentimental vision.
Maieutic Satire in Midcentury
No direct or immediate transition to Christianity exists. All who in this manner propose
to give the individual a rhetorical push into Christianity, or perhaps even to help him by
administering a beating, all these are deceivers – nay, they know not what they do. –
Johannes Climacus, Concluding Unscientific Postscript19
The embrace of indirect communication in the post-war period sprang from aesthetic, as
well as religious, concerns. While the boom in postwar realism ushered in by the Angry Young
Men rejected the aesthetic experimentation of modernism, it shared with modernism a relative
indifference to ethics. Certain authors, however, resisted the new realism and the residues of
modernism equally, critiquing both trends on grounds that were simultaneously aesthetic and
ethical. Critics have frequently lumped Spark together with two other novelists of the same
generation who shared her aesthetic and ethical impatience with the status quo: Iris Murdoch and
William Golding.20 Murdoch herself addressed the question of morality and aesthetics in fiction
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Kierkegaard, Journals, 138.
Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and
Walter Lowrie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941), 47.
20
For these three as writing fictions with “strange god-shapes,” see MacKay, Marina and Lyndsey Stonebridge,
“Introduction,” in British Fiction after Modernism: The Novel at Mid-Century, ed. Marina MacKay and Lyndsey
19
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as adroitly as anyone in her essay “Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch.” In this essay she
connects the dominance of liberal democracy’s preference for individual freedom to the
floundering of aesthetics in the British novel; her solution entails a “Renewed sense of the
difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons.”21 Such difficulty had
aesthetic implications for Murdoch as well as ethical ones, because it prompted a more
thoughtful, thoroughly written style than what Murdoch categorized as the two dominant types of
novel in post-war Britain, the crystalline (beautifully written, but expressive of nothing) and
journalistic; categories that correspond roughly to modernist and realist techniques. The struggle
to create a new form for the British novel that confronted ethical dilemmas while avoiding the
crystalline and the journalistic styles can be seen in Murdoch’s own novelistic output of the
1950s and 60s, including in her Kierkegaardian novel A Severed Head.
Spark took the criticisms of postwar literature forwarded by Murdoch – an agnostic
Platonist – even further through her particularly Catholic critique of literary dullness. Marina
MacKay has traced the post-war dissatisfaction with the Protestant novel among Catholic writers
and pinpoints the gradualist moral development and explicit characterization typical of this form
as a sticking point for Catholic novelists like Spark. Speaking of Spark’s propensity for opaque
characterizations, MacKay argues that “The freest character is the least realized” became a
central tenet of Spark’s authorship.22 Even as she subjects her characters to the most ruthless

Stonebridge (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4. For a productive pairing of Spark with Golding and J.R.R.
Tolkien regarding the nature of evil, see Robert Eaglestone, “The Question of Evil in Post-war British Fiction,” in
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University Press, 2016), 53-63.
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Iris Murdoch, “Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch,” in The Novel Today, ed. Malcolm Bradbury (Glasgow:
Fontana/Collins, 1977), 30.
22
“Catholicism, Character, and the Invention of the Liberal Novel Tradition,” Twentieth Century Literature 48, no.
2 (Summer, 2002): 231. Earlier in the piece, MacKay, assessing Northanger Abbey, quotes Tom Woodman’s
description of that “Distinctively British tendency to believe that Christianity is simply a matter of being an ordinary
decent individual” (220). This equivalence between Christianity and decency, which as MacKay argues forms one

97

surveillance, Spark erases her own presence from her novels as much as possible, preserving her
authorial freedom. Talking of her conversion to Catholicism, Spark captures some of the paradox
involved in her own narrative voice when she asserts both that “I find I speak far more with my
own voice as a Catholic… [Before conversion] I was talking and writing with other people’s
voices all the time,” and that her narrators are themselves characters, since “Every theme
demands a different sort of commentator, a different intellectual attitude.”23 In essence, this
means that while Spark found in Catholicism the resource to speak from her own viewpoint – to
forego imitation of other authors – she also gained access to a range of narrative voices that
allowed her to disguise her presence in the text. A direct echo of Kierkegaard’s method of
indirect communication, where the different pseudonymous authors worked to disguise the
underlying purposes of Kierkegaard’s authorship, Spark’s multiplicity of voices filtered her own
authorial presence through the aesthetic complexities of various narrative viewpoints.
O’Brien enacted a similar rejection of prior models in his late-career repudiation of his
own early work and the influence of James Joyce. When critical rediscovery of At Swim-TwoBirds brought O’Brien belated accolades in the 1950s – and gave publishers enough interest for
O’Brien to write his final two novels – he nevertheless dismissed his debut novel as “mere
juvenilia,” and seemed genuinely annoyed that the book might be the one to secure his
reputation.24 Likewise O’Brien repeatedly distanced himself from the shadow of Joyce; perhaps
understandably, given how frequently At Swim-Two-Birds drew comparisons to Joyce’s work,
and how often Joyce’s own endorsement of O’Brien’s debut got trotted out in support of the
book’s importance. O’Brien’s rejection of Joyce’s legacy reaches its apex in The Dalkey Archive,

important pillar supporting the British Liberal novel, suggests the complacency of Christendom that Kierkegaard
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where Joyce himself becomes a character, one who strenuously denies having written the books
attributed to him, regarding them as smutty trash. As O’Brien himself argued, his treatment of
Joyce had less to do with the man himself than the mythical critical apparatus that surrounded
works like Ulysses.25 At the same time, as Keith Donohue has argued, O’Brien’s movement
away from Joyce had as much to do with differing aesthetic and ethical goals as with personal
animosity. Per Donohue, while Joyce saw the artist as a sympathetic figure intuitively in touch
with the world, O’Brien’s conception of the artist moved ever further “Toward the artist as
master of abstract feeling, exposing both form and content as artificial.”26 In O’Brien’s late
novels this abstraction finds form as extreme detachment: the author as absent presence. At the
same time, the depictions of Irish society in his final two novels gain a granular specificity
missing from the more fantastical early novels; O’Brien’s late novels take place not in the
Ireland of myth or stage, but the Ireland of post-independence drudgery, where self-important
complacency has become all too common.
It was this delicate balancing act between ethico-religious content and detached tone that
separated Spark and O’Brien’s work from previous models of satire, as well as non-satirical
contemporary fiction. Speaking broadly, traditional satire has fallen into two categories.27 The
first category takes as the target of its ridicule the moral failings of a particular society, and
attacks its targets with affective intensity, marshalling anger and disgust in its denunciation of
hypocrisy, corruption, and overweening ambition. The second type of satire – often called
25
See Ronald L. Dotterer, “Flann O’Brien, James Joyce, and The Dalkey Archive,” New Hibernia Review 8, no. 2
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26
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2001), 344.
27
The classic discussion of satire as a genre comes in Northrop Frye, An Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), 223-239. A good contemporary overview of the topic can be found in Jonathan Greenberg,
The Cambridge Introduction to Satire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
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Menippean – employs a more detached tone, in part because it aims at intellectual, rather than
ethical, follies. Given its cynical appraisal of all systems of thought as doomed to failure, it is no
surprise that Menippean satire assumes an air of detached superiority with regard to its targets.28
What was new and unique in Kierkegaardian satire – especially as it became practiced in its
novelistic form by these Catholic authors of the twentieth century – was the combination of
moral satire’s strong, particular conceptions of moral and ethical correctness with Menippean
satire’s detachment of tone. While maieutic satire agrees with moral satire that society is rife
with problems, it seeks change only at the level of the individual, a task for which moral satire’s
angry stance is ill suited, since the anger motivating social reform turns the gaze of the individual
outwards. At the same time, this satire concurs with Menippean satire that detachment allows for
the best puncturing of folly, but it rejects the Menippean tendency to resignation and remains
committed to the possibility of positive ethical change at the level of the individual. Instead,
maieutic satire occupies an ethical vantage point but aims primarily at developing the
individual’s self-awareness, a goal it seeks to accomplish by holding up a mirror to the individual
that exposes the individual’s own follies, an image undistorted by affective response of any sort.
Moving from the conceptual to the historical, the satire of Spark and O’Brien differed
importantly from other contemporaneous practices of satire. Following Wyndham Lewis, the
satire practiced by many British modernists also deviated from traditional categories of satire,
but in the opposite direction from Spark and O’Brien’s satire, tending to be both non-moral and
more affectively charged than what would follow post-war.29 There was a savagery, a heatedness
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to Lewis’ style that fit oddly with his insistence on the non-moral, surface-focused nature of his
satire, an anger which led to Hugh Kenner’s memorable epithet for Lewis: the satirist as
barbarian.30 As Alan Bold notes, this savagery is at odds with Spark’s more restrained style, a
restraint shared by O’Brien’s late work.31 Evelyn Waugh – the most obvious predecessor to
Spark, as a Catholic convert and satirical novelist – possessed strong convictions and a certain
detachedness in tone, but rarely simultaneously: his earlier, more detached novels display a
certain Menippean non-moral anarchy, while his later, more moral works come laced with an
obvious bitterness in tone.32
The realist fiction of the post-war novelists associated with the Angry Young Men
favored descriptive precision over any prescriptive ethics, and indeed flaunted its willingness to
transgress norms, while prizing the strong, obvious connections between author and creation.33
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Those realist authors who traded in satire, notably Kingsley Amis, seemed to follow Wyndham
Lewis in mixing non-moral satire with an affective register containing anger and disgust. Across
the Atlantic, the 1950s and 60s saw a flourishing of political and social satire which depended on
the anger of the outsider to power its critiques of conformist American culture.34 Finally, the
postmodern fiction that would emerge in the 1960s and 70s – a movement with which Spark and
O’Brien are often linked as forerunners – would value the erasure of the author, but an erasure at
odds with Spark and O’Brien’s conceptions of it.35 Postmodern fiction, like Menippean satire,
tended to practice fiction that was non-moral and detached, a fact that accounts for frequent
critical association of postmodern authors with Menippean practice – including, erroneously,
O’Brien.36 It is precisely this unique combination – moral firmness with aesthetic detachment –
that has led to such divisive critical debate on the proper way to categorize the work of Spark and
O’Brien.
While earlier authors like Huxley and Greene utilized Kierkegaardian ideas about the
stages of life to create new methods of character development, Spark and O’Brien largely
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abstained from character development in favor of static, almost caricatural figures who they set
to work in their theater of ideas. Like Kierkegaard, they might be accused of acting as puppet
masters over their characters, but they enacted their strict control in the service of satires that
draw the reader in through aesthetic openness; the affective gaps in the text brought about by the
unfreedom of the characters elicit an active response from the reader. As Wayne C. Booth
argues, “Distance is never an end in itself; distance along one axis is sought for the sake of
increasing the reader’s involvement along some other axis.”37 By severing any positive affective
engagement with the text, Spark and O’Brien force the astute reader into a grappling with his or
her own folly, since every reader will potentially find some character in the text who acts as a
reflection of his or her own vices.
Crucially, even anger is absent from the affective register of these satires. The absence of
anger clearly separates this strain of satire from earlier practices of the form; not only the satires
of Lewis and the modernists, but previous giants like Swift, who saw satire as a means of
enacting societal reform. Anger prompts the reader to turn outward, identifying problems in
society at large. Maieutic satire, by maintaining a flat or neutral affect, does not afford the reader
the option of evading their own problems, nor does it allow the reader to depict their own vices
as tragic or sympathetic (as a non-satirical novel might). Neither does it line up with the aims of
Menippean satire that seeks to undermine all systems of thought. Since Menippean satire takes as
a starting premise the idea that all forms of knowledge and structures of authority are
irredeemably rotted, it enacts a sort of literary nihilism, where injustices and follies are not worth
getting angry about, since they form the status quo of human existence. Readers, then, receives a
reprieve from Menippean satire: if they are fools too, they cannot change their plight. With

37

The Rhetoric of Fiction, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 123.

103

maieutic satire, however, the individual reader gets indicted as a fool, just like every other
member of modern society, but his or her folly can be measured against an unwavering standard,
the demands of truth – in the case of O’Brien and Spark, the truth of the Catholic Church. Spark,
crediting her conversion with giving her the tools needed to write novels, asserts that “I’m quite
sure that my conversion gave me something to work on as a satirist. The Catholic belief is a
norm from which one can depart.”38 It is this combination of an unwavering norm with a
technique that only hints at that norm that gives the satires of Spark and O’Brien their
Kierkegaardian nature, an indirectness that has made them difficult for critics to pin down. Their
satire cannot be categorized under previous models of the genre; it represents a new form,
responsive to the pressures of modern life, that combines static ethics with fluid aesthetics.
Indirect Communication and Satire in Kierkegaard’s Christendom
The category of my work is: to make men aware of Christianity, and consequently
I always say: I am not an example, for otherwise all would be confusion. My task
is to deceive people, in a true sense, into entering the sphere of religious
obligation which they have done away with; but I am without authority. Instead of
authority I make use of the very reverse, I say: the whole thing is my own
education. That, once again, is a truly socratic discovery. Just as he was ignorant,
in my case it is: instead of being the teacher, being the one who is educated– 1849
entry in Kierkegaard’s journal39
The two scholars to document in any detail Kierkegaard’s entrance into British culture,
George Pattison and Peter A. Schilling, both argue that the philosopher’s popularity reached an
early peak with the waging of World War II and declined precipitously in the period afterward.
Pattison and Schilling suggest that this had in part to do with the passing of the sense of crisis
fomented by the war – as optimism returned, Kierkegaard became less salient as a coping
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mechanism.40 Kierkegaard’s decline in popularity seems inarguable, but also historically apt,
since Kierkegaard’s visibility waned during a time similar to the one he wrote against in his
works. Kierkegaard, while the voice of crisis, wrote in a time that he saw as largely devoid of
crisis. He wrote specifically to imbue the bourgeois, contented Copenhagen of his lifetime with a
sense of the urgency of religious belief. Given that his contemporaneous countrymen largely
ignored his writings, there is a certain appropriateness in the fact that his star faded in Britain at
the exact time he would have felt himself most needed: the re-establishment of Christianity as a
status quo in the post-war period would have spurred him on to continued assaults on rote
religion.
Tracing Kierkegaard’s continuing imprint on British culture after World War II, then,
entails turning from the obvious contact point of crisis-catalyzed character change, the what of
Kierkegaard’s movement between the stages of life that most influenced Huxley and Greene, to
the how, Kierkegaard’s maieutic method. In seeking to communicate with his fellow Danes
about religious truth, and to rouse them from their complacency, Kierkegaard utilized indirect
communication, especially in the early, pseudonymous period. For Kierkegaard to preach a
sermon to his contemporaries on the truths of Christianity would have done them little good,
because as members of Christendom they knew the words and dogmas already. Instead,
Kierkegaard saw his goal as deceiving his readers into understanding Christianity anew by first
making it strange and difficult, and by peeling away the detritus of false Christianity through
ridicule. He portrayed indirect communication as the art of taking away:
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Because everybody knows it, the Christian truth has gradually become a triviality, of
which it is difficult to secure a primitive impression. This being the case, the art of
communication at last becomes the art of taking away, of luring something away from
someone… When a man has his mouth so full of food that he is prevented from eating,
and is like to starve in consequence, does giving him food consist in stuffing still more of
it in his mouth, or does it consist in taking some of it away, so that he can begin to eat?41
The necessity of religious communication as a taking away connects Kierkegaard’s moment to
the midcentury in Britain and Ireland, where religious terminology remained prevalent enough to
be familiar to a general populace raised in the atmosphere of Christendom. Other methods of
religious communication gaining traction after World War II, notably the religious crusades of
Billy Graham and religious broadcasting made available over the radio, aimed to reach mass
audiences with direct restatements of Christian doctrine. Though crusades and radio
programming proved immensely popular in the post-war years, they failed to spark
thoroughgoing revival, their influence quickly spluttering.42 Kierkegaard would say that their
method of communication had doomed them from the start: direct communication about religion
broadcast to the masses would by its very nature fail to convey the realities of Christianity.
Instead, the individual must be goaded toward religious truth through the helpful deceit of
indirect communication.
Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, or fictional authors, themselves constituted a main avenue
for his indirect communication, for they take away the certainty of direct statement through their
dialectic multiplicity. Hence my preference for referring to them as fictional authors: they do not
merely disguise Kierkegaard’s true opinions under a false name but represent distinct viewpoints
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in their own right, viewpoints that interact with each other over the course of the pseudonymous
works. Kierkegaard strove to create distance between his position as author and the position of
the reader by erasing the traditional authority of the author-figure. As one fictional author,
Johannes Climacus, says of the fictional personalities A and B of Either/Or, “The fact that there
is no author is a means of keeping the reader at a distance”.43 For Flann O’Brien and Muriel
Spark, as for the midcentury Catholic satirists more generally, authorial distance would prove
key in their method of satirizing religious complacency. O’Brien – real name Brian O’Nolan –
famously wrote under several pseudonyms, but the more interesting technique of distancing
found in his later work, a technique he shares with Spark, consists in deploying narrative
distance through cold, affectless tone. This deadpan presentation works to defamiliarize and
discomfort readers, in the process forcing them to consider uncomfortable topics like hypocrisy
and death not as traits or events happening to outlandish fictional characters, but as directly
relevant to the life of the reader.
By blandly yet ruthlessly depicting the empty folly of their characters, Spark and O’Brien
encouraged their readers to identify folly in their own lives, without being waylaid by verbal
pyrotechnics, distracting sympathy, or the presence of the author. This absence of authorial
presence leaves the reader without a sure guide through the follies they witness on the page,
creating gaps of affect where the reader does not immediately know the proper emotional
response. These affective gaps elicit an active response in the reader, a response Kierkegaard
discussed when praising those of Plato’s dialogs that end not “In a result but a sting.” The
method of learning allowed by indirectness forces the reader to slow down and consider his or
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her position, a reaction which contrasts strongly with the rote learning of direct communication,
which “Says everything as quickly as possible and all at once” and only enables the learner to
repeat phrases “Like a parrot”.44
Maieutic satire, of necessity, trades breadth of reach for depth of impact, preferring to
reach a few individuals receptive to its message rather than compromise and reach the
multitudes, which would entail a distortion of the message. According to Kierkegaard, the
individual can only attain true Christianity through a direct confrontation with God; the writer
who hopes to communicate religious truth must therefore craft their message to fit the individual
reader, and in such a way as to not distract the reader with any hint of authorial authority.
Kierkegaard’s heroes, Socrates and Jesus, willingly made this trade-off between quality and
quantity, as did Kierkegaard himself.45 The Catholic satirists of the midcentury made this same
bargain, avoiding the direct communication indicative of both religious preaching like Graham’s,
and the resurgent realism of postwar fiction. In pursuing indirect communication, O’Brien and
Spark became like Kierkegaard’s “Secret agents… not only [having] to work continuously, but at
the same time labour[ing] to conceal [their] work”.46 Spark and O’Brien echoed Kierkegaard in
their creation of a satiric style that combined the unlikely bedfellows of firm moral judgement
and a style detached from the typical moral judgements or affective registers of satire, crafting a
satire responsive to life in the waning days of Christendom.

44

Kierkegaard, Journals, 155.
Consider, for example, Jesus’ discourse on his use of parables in Matthew 13, where he states that he uses
parables specifically so that the crowds will not understand him. For a reading of Spark’s fiction as akin to parables,
see Joan Leonard, “‘Loitering with Intent: Muriel Spark’s Parabolic Technique,” Studies in the Literary Imagination
18, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 65-77.
46
Søren Kierkegaard, The Present Age and Of the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle, trans. Alexander
Dru (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 80, 82.
45

108

Tectonic Shifts: Postwar Religion in Britain and Ireland
‘Do you believe in God?’
‘Yes.’
‘Do you believe in a God who can change the course of events on
earth?’
‘No, just the ordinary one.’ – From a survey of British religious beliefs47
Before analyzing the ways in which Spark and O’Brien enacted their satire at the level of
form, it’s important to understand the instantiation of Christendom which they confronted in
their work. Muriel Spark could not have known, when joining the Roman Catholic Church in
1954 after a brief stopover in Anglicanism, that she was converting to Christianity just before a
time of unprecedented upheaval in religion’s place in British life. Though a rigorous scholarly
debate exists over particulars of scope and causation, most scholars of British religion agree that
the 1960s marked a sea change in British religious practice, a cataclysmic drop-off from which
institutional Christianity in Britain has never recovered.48 Usual suspects abound: the sexual
revolution, a resurgence of theological modernism, an insurmountable generation gap.49
Regardless of its causes, this national nosedive in church participation, across all metrics, is all
the more startling considering that the immediate aftermath of World War II witnessed a boom in
public religion in the country.50 As we shall see, the drop-off in Ireland was less obvious and
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cataclysmic, but cracks had begun to show in the Catholic foundation of Irish public life, and by
century’s end Ireland would land in roughly the same space as Britain, with the Catholic Church
stripped of its traditional pride of place in Irish life.
Hugh McCleod suggests a sub-periodization he refers to as the “early sixties”, lasting
from 1958-1962, which preceded the deluge of de-Christianization in the sixties proper, but
which hinted at the impending crisis. While, according to McCleod, “Christendom” remained
intact in the early sixties, the cracks in its foundation became more visible, with satirists and
individualists engaging in a “cautious questioning” of the religious status quo.51 McCleod’s
periodization helpfully distinguishes a period of pre-crisis during which Catholic satirists like
Spark seemed to sense the coming storm. If we assume that the post-war survival of Christendom
was more fragile than it appeared, as even McCleod acknowledges, then the two decades
between the end of the war and the beginning of major religious decline mark a period of gradual
rotting away, in internal and often invisible ways, of the structures of institutional Christianity in
Britain and Ireland. Rowntree and Lavers’ major post-war sociological survey, English Life and
Leisure, confirms the shaky ground on which “Christendom” stood in Britain in this era. The
many case studies provided in the book attest to a combination of public acknowledgement of
religion, especially the Church of England, paired with a general indifference to its actual
content, and a marked distrust of its institutional aspects, especially the clergy.52
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While Ireland saw little of the immediate changes wrought in British religion in the
1960s, remaining a country with a public life heavily dominated by the Catholic Church until at
least the 1990s, many of the same tensions could be felt there as in Britain in the post-war
period.53 Church and state remained fairly separate from each other in the wake of the formation
of the Irish Republic.54 Lack of official state power, however, did not keep the Church from
playing a significant role in Ireland’s public life, especially since Irish education ran largely
through parochial schools.55 No less influential for being indirect, Catholicism’s power in Ireland
created a curious state of affairs, a religious practice at once private and public. Tom Inglis
identifies three major areas where adherence to Catholic practice afforded individuals capital: in
the social, political, and economic spheres.56 Since to defy the church entailed a loss of cultural
capital, most Irish Catholics conformed outwardly to the church’s demands, even if this practice
was “Often a matter of lip service by people going through the motions”.57 The unique Irish
blend of private and public religion created an environment where even a committed Catholic
like Flann O’Brien might flinch at the particular version of Christianity found in the country, and
the prevalence of rote, lifeless religion gave O’Brien’s satirical sensibilities plenty of fodder.
In this period of the “early sixties,” then – the period in which O’Brien wrote his late
novels, and Spark her early ones – both Britain and Ireland experienced an odd mixture of public
and private Christianities, where public assent often outstripped private devotion. In Britain,
affirmation of Christianity’s importance to the nation could quite easily go hand in hand with an
53
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utter lack of interest, even strong disbelief, in the particulars of its belief system and in its formal
practice, a state Grace Davie has described as “believing without belonging” – where the
“believing” itself often amounted to little more than a vague deism and assent to the Golden
Rule.58 In Ireland this religious ambiguity took the form of public adherence to religious practice
– fulfilling the obligation to attend Sunday mass, primarily – without a corresponding
internalization of religious beliefs and practices. Both these situations imply the existence of
what Kierkegaard described as Christendom, the enshrinement of Christianity as a presumed
state of being, and part of the presumed being of the State. For Kierkegaard, the Lutheranism of
most of his fellow Danes lacked vigor; people assumed they were Christian by virtue of their
baptism as infants, and their life in a Lutheran nation, but gave their attention to other pursuits.
Kierkegaard’s self-appointed task was to sting them out of complacency, toward a choice
between wholehearted embrace of Christianity and absolute rejection.59 O’Brien and Spark’s
novels in this period aim at similar ends, devoting themselves to excoriating rote religious
practice while hinting at a fuller practice of Christianity. While O’Brien tried to sweep away the
detritus peculiar to the Irish practice of Roman Catholicism, Spark satirized both the complacent
Anglican majority of Britain and the lackluster Catholic minority, who often fail to live up to the
standards of the Church. Both authors engage in a sort of via negativa, where their satirical
depictions of religious practice show the reader what not to do, but only obliquely sketch what
they see as the shape of true belief.
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In one sense, it is no spectacular feat to deride religious complacency and hypocrisy,
stock targets of satirists throughout the ages. What set O’Brien’s and Spark’s work apart was the
granularity of their critiques; since they recognized the faults endemic to religious practice while
remaining religious themselves, they achieved the specificity of caricature that general attacks on
religious hypocrisy often miss. Since the Irish religious context differed from the British context,
it is no surprise that O’Brien and Spark emphasized different faults, but their critiques shared
important similarities. Primarily, both attacked the use of religion as a means of intellectual,
social, or emotional security: their ridiculous characters miss the dangerous edge of faith, what
Kierkegaard described as life “out over seventy thousand fathoms,” because they see religion as
a source of security, not challenge. If Christendom entailed, for Kierkegaard, the valuing
Christianity as a means to some other end, rather than an end in itself, then O’Brien and Spark
bring Kierkegaard’s attack upon Christendom into the twentieth century, critiquing the last
vestiges of means-to-an-end Christianity as it stood on the cusp of vanishing from British and
Irish life.
Though a lifelong practicing Catholic, O’Brien treated religion only glancingly in his
early novels, where it acted as backdrop rather than focal point. But The Hard Life and The
Dalkey Archive examine religion extensively, showing O’Brien’s willingness to criticize the
excesses of Irish Catholicism while remaining loyal to the church. When O’Brien, offering a
retrospective on James Joyce, outlined Joyce’s reaction against the stifling forces of Irish
Catholicism, he could well have been describing his own life and work: “Rebelling not so much
against the Church but against its near-schismatic Irish eccentricities, its pretence that there is
only one Commandment, the vulgarity of its edifices, the shallowness and stupidity of many of
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its ministers.”60 These conditions surrounding Irish Catholicism had, if anything, intensified in
the period after Joyce left Ireland for good, and the 1950s could be seen as their apex, before the
thaw that came in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, the reforms of which O’Brien
heartily approved.61 Like many Irish writers, O’Brien criticized the staidness of Irish religious
culture but, bucking the general trend, he never abandoned the Catholicism of his upbringing;62
neither did he crusade directly for internal changes to the structure of the Church in Ireland.
Instead he engaged in bouts of Kierkegaardian satire, sketching, in dispassionate detail, the
vagaries of religious belief drained of its vigor, reduced to rote recitations of catechetical
theology and memorized factoids of church history. As he said of The Dalkey Archive, his late
work represented both a satire on those who would attack religious belief tout cort, and a chance
to “Chide the Church in certain of its aspects.”63
The late novels abound with examples of Catholic practice gone bad, from the abusive
schooling Finnbar receives from the Christian Brothers in The Hard Life – who “Give [him]
some idea of what the early Christians went through in the arena by thrashing the life out of
[him]”64 – to the presence of the disappointingly petty spirit of St. Augustine in The Dalkey
Archive. Much of the satire in the two books focuses on the presence of Jesuit priests, who
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exemplify the use of religion as a means to intellectual and material comfort.65 Both books
feature Jesuits in prominent roles, bearing provocative but descriptive names: the German Jesuit
Father Kurt Fahrt in The Hard Life, who lives up to his moniker through long-winded
pontificating, and Father Cobble in The Dalkey Archive, who can barely cobble together enough
intelligence to perform his duties as priest and religious counselor. Both men ably live up to the
Jesuit stereotype of being both nitpicky and materialistic, less concerned with spiritual duties
than fleshly comforts. Fahrt spends most of his time away from his brother priests, engaging in
flaccid theological discourses with the equally bloviated Mr. Collopy, always over a warming
jug of whiskey; though he defends the church absolutely against Collopy’s accusations of
corruption, he does nothing to live out its teachings. Cobble, meanwhile, fails utterly at his main
task of providing spiritual guidance. He does nothing to persuade the mad scientist De Selby to
renounce his dangerous experiments, and when confronted with the figure of James Joyce, who
disputes his own authorship of smut like Ulysses and wishes to join the Jesuits, Father Cobble
misunderstands and offers him a job repairing the holes in the Fathers’ undergarments. These
priests have so accustomed themselves to the order of the world that they retain no inkling of
true religious practice. Like the Lutheran pastors of Kierkegaard’s Denmark, others forgive them
their outbursts of religious language, since such rote words form part of their job description, but
they do their best to otherwise conceal the demands of Christian practice.66
Through these satirical pokes, O’Brien exposed the dangers of too much deference
toward priests, especially educated orders like the Jesuits, a deference that formed one of the
foundations of Irish Catholicism.67 Far from mere anti-clericalism, however, O’Brien’s satirical
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anatomizing of the clergy related to a deeper spiritual problem he sensed in Irish Catholicism: an
all or nothing mentality where people either engaged heroically with religion, or scraped by with
the bare minimum as they went about their daily lives. O’Brien sensed behind grandiose
pretensions to spiritual greatness a longing for life made easy; it is in fact much easier to be
religious in a state of heroic isolation than in the muck of everyday life. In The Hard Life, Mr.
Collopy, who equates religion with social justice, ignores his familial responsibilities to focus
obsessively on his crusade to install public women’s restrooms in Dublin (a quest that he views
as spiritual in nature), going so far as to secure a papal visit to help arrange the details. Mick, the
protagonist of The Dalkey Archive, contemplates abandoning his girlfriend Mary for life in a
religious order, preferably one with a vow of silence for added difficulty. Both novels push
against this heroic view of religion, satirizing it by comparing it unfavorably with the simple life
of faithful religious practice. Mick, describing the mad scientist and heretic De Selby, claims that
““His ideas quite transcended this earth – this damn earth we’re lying on now,” to which Mary
replies “But about transcending this earth… the simplest priest does that every Sunday.”68 No
spiritual or intellectual superheroics required: the faithful repetition of the Mass provides the
surest route to transcendence. Mick learns this lesson by novel’s end, as he decides to marry
Mary after all, despite the fact that she might be pregnant, either by divine miracle or by Mick’s
unscrupulous best friend. His decision to embrace the absurd as a second Joseph marks Mick as a
Kierkegaardian knight of true faith, making the necessary inward leap while remaining
outwardly unremarkable. Mick’s renunciation of spiritual elitism and embrace of everyday living
make him O’Brien’s sort of spiritual exemplar, a man willing to embrace the absurdities of belief
in the midst of mundane life.
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Likewise, the picture Muriel Spark painted in her early novels of the perils of
Christendom underscored the dangers of seeking in religion a source of security. She exposed all
sorts of religious practice as a means to an end, from spiritualism that acts as a cover for material
greed in The Bachelors to the Calvinism of 1930s Edinburgh, utilized primarily to keep social
order, in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie. Spark saved her sharpest barbs for her co-religionists,
however, perhaps because she saw complacency in the face of the claims of Catholicism most
objectionable. Caroline, the convert protagonist of her first novel The Comforters, regards her
fellow English Catholics with contempt because of their lackadaisical and self-satisfied
approaches to their religion. Hearing a fellow convert’s description of Catholicism, Caroline is
taken aback: “‘The wonderful thing about being a Catholic is that it makes life so easy.
Everything easy for salvation and you can have a happy life…’ He finished there, as if he had
filled up the required page of his school exercise book, and need state no more; he lay back in his
chair, wiped his glasses, crossed his legs.”69 The idea of Catholicism making life easy appears
absurd to Caroline, who (like Spark) has broken off a longstanding affair to conform to the
Church’s teaching on chastity. Instead, for her Catholicism involves suffering, a pain that strips
away the illusion of religion as comfort.
Perhaps Spark’s most distilled picture of religion as security comes in the description of
the grandmother character in Spark’s short story “The Gentile Jewesses”: “She believed in the
Almighty… She was a member of the Mother’s Union of the Church of England. She attended
all the social functions of the Methodists, Baptists, and Quakers. This was bright and agreeable
as well as being good for business. She never went to church on Sundays, only for special

69

Muriel Spark, The Comforters (London: Penguin, 1963), 40. The assessment given of this convert’s complacency
almost certainly directly echoes this passage from Kierkegaard’s Journals: “There are many people who reach their
conclusions about life like schoolboys; they cheat their master by copying the answer out of a book without having
worked out the sum for themselves” (39).

117

services such as on Remembrance Day.”70 Adherence to the outward, social and national aspects
of religion, combined with a baseline belief in a vague sort of deism: this is what Spark detected
in the England around her in the “early sixties,” and it was this complacent public religion that
she ruthlessly anatomized, nowhere more effectively than in The Comforters and Memento Mori.
The Comforters is very much the product of a recent convert to Catholicism, full of energy but
also skepticism regarding fellow-practitioners, who may not be living the faith with full vigor.
The only Catholic Caroline feels any sympathy with is Ernest Manders, the gay uncle of her
former lover, who like her has chosen the celibate life after reverting: “She said he was her sort
of Catholic, critical but conforming. Ernest always agreed with Caroline that the True Church
was awful, though unfortunately, one couldn’t deny, true.”71 The ability to be both critical and
conforming is the paradoxical active faith that Spark’s work embraces yet finds all too
uncommon among Catholics.
If The Comforters provides several salient examples of complacent living, Memento Mori
offers a whole smörgåsbord. Every character in the book’s cast of elderly upper-class Brits gives
a different angle on the problem of complacent living, from Alec Warner’s scientific detachment
to Percy Mannering’s poetic excesses to Geoffrey Colston’s stubborn refusal to examine his life.
The plot of the book, wherein each character receives phone calls from a mysterious voice who
warns them to “Remember you must die,” imbues Memento Mori with something of the feel of a
laboratory, with the reader observing the different reactions elicited by this aural experiment.72
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Mostly these reactions take the form of evasion, a refusal to come to grips with the message itself
in favor of obsessing over the incidentals of the calls: what the voice sounds like, who the caller
could be, or how the other recipients respond to hearing the voice.
At one extreme stands Mrs. Pettigrew, the vain, greedy housekeeper, who simply blocks
the message from her mind entirely: “Mrs. Pettigrew continued to persuade herself she had not
heard the anonymous voice on the telephone; it was not a plain ignoring of the incident; she
omitted even to keep a mental record of it, but put down the receiver and blacked it out from her
life.”73 Mrs. Pettigrew cannot allow anything to disturb her material and psychological comfort,
so she blots out any attempts to rouse her from complacency. At the other pole stands Jean
Taylor, former maid, who receives no phone calls but endures daily reminders of death, stuck in
a gerontology ward. Taylor copes with unpleasant realities through her Catholicism, “Employing
her pain to magnify the Lord, and meditating sometimes confidingly upon Death, the first of the
Four Last Things to be ever remembered,” as the book’s final line informs the reader.74 Like
Caroline in The Comforters, Jean Taylor uses the suffering of religious belief as a means of
staving off complacency. Between these two poles lie a whole range of responses to the painful
prick of the memento mori, a panoply of roads better not taken. What the various characters miss
in their avoidance of the message is life itself; as the police inspector Mortimer – who shares
Jean Taylor’s opinion that the phone calls come from Death itself – muses, “Death, when it
approaches, ought not take one by surprise. It should be part of the full expectancy of life.
Without an ever-present sense of death life is insipid.”75 Many characters in Spark’s early novels
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share this quality of insipidness, and as a result live as if not fully alive. Whatever their stated
religious affiliations, their ultimate object of worship remains the material world they inhabit.
Detachment at Work
My purpose in life would seem to be to present the truth as I discover it in such a way as
simultaneously to destroy all possible authority. By ceasing to have authority, by being in
the greatest possible degree unreliable in the eyes of man, I present the truth and put
them in a contradictory position from which they can only save themselves by making the
truth their own. Personality is only ripe when a man has made the truth his own whether
it is Balaam’s ass speaking or a laughing jack-ass with his loud laugh, an apostle or an
angel – 1843 entry in Kierkegaard’s Journal76

As they sought to expose the follies of complacency they witnessed in the contemporary
practice of Christianity, Spark and O’Brien maintained an ironic distance in their critiques, a
distance that might suggest a lack of concern about the religious problems they detected in
society, but which rather constituted a method of maneuvering the reader toward an unflinching
confrontation with his or her own follies. While the particularities of their detached methods
differed, the underlying goal remained the same: to provoke the reader to inward reflection and
awareness. For O’Brien, detached satire takes the form of a plain documentary style – too plain
even for realism, rather a sort of sub-realism – that favors reported speech with little narratorial
comment. Such plainness lets O’Brien’s characters expose themselves through their own speech,
and corresponding (lack of) actions, while putting the reader through a test of patience. In some
sense the critical consensus that finds The Hard Life and The Dalkey Archive less appealing than
O’Brien’s early novels is correct: the late novels cultivate a deliberate difficulty and
unpleasantness in their deadpan recording of folly. By withholding any source of aesthetic relief,
O’Brien forces the reader to stare, unblinking, at the effects of ethical complacency on the
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individual. Spark achieves her detachment through another method; if O’Brien utilizes the
narratorial eye of the documentary camera, Spark’s vision resembles that of a scientist peering
through a microscope, looking down and impartially observing the results of her narrative
experiments. Critics have sometimes regarded Spark’s lack of sympathy for her characters as
springing from cruelty, but in reality it has its source in Spark’s desire to challenge and develop
the reader. Her authorial detachment teaches the reader how to respond to foolish characters –
with neither anger nor sentimental pity, but a clear-eyed gaze that recognizes in every fool a
reflection of the reader.
An Astonishing Parade of Nullity: Detachment in Flann O’Brien
An illusion can never be destroyed directly, and only by indirect means can it be
radically removed. If it is an illusion that all are Christians – and if there is anything to
be done about it, it must be done indirectly, not by one who vociferously proclaims
himself an extraordinary Christian, but by one who, better instructed, is ready to declare
that he is not a Christian at all – Kierkegaard, The Point of View77

Flann O’Brien’s final two novels pushed to the extreme a comic and satirical technique of
absence which long fascinated him. As pseudonym Myles speculated in one of his newspaper
columns, “The supreme if somewhat esoteric expression of comicality [is] not to appear at all.
Just abstraction, blankness, nullity for one day.”78 O’Brien’s taste for nullity reaches its apex in
the late novels, which O’Brien regarded as his finest – and funniest – books, an opinion which
few critics share.79 Regardless of how humorous these last two novels are, their heightened
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detachment does affect readers through its very lack of affect. As Neil R. Davison argues, the
sub-realism of The Hard Life helps evoke its target of attack, the complacent bourgeois society
of 1950s Ireland.80 O’Brien himself recognized the satirical and educative potential of the
indirect communication of these two novels; like Kierkegaard, he sought to force a confrontation
between reader and idea through stepping out of the way and leaving space. Of The Hard Life he
asserted that “Its apparently pedestrian style is delusive… Everything was done with
deliberation, the characters illuminating themselves and others by their outlandish behaviour and
preposterous conversations… I deliberately avoided direct narrative on description.” He went
even farther in his assessment of The Dalkey Archive: “The Dalkey Archive is not a novel… The
book is really an essay in extreme derision of literary attitudes and people and its pervasive fault
is its absence of emphasis in certain places, to help the reader.”81 This statement contains an
unexplained ambiguity: does O’Brien mean that the book lacks the emphasis that would help
readers, or does he mean that the absence itself gives readers the help they require? Whatever
O’Brien meant by the assessment, the gaps and absences in The Hard Life and The Dalkey
Archive put the burden of interpretation on the reader, forcing her or him to untangle the
knottiness lying under the apparently simple surface. In O’Brien’s late novels, the bland surface
disguises a depth of critique, the “pervasive fault” of lack of emphasis becoming an asset
prompting greater alertness on the part of the reader.
A main technique O’Brien employs in both novels to create these Kierkegaardian empty
spaces is the use of simply presented dialog, without narrative comment, that allows for “The
characters illuminating themselves and others… by their preposterous conversations.” In other
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words, O’Brien lets his characters hang themselves with their own rope, carving out space in
these brief, compact novels for winding discourses that produce little to no meaning. Tellingly,
these conversations tend to be of a theological nature: Mr. Collopy and Father Fahrt joust with
each other repeatedly in The Hard Life, and the various puffed up characters in The Dalkey
Archive – De Selby, St. Augustine, Father Cobble, and James Joyce – engage in a series of
dialogs where they hash out obscure matters of church history and dogma. O’Brien lets these
conversations develop languidly, creating baggy pockets of digression within each novel. What
frustrates the reader in these conversations – their meandering pointlessness – is precisely the
point. The collective pontificating of these various blowhards forms (to borrow a phrase from
The Third Policeman) “an astonishing parade of nullity.”82 Apart from subtleties like character
names, the books make little comment on the nature of these discourses, instead letting the
reader draw his or her own conclusions.83 Take for example this back and forth between Collopy
and Fahrt, where the two start out discussing Collopy’s hobby horse of public women’s
restrooms, then expand into a discourse on suffering and the corruption of the church:
-- Tell me this, Father. Would you say it’s natural for a woman to have children?
-- Provided she is married in a union blessed by the Church – yes… Your catechism will
tell you that… Perhaps if a strong hint were dropped [Dublin would install women’s
restrooms]
-- If a hint were dropped, Mr. Collopy exploded… Well the dear knows I think you are
trying to destroy my temper, Father…
-- Has it ever entered your head, Collopy, that perhaps you are not the most tactful of
men?
-- Tact, is it? Is that the latest? Give me your glass.
Another pause for decantation and reflection…
--Damn the thing you know about suffering yourself… Of course you are only spewing
out what you were taught in the holy schools. ‘By the sweat of thy brow shalt thou
mourn.’ Oh the grand old Catholic Church has always had great praise for sufferers.
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-- That phrase you quoted was inaccurate, Collopy.
-- Well, am I supposed to be a deacon or a Bible scholar or what?... You have a smart
answer for everything. ‘Do you believe in the true faith?’ ‘No.’ ‘Very well. Eight
hundred lashes. If that’s the Catholic Church for you, is it any wonder there was a
Reformation? Three cheers for Martin Luther!...
-- Collopy, please remember that you belong to the true fold yourself. That talk is
scandalous.
-- True fold? Do I? And doesn’t the Lord Mayor and the other gougers in the City Hall?
And look at the way they’re behaving – killing unfortunate women?... It was our own
crowd, those ruffians in Spain and all, who provoked [The Reformation]…
-- It is not a fact, Collopy. The Reformation was a doctrinal revolt, inspired I have no
doubt by Satan. It had nothing to do with human temporal weaknesses in the Papacy or
elsewhere…
-- I’m afraid, Father Fahrt… we are only wasting time and just annoying each other with
these arguments. These things have been argued out years ago. You’d imagine we here
were like Our Lord disputing with the doctors in the temple. The real question is this:
What action can we take? What can be done?...
-- There is one remedy I’m sure you haven’t tried, Collopy… Prayer…
-- You can move mountains with prayer, I believe, but I’m not trying to move
mountains… [My solution would be] Trams, Father. Trams… They would have to be
distinctive, painted black all over, preferably, and only one sign up front and rear – just
the one word WOMEN… Ah, Father, you don’t know how dear to my heart this struggle
is and the peace that will come down on top of my head when it is happily ended for
ever.84
Here, without the aid of narratorial comment, O’Brien paints a clear picture of both men. Fahrt
toggles between spouting cliché pieties about the power of prayer and the need to read the
catechism, engaging in casuistry by picking at Collopy’s minor errors, and taking his Jesuit vow
of total obedience to the extreme by dismissing out of hand any hint of the Church’s temporal
corruption. He would rather ascribe the Reformation to demonic activity than to more obvious,
mundane causes. The most damning thing about this portrait of Fahrt, though, is the
complacency with which he engages in debate. Even at the points when he might legitimately
express anger or other strong emotion, as he rebukes Collopy’s supposed errors, he maintains
equilibrium, not wanting to spoil the pleasant comforts of hearth and home (and whiskey).
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Collopy, while more animated than Fahrt, suffers from the same lack of motivating passion.
True, he works himself up regarding his pet issue of women’s restrooms, but cannot get beyond a
stage-Irish spluttering; he counsels action while doing nothing himself. Even his moment of selfawareness, that his and Fahrt’s conversing matters less than action, dissolves into nothing. While
Fahrt advises prayer as the answer, Collopy suggests no less miraculous a solution: the
installation of a costly and logistically tricky system of bathroom trams.
The voice of Finnbar, the narrator, excuses itself from this long conversation, intervening
only three brief times. The interruption included in the passage above is especially telling. After
reaching an especially tense moment in the conversation, one in which a real disagreement
threatens to break out between the men, or perhaps a real solution hit on, Finnbar records
“Another pause for decantation and reflection,” a clear sign that, whenever the complacency of
their armchair philosophy gets threatened by real action, Collopy and Fahrt circle back around to
that saving aid of stupor, the bottle. Even O’Brien’s choice of punctuation in these dialogs
creates a sense of detachment. Rather than using quotation marks, which give some sense of a
personal conversation happening, O’Brien notes the back and forth only through dashes, which
impersonalize the debate, giving it a mechanical, recorded feel.
In stepping back to allow his characters free rein to follow their conversational instincts,
O’Brien creates a more effective condemnation of their tendencies than direct judgement would
allow. Alert readers, put off by the blather, will sort through and reach the proper conclusion
themselves: these men are mired in deeply ingrained habits of complacency, their religious
educations wasted through lack of useful exercise. O’Brien carried these sorts of conversations
over into The Dalkey Archive, most famously in the conversation between De Selby and the
conjured spirit of St. Augustine, where De Selby seems most interested in discovering whether
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Augustine was black, and Augustine focuses mostly on taking petty revenge on fellow saints
whom he despises. The clearest example, though, comes when Father Cobble, commissioned by
Mick to dissuade De Selby from using his device that might destroy life on earth, instead
becomes seduced by the communicative possibilities inherent in De Selby’s DMP device.
Cobble, attracted by the ease of communicating the Catholic message in an age of mass media,
foreswears the traditional hardships of mission work for the ease of the airwaves: “Modern
achievements in radio and television, tape recording and all the magic of the cinema have so
radically improved communication – communication, I repeat – that the old-fashioned preacher
going into the wilds is now almost obsolete. Beside the pulpit we may now place the
microphone.”85 Like his brother Jesuit Fahrt, Father Cobble speaks largely in clichés (“all the
magic of cinema”), rhetorical oddities (“communication, I repeat”), and outdated notions of the
work of pastoral ministry (“the old-fashioned preacher going into the wilds”). His languid speech
exposes Father Cobble as someone attached more to ease and comfort than his priestly duties. At
the same time, this presentation hints that Cobble is a man for his time: the book subtly suggests
that a blatherer like Cobble finds his natural outlet in mass media, designed as they are to
amplify a whole lot of nothing. As in The Hard Life, the narrator of The Dalkey Archive
interrupts these conversations only infrequently, and then only to provide the barest of context.
The impetus of judging the follies on display falls squarely on the reader. At every turn, O’Brien
presents characters who seek to make the religious life easier, a matter of mere expertise rather
than faith. In his distant, detached portrayals of these buffoons, he magnifies their religious
torpor to the point of the grotesque, simultaneously making clear that no one should aspire to be
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like them, and that most of us are closer to their behavior than we might be comfortable
believing.
O’Brien sustains his focus on contemporary complacency by stripping these two novels
of much of the dexterity and experimentation that mark At Swim-Two-Birds and The Third
Policeman. The first-person narrators of those early novels drew the reader in through verbosity
and technical skill; even as the books questioned authorial authority, they highlighted the
prestidigitational possibilities of literature. The Hard Life and The Dalkey Archive forego such
expertise; they are, much more pointedly, tales told by idiots. While The Hard Life retains firstperson narration, the narrator, Finnbar, is one of the least competent, least appealing narrators in
the history of fiction.86 Constantly forgetting or brushing memories aside, he provides the most
skeletal of narratives on which to hang his story, and never interjects with strong opinions. His
constant mode is deferral:
That’s merely my recollection of the silly sort of conversation we had. Probably it is all
wrong… It cannot be truly my impression of [Mr. Collopy] when I first saw him but
rather a synthesis of all the thoughts and experiences I had of him over the years… It is
seemly, as I have said, to give that explanation but I cannot pretend to have illuminated
the situation or made it more reasonable.87
Because of Finnbar’s constant evasion of narratorial duties, The Hard Life relies largely on
reported speech and writing: the middle section of the book consists mostly of direct
transcriptions of the conversations between Mr. Collopy and Father Fahrt, and the book’s climax
in Rome gets conveyed indirectly through the letters of Finnbar’s brother Manus. At every point
O’Brien deters the reader from affective response by filtering information through mediators;
even Collopy’s death in Rome, which should be a comic highlight (he falls through the floor of
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an opera house), comes across flattened to the reader, who experiences the event through Manus’
recollections after the fact.
The Dalkey Archive goes even further to detach the reader from the text by utilizing the
first and only third-person narrator of O’Brien’s career, the result of a last minute rewrite that
suggests O’Brien wanted to further distance his audience from Mick’s point of view.88 Like
Finnbar, this unnamed, objective narrator struggles with the basic requirements of the job; the
plot comes in fits and starts, and the narrator frequently elides information, at one point
dismissing an entire conversation with a hand wave: “The conversation had become desultory,
tending to lapse. There was simply nothing to talk about.”89 The narrative “taking away” on
display in both novels strips the reader of the aesthetic comforts of O’Brien’s more experimental
books, and of the familiar affective comforts of the realist novel. Though initially the books seem
like realist texts, they are in fact sub-realist, lacking the detailed description characteristic of
realism, a trait noticed by many critics.90 Language fails as a means of conveying what matters in
the stories, leaving gaps for the reader to fill in.91 By coercing the activation of the reader’s
aesthetic imagination, O’Brien allows also for the catalyzation of the moral imagination; startled
by the strange gaps in information and affect, the alert reader slowly recognizes the ethicoreligious lack at the center of the novels’ characterizations.
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Remember You Must Lie: Sparkian Detachment
The majority of authors write so uncharacteristically that almost every man in the
Kingdom might have been the author of what is written, and as the name is a meaningless
accessory it is easy to see that from a poetic point of view anonymity also has its
importance; on the other hand, authors who have an individuality do not need to put their
names to their works – 1839 entry in Kierkegaard’s journal92
Like O’Brien, Muriel Spark lobs the explosive device of detached satire into the world of
her complacent characters. Seeking to provoke both her characters and her readers to action, she
lets loose voices that startle her characters out of complacency, while rousing her readers through
the detached precision of her satire. By putting her characters beyond the reach of sympathy,
Spark unsettles her readers, forcing them to consider the lives on display as mirror images of
their own.93 Just as the characters in The Comforters and Memento Mori deal with the mysterious
voices that surround them, so too readers must discern what lies behind the mysterious narrative
voices of Spark’s novels, voices that present themselves while simultaneously working for their
own erasure. In these voices Spark hits upon a Kierkegaardian method of communicating “like a
secret agent,” clearing away the detritus of complacency without directly pointing to the answer
– a life lived with religious vigor.
Though many of Spark’s novels feature some invasion of reality by unknown narrative
voices, The Comforters and Memento Mori literalize this theme. Both books feature characters
hearing strange voices, and in both cases the voices act as a catalyst to greater self-awareness – at
least for some characters. In The Comforters, Caroline Rose suddenly begins to hear a voice
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narrating her every action, accompanied by the rat-a-tat of a typewriter, suggesting she has fallen
prey to some sinister force that has taken control of her life. Though everyone thinks she has lost
her grip on reality, she clings to her sanity, intent on resisting the voices: “I refuse to have my
thoughts and actions controlled by some unknown, possibly sinister being. I intend to subject
him to reason. I happen to be a Christian… I intend to stand aside and see if the novel has any
real form apart from this artificial plot. I happen to be a Christian.”94 As her repetition of the
phrase “I happen to be a Christian” suggests, Caroline draws strength from her Catholicism – a
religion that embraces the possibility of forces beyond human control – and steps up to the
challenge of untangling the mystery. The book even suggests that to relent and agree with the
prevailing opinion of her madness would be to cave to the complacent pressures of the crowd
around her; it is her resistance to the easy explanation that sets Caroline apart.95 Instead of
externalizing the voice by blaming it on a madness beyond her control, Caroline internalizes it by
focusing on her response to its presence.
Though the provenance of the voice never becomes clear, its presence does transform
Caroline in such a way that she is able to take charge of her life, eventually reconciling herself to
reality in the metafictional act of writing a novel about her experiences, a book that replaces her
long-gestating critical work Form in the Modern Novel. “I’m having difficulty with the chapter
on realism,”96 Caroline admits of her critical work early in The Comforters, a sly hint from Spark
that realism – both the aesthetic technique and the approach to life that values only material facts
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– may be inadequate to understanding the nature of reality and of the self. The mysterious voice,
though disruptive, proves transformational precisely in its ability to keep Caroline spiritually
“awake”; like the voice of Socrates’ daimon, Caroline’s narrator keeps her alert and active. The
book’s fascination with occult forces suggests that Spark believes in the helpfulness of extremes:
though diametrically opposed, sincere occultism and sincere Catholicism share a similar
advantage over rote religiosity or spiritual indifference – both know the stakes of life. Just as
Kierkegaard prefers absolute rejection of Christianity to the admission that it might be true “to a
certain degree,”97 Spark finds more potential for good in the most evil of practices than in the
slow slog of indifferent living.
The mysterious caller in Memento Mori acts similarly to Caroline’s unknown narrator,
but he finds his reception more mixed. To those characters like Inspector Mortimer and
Charmian Colston who have some grasp on their own mortality, the speaker’s message helps
prepare them further for their own deaths. The voice even seems satisfied with Charmian’s
assurance that “For the past thirty years and more I have thought of it from time to time… I do
not forget my own death, whenever that will be,”98 hanging up and not bothering her again with
the call: his mission has been accomplished, or rather not needed, since Charmian already
exhibits the necessary alertness. Those who do not remember they must die, however, find
themselves deeply unsettled by the caller’s constant intrusions. Most frightened of all is Dame
Lettie, a selfish and self-obsessed woman, who becomes convinced the voice belongs to a
criminal planning to rob her. By externalizing the memento mori instead of internalizing its
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message, Dame Lettie unwittingly hastens her own death – her constant worried chatter about
burglars inspire some actual burglars to rob her house, killing her in the process. Here Spark
shows the dangerous edge of indirect communication: by remaining hidden, his motives unclear,
the messenger leaves each recipient to interpret the message for him or herself, a freedom that
often gets abused. At the same time, the hiddenness cannot be removed, because without the
unsettling mystery of the speaker’s identity, the cast of characters could not be shaken from their
complacency at all. Even a bad response like Lettie’s is preferable to remaining locked into a
complacent life.
An overlooked key to the effectiveness of the voices in both novels is their detachment
from the hearers. Not only are both sets of voices unknown to the characters who hear them, they
come mediated through technology – Caroline’s voices through the typewriter, the caller in
Memento Mori through the telephone.99 This disconnect between speaker and voice creates two
contradictory sets of responses. Dame Lettie and Geoffrey, in Memento Mori, and Caroline’s
skeptical friends in The Comforters, focus on the voice itself: its nature, its origin, even its very
existence. This focus on externals prevents them from grasping the point of the messages. On the
other hand, the insistence of certain characters – Caroline, Charmian, Inspector Mortimer, and
Jean Taylor – of responding to the voices with inward reflection allows them to emerge from
their ordeals positively transformed by the recognition that they must practice constant
awareness.
Just as the voices within these two novels seek to sting the characters into action, so does
Spark’s detached narrative voice aim its barbs at the reader. Spark would seem to agree with
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Charmian in Memento Mori – a novelist by trade – that “The art of fiction is very like the
practise of deception.”100 Using her cold, distant narrative voice as a cover, Spark maneuvers the
reader into a position of supposed superiority over her characters, only to force the reader to see
his or herself reflected grotesquely on the page.101 By denying readers the usual affective
comforts of fiction, Spark presses them to consider important ideas in a new light.102 Consider
the detached, clinical anatomization of the pious but complacent Sir Edwin Manders, Laurence’s
father, in The Comforters. Viewed from the outside, Edwin is a model of religious devotion, but
his arid inner life manifests itself in his inability to live connected to others. As The Comforters
records it:
It is possible for a man matured in religion by half a century of punctilious observance,
having advanced himself in devotion the slow and exquisite way, trustfully ascending his
winding stair, and, to make doubly sure, supplementing his meditations by deepbreathing exercises twice daily, to go into a flat spin when faced with some trouble which
does not come within a familiar category. Should this occur, it causes dismay in others.
To anyone accustomed to respect the wisdom and control of a contemplative creature, the
evidence of his failure to cope with a normal emergency is distressing… But fortunately
that situation rarely happens. The common instinct knows how to gauge the limits of a
man’s sanctity, and anyone who has earned a reputation for piety by prayer, deep
breathing and one or two acceptable good works has gained this much for his trouble, that
few people bring him any extraordinary problem.103
It would be quite simple to feed the reader the appropriate response to Edwin’s complacency. He
could be painted as an over the top buffoon, concerned only with private trivialities. Given that
this description comes directly after his son suffers a near-fatal car accident, anger at his self-
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satisfied religiosity would be an equally easy emotion to elicit from the reader. Instead, Spark
tamps down any affect to the point of non-existence. First, she distances the reader from Sir
Edwin himself. This description begins a new section in the chapter, and it is not until a
paragraph after this hypothetical description that the reader realizes the book is talking about
Edwin, and not some purely imaginary figure. The long, complex sentences also work as a
damper on affect: the halting but precise description of the man “matured in religion” could be
pulled from Newman’s limpid but complex prose and works to anatomize Edwin’s flaws without
passing explicit judgement on them. The subtle irony never gets oversold, but comes across in
hints: the use of the word “fortunately” to describe the fact that Manders does not have his
lifestyle tested by real trial, the addition of “one or two acceptable” as a modifier for his good
works – these touches work to delicately expose his outward piety as a fragile cover for a lack of
spiritual vigor. By keeping the reader distant from Edwin, preserving him from either pity or
anger, Spark forces a slow consideration of Edwin’s flaws, a process that makes the reader more
alert for signs of his or her own complacency.
Spark’s most brutally effective use of distancing works to make strange death itself, as
her narrator depicts the murder of Dame Lettie in Memento Mori:
She switched on the light. It was five past two. A man was standing over by her dressingtable, the drawers of which were open and disarranged. He had turned round to face her.
Her bedroom door was open. There was a light in the passage and she heard someone
else padding along it. She screamed, grabbed her stick, and was attempting to rise from
her bed when a man’s voice from the passage outside said, ‘That’s enough, let’s go.’ The
man by the dressing table hesitated nervily for a moment, then swiftly he was by Lettie’s
side. She opened wide her mouth and her yellow and brown eyes. He wrenched the stick
from the old woman’s hand and, with the blunt end of it, battered her to death. It was her
eighty-first year.104
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The bland attention to externals in this passage crowds out any affective response the reader
might have, whether pity, outrage, or the illicit thrill of sensationalism. Short, declarative
sentences paint the scene in neutral colors, with all the passion of a police report. Only one word
in the entire passage, “Nervily,” could possibly relate to the emotions of a character, and even
that word choice suggests a physical, chemical response more than an emotional one. Lettie’s
feelings only get hinted at by her actions – her scream and the opening wide of her mouth and
eyes. The actual murder gets described with clinical precision: the reader knows the murder
weapon and the exact cause of death but has no access to Lettie’s thoughts or emotions as she
expires; nor does the description carry with it the catharsis of gore. The refrain-like chant of “It
was her eighty-first year” – reminiscent in its spare language of the genealogy found in Genesis
chapter five, which recounts the generations that follow Adam, all ending in death – comes in
with a thud, cauterizing any emotions, even the barest pity, that readers might feel toward Lettie.
The subtle choice of diction – not “She was eighty-one,” but “It was her eighty-first year” – adds
an extra layer of remove. All that is left is a stark confrontation with the fact of death itself, a
totally unromanticized presentation that shocks the reader out of the expected response. We are
so used to ignoring death, either by euphemizing it out of existence, or sensationalizing it, Spark
suggests, that what is required is a complete, calm exposure to the bare fact of its existence.105
In denying her reader the expected release of catharsis, Spark engages in Kierkegaardian
communication by showing the difficulty involved in living a religious life, whether that pertains
to the material comforts of faith in this life, or the correct attitude toward the next life. For the
most part, her detached style works to accomplish the very Kierkegaardian goal of making true
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faith appear more difficult to attain than most readers think.106 Like Kierkegaard, her portrayals
of Christianity remain primarily negative, showing the many assorted ways in which people can
go off path. In part, this may be a recognition by Spark that her mode of fiction (or perhaps any
mode of fiction) is ill equipped to directly portray religious belief, a concept she would be
familiar with from the Journals.107 Insofar as it tackles questions of religion, then, her fiction
primarily concerns itself with the Kierkegaardian act of “taking away,” of stripping certainties
from the complacent citizens of Christendom. Yet occasionally Spark offers a brief glimpse of
what might compel someone to take the leap of conversion, especially her depiction of the
persuasive power of a “vision of evil,” as theorized in The Girls of Slender Means.108 The
Comforters offers an oblique glance of this kind, as Caroline’s jilted lover Laurence
contemplates her news that she has been hearing voices:
Caroline saw on his face an expression which she remembered having seen before. It was
a look of stumped surprise, the look of one who faces an altogether and irrational new
experience; a look partly fearful, partly indignant, partly curious, but predominantly
joyful. The other occasion on which she had seen this expression on Laurence’s face was
during an argument, when she had told him of her decision to enter the Church, with the
consequence that they must part. They were both distressed; they hardly knew what they
were saying. In reply to some remark of Laurence she had rapped out, nastily, ‘I love
God better than you!’ It was then she saw on his face that mixture of surprise and dismay,
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somehow revealing in its midst an unconscious alien delight, which she witnessed now
once more.109
The phrase “an unconscious alien delight,” captures Spark’s attitude regarding the unconveyable
nature of religious belief. Laurence has long since abandoned the Catholicism of his upbringing
and finds himself upset that Caroline’s conversion means the end of their relationship. Yet in the
moment of confrontation with a religious conviction – Caroline’s own reminder to Laurence that
“Against God we are always in the wrong”110 – Laurence experiences a surprisingly complex
affective response, his shock and disappointment leavened by a joy that seems to come from true
recognition. Even as he knows he must lose Caroline, he senses that for the first time her intense
conviction has been channeled into something worthy of it. Having experienced at home a less
vibrant faith, Laurence finds himself taken aback by belief with the force of conviction behind it.
The reader too gets invited to share in this mixture of shock and joy as he or she recognizes in
Laurence’s own response of “surprise and dismay” – and in Spark’s detached presentation of
such complicated emotions – a complex of emotions that both unsettles and opens the individual
to new experiences.
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Rejecting the Comforters: Resituating O’Brien and Spark
A literary attack… constitutes no infringement upon the personal freedom of an author…
But an expression of approval is by no means so innocuous. The critical judgment which
excludes a writer from the realm of literature does not limit his sphere of action; but the
criticism which assigns him a definite place within, may well be cause for
apprehension… To speak dialectically, it is not the negative which constitutes an
encroachment, but the positive – Johannes Climacus, Concluding Unscientific
Postscript111
The Hard Life and The Dalkey Archive, which followed a twenty year silence in Flann
O’Brien’s career (minus the Irish Times columns and the Irish language novel An Beal Bocht,
both written under the Myles pseudonym), often get treated as the black sheep of his oeuvre,
disappointing excursions into mundanity after the stratospheric flights of fancy of At Swim-TwoBirds and The Third Policeman.112 Because of the commercial failure of At Swim-Two-Birds and
O’Brien’s inability to find a publisher for The Third Policeman, and the fact that The Dalkey
Archive recycled many characters and plot points from that unpublished work in a different style
and tone, critics see these later books as attempts to compromise artistic integrity for wider
readership. This critical attitude has if anything increased in the past two decades in the wake of
the claiming of O’Brien as a postmodernist, a stance forwarded most vocally by Keith Hopper.113
Even critics who champion the later books, like Thomas F. Shea, tend to do so in an attempt to
argue for their status as postmodern texts.114 In painting O’Brien as a postmodern author,
however, critics fail to recognize the tensions within O’Brien’s work between form and content:
while O’Brien’s aesthetics were experimental, perhaps even avant-garde, the authorial stance
111

Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 5.
Hugh Kenner, never one to mince words, dismisses O’Brien’s entire career after the first two books as “Ruin…
So much promise has seldom accomplished so little” (A Colder Eye: The Modern Irish Writers [New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1983], 255). Carol Taafe explicitly argues for their failure as conventional novels: “Their repetition of
earlier comic material, and their lacklustre commitment to the novelistic conventions which his experimental novels
had joyfully unpicked, betray a fairly crippled consistency” (Ireland Through the Looking Glass, 184).
113
Hopper, Flann O’Brien: A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Post-Modernist, 1-22.
114
Shea, Flann O’Brien’s Exorbitant Novels, 142. A welcome exception to this can be found in Donohue, The
Writer as Self-Evident Sham.
112

138

underneath was more static than critics like Hopper allow. Hopper’s insistence that O’Brien’s
best work creates “An impossible flux of shifting perspectives which clash and interact
unpredictably… so as to never rest on any one ‘true’ meaning… [such that] the centrality of
authorship is undermined and reconstructed” works well as a generic statement of postmodern
aesthetics, but it hardly fits as a descriptor for O’Brien’s novels, which maintain an ethical and
intellectual rigidity under their mellifluous aesthetic surfaces.115 The books are, as Hopper rightly
notes, dialectic, but they neither build toward a Hegelian synthesis, nor dissolve into
deconstruction; rather, their dialectic exposes the follies of complacency and pushes the reader
toward a Kierkegaardian moment of self-examination and choice. In other words, O’Brien’s
aesthetic playfulness does not negate his staunchly held Catholicism; rather it complements
O’Brien’s underlying beliefs by encouraging the reader to reach similar conclusions without
direct guidance.
While The Hard Life and The Dalkey Archive fit uneasily into the category of the
postmodern, neither do they represent a repudiation of experimentation in favor of realism.
Understanding them as Kierkegaardian texts – simultaneously distant, ironic novels, and ones
deeply invested in ethico-religious concerns – reveals them as products of an aesthetic shift by
O’Brien toward a satirical form better suited for contemporary cultural critique than the ludic
multiplicity of At Swim-Two-Birds or the feverish nightmares of The Third Policeman.116 As
Flann O’Brien the author recedes in prominence through a disavowal of verbal pyrotechnics, the
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novels open up space to work maieutically on the reader. In other words, while readers finish At
Swim-Two-Birds impressed by the dexterity of the author, they close The Hard Life focused
more on the unsettling picture of Irish religious and social life it presents. What some scholars
have identified as a postmodern or Menippean strain in O’Brien that seeks to undermine
authority is in fact closer to a Kierkegaardian distrust of life-mastery that would substitute
mechanical systems for organic life, rote learning for direct experience. In The Hard Life and
The Dalkey Archive O’Brien uses detachment to ridicule four areas of potential mastery –
scientific, political, religious, and aesthetic – while subtly advocating for an approach to life
grounded instead in the risk of faith.
Like O’Brien, Spark has often been pegged as a forerunner of postmodern fiction. Unlike
O’Brien, however, whose deeply ingrained Catholicism has largely gone overlooked, Spark has
been the subject of a critical tug of war between those who would claim her as a postmodernist
and those who see her as a prime exemplar of the Catholic novelist.117 As with O’Brien, the crux
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of this critical confusion lies in the tension between form and content – Spark’s orthodox
Catholicism striking critics as an odd fit with her distinctive aesthetic. Viewed through a
Kierkegaardian lens, however, the marriage makes perfect sense. Catholicism underlies Spark’s
writing, but she cannot (and would not if she could) express what she sees as its truth directly.
For her, Catholicism acts as the understated norm from which her characters depart into all sorts
of folly and meanness. Satire and irony are her forms of indirect communication, her characters
the models of a complacency that must be avoided.
Marina MacKay has helpfully laid out the problems that emerge when critics try to
taxonomize Spark as either a realist or a postmodernist; MacKay also argues for the need to read
Spark in her historical moment, a need often overlooked in the rush to meditate on Spark’s
ontological interests.118 These concerns apply just as easily to O’Brien’s novels as to Spark’s.
Understanding the importance of Kierkegaardian indirect communication in their satires provides
a way out of these false critical dichotomies.119 The marrying of aesthetic complexity with
ethico-religious stability in these maieutic satires suggests a third way between postmodernism
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and realism, a style of fiction that hybridizes postmodernism’s playful spirit with the social
consciousness of realism. Recognizing the spirit of late Christendom in which Spark and O’Brien
wrote their novels of the “early sixties,” meanwhile, grounds the religious content of these novels
as much in historical as in ontological pressures. Surveying the complacency around them, Spark
and O’Brien found in detachment the means to provoke the individual reader to greater religious
self-awareness, a unique Kierkegaardian inheritance perfectly suited to their chosen roles as
religious provocateurs outside the complacent mainstream.
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Chapter 3: On the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle –
W.H. Auden, R.S. Thomas, and the Vocation of Poetry
In our age what is an author? An author is often merely an x, even when his name is
signed, something quite impersonal, which addresses itself abstractly, by the aid of
printing, to thousands and thousands, while remaining itself unseen and unknown, living
a life as hidden, as anonymous, as it is possible for a life to be, in order, presumably, not
to reveal the too obvious and striking contradiction between the prodigious means of
communication employed and the fact that the author is only a single individual –
Kierkegaard, The Point of View.1

Philip Larkin’s poem “Church Going” presents the scholar of British literature with an
almost irresistible interpretive temptation. The poem, which recounts the speaker’s presence in
an empty country church while reflecting more broadly on the lingering ghost of traditional
religion in Britain, bottles in its lines a whole attitude toward religious practice – and its
confluence with literary production – in midcentury Britain. Larkin’s tone of unfamiliarity mixed
with vague nostalgia flows through his assessment of the church:
some brass and stuff
Up at the holy end; the small neat organ;
And a tense musty unignorable silence
Brewed God knows how long…
Mounting the lectern I peruse a few
hectoring large-scale verses and pronounce
Here endeth much more loudly than I'd meant
The echoes snigger briefly…
I… Reflect the place was not worth stopping for.
Yet stop I did: in fact I often do
And always end much at a loss like this
Wondering what to look for; wondering too
When churches fall completely out of use
What we shall turn them into…
But superstition like belief must die
1

Kierkegaard, Søren, The Point of View, Etc., trans. Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 45.
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And what remains when disbelief has gone?
Grass weedy pavement brambles buttress sky…
though I've no idea
What this accoutred frowsty barn is worth
It pleases me to stand in silence here;
A serious house on serious earth it is
In whose blent air all our compulsions meet
Are recognised and robed as destinies.
And that much never can be obsolete
Since someone will forever be surprising
A hunger in himself to be more serious
And gravitating with it to this ground
Which he once heard was proper to grow wise in
If only that so many dead lie round.2
The speaker experiences a strange mixture of bewilderment and allurement. His alienation comes
across in Larkin’s mixture of vague description (“some brass and stuff”) with self-consciously
high diction (“accoutered frowsty barn”). On top of this, the speaker presents the work of the
church as faded and passing, his declaration “Here endeth” signaling not merely the end of the
scripture lesson, but of a whole way of life.3 Despite his distance from the religion that had
actually been practiced in the church, however, the speaker retains a sort of nostalgia for this
“serious house on serious earth.” Larkin’s speaker believes that the church will continue as a
significant marker of human production, “If only that so many dead lie round.” The poem thus
presents British religion as surviving spectrally – stripped of real belief and practice but
maintaining some slight grip on the emotions and imagination of those who stumble upon its
remnants.
Larkin’s poem presents powerful images of half-regretted disbelief, and his tone of
unfamiliarity mixed with regret taps into a certain vein of midcentury attitudes toward religion.
2

Philip Larkin, Collected Poems (London: Faber and Faber, 2003), 34-5.
This sense of permanent loss is apparent in the poem’s title, as Larkin splits the gerund “Churchgoing” into a noun
and verb phrase to suggest the passing away of religion.
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There is a danger, however, in taking “Church Going” as the literary representation of
midcentury religious decline.4 For one thing, though the sense of disconnection from Christianity
Larkin captures continued to grow at midcentury, it had not yet become the dominant religious
attitude among the British public, and religious practice remained highly contested in 1954, the
year of the poem’s composition. Second, Larkin’s poem rests on an unstated assumption of
temporal separation: while the religious lie in graves around him, the poet remains very much
alive, and able to voice the thoughts of many. Poetry has, in this account, if not replaced religion,
at least overtaken it, recording its decline along the way. But Larkin’s image of a space where
“so many dead lie round” might just as easily describe Poet’s Corner as an anonymous country
church; whatever Arnoldian hopes for literature’s ascendancy poets like Larkin might have clung
to in the midcentury, on the ground poetry’s position in British public life was at least as tenuous
as that of the Anglican church.5
For some poets of the midcentury, especially those with religious affiliations, this
connection between poetic and religious fortunes did not go unnoticed. As Raymond Williams
has warned, there is a vanishing horizon regarding utopian ideals like the idyllic countryside,
with each generation longing for the one before it, back into an Edenic past.6 This same danger
applies to other aspects of British culture, be it the myth of a truly Anglican England or the

4

Nigel Alderman observes that “Church Going” “Quickly turned into a set-piece poem that came to represent not just
[the] empirical turn, but also the decline of Christianity in postwar Britain” (“Impossible Elegies: Poetry in Transition
1940-1960,” in British Literature in Transition: 1940-1960 – Postwar, ed. Gill Plain [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2019], 60). For one such reading, see Lewis, Pericles, Religious Experience and the Modernist Novel,
1-5. Lewis does acknowledge that Larkin’s poem is more predictive than descriptive, noting the post-war religious
boom in Britain, but he still takes the poem as a semi-confident attempt at an Arnoldian replacement of religion with
poetry.
5
At times, at least, Larkin seemed oblivious to poetry’s tentative situation; as he said in a 1956 magazine profile, he
thought poetry “Should keep the child from its television set and the old man from his pub” (Qtd. in Charles
Tomlinson, “The Middlebrow Muse,” Essays in Criticism VII, no. 2, (April 1, 1957): 209.
6
The Country and the City (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 9-12.
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dream of a time when poetry truly mattered.7 Still, whether the feelings that Christianity and
poetry alike faced a crisis in the midcentury hinged on a real or imagined crisis, these feelings
catalyzed a strong response among Christian poets. The dissolution of Christianity as a public
force, if not directly connected to poetry’s decline in public importance, at least ran parallel to it
in the minds of these poets, since both declines could be traced to the rise of an indifferent public
fed on mass media.
Amidst these dual pressures, two of the most important Christian poets of the midcentury
turned to the work of Kierkegaard as a resource for navigating the shrinking public significance
of their art and their religious beliefs. Despite differences in station, style, and philosophy, W.H.
Auden and R.S. Thomas both utilized Kierkegaardian ideas extensively as they sought a firm
foothold for religious poets in a rapidly changing era.8 At critical points in their poetic careers –
Auden in the 1940s and 50s, as his style became more elusive and comic in the wake of his move

7

See, for example, the rigorous scholarly debate surrounding the origins of religious decline in Britain discussed in
Chapter Two.
8
Both Auden and Thomas engaged with Kierkegaard’s works over almost the entire span of their working lives.
Auden discovered Kierkegaard near the beginning of Kierkegaard’s life in English, having been introduced to his
work by Charles Williams, whose own influence on Auden’s reversion to Anglicanism was huge. Auden began to
read Kierkegaard deeply and broadly in the 1940s, expressing both in public and private a grasp on nearly all of
Kierkegaard’s works in English. By the mid-1950s Auden had begun to cool on Kierkegaard somewhat, noting in
1956 what he saw as Kierkegaard’s great limitation – an inability to recognize the worth of material goods (see
“Contribution to Modern Canterbury Pilgrims” in W.H. Auden, The Complete Works of W.H. Auden – Prose
Volume III: 1949-1955, ed. Edward Mendelson [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011] 573-80). This
dissatisfaction would culminate in a 1968 essay, “A Knight of Doleful Countenance,” in which Auden would accuse
Kierkegaard of de facto Manichaeism (W.H. Auden, The Complete Works of W.H. Auden – Prose Volume V – 19631968, ed. Edward Mendelson [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015], 361-373). Even in this essay, however,
his admiration of Kierkegaard remains. That he acknowledged his debt to Kierkegaard till the end of his life is
shown in one of his final poems, “A Thanksgiving,” where Kierkegaard is included among a litany of the most
important influences in Auden’s work, without whom “I couldn’t have managed/even my weakest of lines” (Auden.
W.H., Collected Poems, ed. Edward Mendelson [New York: Vintage, 1991], 892). Thomas likewise was an early
adopter of Kierkegaard, having started reading him at the beginning of his priestly ministry in the 1940s. He began
to engage with Kierkegaard via poetry in the 1960s, and wrote a series of poems over the next forty years that
reference Kierkegaard explicitly. Like Auden, he had mixed feelings about Kierkegaard’s thought – he accused
Kierkegaard of being anti-poetry, a charge we will explore below, but to the end of his life he saw Kierkegaard’s
work as a guiding light, and continued to reread his works. See “R.S. Thomas Talks to J.B. Lethbridge,” AngloWelsh Review 74 (1983): 36-56, especially 51, 54-5; Byron Rogers, The Man Who Went into the West: The Life of
R.S. Thomas (London: Aurum Press, 2006), 30; and John Ormond, “R.S. Thomas: Priest and Poet,” Poetry Wales 7,
no. 4 (1973): 52-3.
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to America and his reembrace of Christianity, Thomas in the 1960s and 70s as he moved from
writing poems primarily in a Welsh pastoral mode to his mature poetry of religious questioning –
these two poets found a fellow traveler in the Danish philosopher, one who would shape not just
their thought, but also their poetics. Kierkegaard’s concepts of literary audience and vocation
especially appealed to Auden and Thomas. Theorizing the existence of an abstract, indifferent
Public, Kierkegaard advocated for literature that would communicate at the level of the
individual reader, a call picked up on by both Auden and Thomas. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s
distinction between the aesthetic “genius” and the religious “apostle” represented an antiRomantic conception of the artist, giving a reduced importance to the act of aesthetic creation;
though this stance may seem unattractive to poets, it was seized by Auden especially as a means
of securing a modest but stable role for the poet in society.9 Finally, Kierkegaard’s intuition that
true communication aimed primarily toward silence manifested itself in the poetry of both Auden
and Thomas, albeit in opposite ways. In a sense, the two poets took radically different paths to
the same destination; while Thomas fostered a sense of silence in his late poetry through a
radical simplification of diction, syntax, and verse form, Auden used verbal excess and
circumlocution in his late poetry as a means of hinting at the failure of language, his sense that
“truth, in any serious sense,/Like orthodoxy is a reticence”.10 While critics have written
voluminously about these mid-career changes in style in both Auden and Thomas, and have
likewise commented extensively on their reading of Kierkegaard, no one has yet connected the
two together, to show that the aesthetic changes in the poems of both men came about, at least in
part, through an adoption of Kierkegaardian ideas of communication and vocation.11 By reading

9

Thomas’ relation to this idea is more complex and will be explored below.
Auden, Collected Poems, 621.
11
Though Brian Conniff comes close, linking Auden’s crisis of vocation to the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, himself a
reader of Kierkegaard (“Auden, Niebuhr, and the Vocation of Poetry,” Religion & Literature 25, no. 3 [Autumn
10
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key late poems of Auden’s (including his pivotal long poem The Sea and the Mirror) and
Thomas’s (including those specifically centered around Kierkegaard) as examples of
Kierkegaardian indirect communication, I show how maieutic literature – that which aims at
developing individual religious consciousness – proved an attractive option for these poets as
they navigated shifts in both the religious and poetic landscapes of midcentury Britain and
America, helping them avoid both the secular turn of Movement poets like Larkin and the
embrace of mythology present in some midcentury Christian poets.12

1993]: 45-65. Critics have long recognized the intellectual debt both men owe to Kierkegaard. For Auden’s
connection to Kierkegaard, see, for example, Edward Callan, Auden: A Carnival of Intellect (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983), 163-217; Edward Mendelson, Early Auden, Later Auden: A Critical Biography (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2017), 454-464, 471-6; Justin Replogle, Auden’s Poetry (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1969), 50-82; and Rachel Wetzsteon, Influential Ghosts: A Study of Auden’s Sources (New York:
Routledge, 2007), 84-107. Auden critics have tended to downplay Kierkegaard’s stylistic importance for Auden,
following John Fuller’s declaration, in regard to “New Year Letter,” that “Kierkegaard’s categories should be taken,
not as a hidden key to the work, but as a parallel expression of ideas that have already deeply influenced the
argument” (A Reader’s Guide to W.H. Auden [New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1970], 135; and Justin
Replogle’s assertion that it was Auden’s temperament that eventually drove him to embrace Kierkegaard as
confirmation of already existing ideas (Auden’s Poetry, 148-9). For Thomas and Kierkegaard, see William V. Davis,
R.S. Thomas: Poetry and Theology (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 123-42; Timothy Saunders, “Peripheries
of Space, Self and Literary Style in R.S. Thomas’s Readings of Søren Kierkegaard,” Scandinavica 56, no. 1 (2017):
59-95; and Rowan Williams, “Suspending the Ethical: R.S. Thomas and Kierkegaard,” in Echoes to the Amen:
Essays after R.S. Thomas, ed. Damian Walford Davies (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), 206-219.
12
Nigel Alderman asserts that “Poets of this so-called religious turn often critique secular modernity by attempting
to imagine or locate the survival of mythic rites whose performance unites the individual and the collective, and for
which the writing and reading of the poem itself stands as an attenuated, archetypal ritual” (“Impossible Elegies,”
61). As I will show, neither aspect of this “mythological” embrace applies to Auden or Thomas, who specifically
sought poetry grounded in the present struggle of religious faith, and who – in the case of Auden especially –
distrusted the idea of poetry as any form of or substitute for religion.
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Poetic Decline at Midcentury
It appears likely that poets in our civilization, as it exists at present, must be difficult. Our
civilization comprehends great variety and complexity, and this variety and complexity,
playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce various and complex results. The poet
must become more and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, in order to
force, to dislocate if necessary, language into his meaning – T.S. Eliot, “The
Metaphysical Poets”13

How do you gauge the impact of poetry on culture? By some measures, Anglo-American
poetry found itself in a more secure position than ever before by the end of the twentieth century;
with creative writing ensconced in academic departments, poets found themselves able to earn
livings in fields adjacent to their poetic work, while the expansion of publishing ventures meant
that many poets’ debut collections might outsell, in terms of raw copies, the initial printings of
canonical works like Eliot’s The Waste Land.14 Still, by many other indications poetry no longer
captured the imagination of the public – however narrowly defined – as it had during the heights
of modernism; the decline of poems printed in newspapers and magazines, and the death of the
radio poetry program suggested a displacing of poetry from public life.15 The late 1980s and
early 1990s saw a flurry of articles and books that attempted to diagnose the death throes of
public poetry, most famously those penned by Joseph Epstein and Dana Gioia.16 These jeremiads

13
Eliot, T.S. The Complete Prose of T.S. Eliot: The Critical Edition: The Perfect Critic, 1919-1926, ed. Anthony
Cuda and Ronald Schuchard (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 381.
14
See Robert Von Hallberg, American Poetry and Culture: 1945-1980 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1985), 10-14 for an optimistic take on the state of contemporary American poetry in comparison to the modernist
period. See also Christopher Beach, Poetic Culture: Contemporary American Poetry between Community and
Institution (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999), 1-36. Much of the scholarly literature surrounding this
topic focuses on the American context – not irrelevant here, since Auden found himself writing in this context after
1940. For good overviews of British poetry in this period, see Alderman, “Impossible Elegies,” 52-67, and Hannah
Brooks-Motl, “Reading Poetry from The Group to the British Poetry Revival,” in British Literature in Transition:
1960-1980 – Flower Power, ed. Kate McLoughlin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 50-64 – see
especially 53-7 for a good discussion of the institutional context of this poetry, as more college students became
interested in creative writing, and funding from philanthropic organizations increased.
15
See John Spaulding, “Poetry and the Media: The Decline of Popular Poetry,” Journal of Popular Culture 33, no. 2
(Fall 1999): 147-153.
16
Joseph Epstein, “Who Killed Poetry?” Commentary 86, no. 2 (August 1988): 13-20, and Dana Gioia, “Can Poetry
Matter?” The Atlantic May 1991. For a more academic counterpart to these works, see Christopher Clausen, The
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placed much of the blame on poetry itself, accusing the field of sequestering itself behind layers
of solipsism and difficulty, with little to attract the average reader.
Laying aside the question of the justice of these invectives, it is worth noting that they
largely recapitulated an earlier generation of critiques. Already in the 1940s, critics such as
Edmund Wilson, Delmore Schwartz, and Randall Jarrell sensed poetry’s declining presence in
public life.17 In their critiques, Wilson, Schwartz, and Jarrell intuited the radical shift overtaking
poetry in the midcentury, a shift Evan Kindley has recently identified as a movement from the
poet as recipient of aristocratic patronage to the poet-critic as a bureaucratic official.18 The major
difference between the critiques of these earlier critics and those of Epstein and Gioia is where
they placed the blame; while Epstein and Gioia pointed the finger firmly at poets themselves,
these earlier critics viewed tectonic shifts in the underlying culture as the real culprit. As Jarrell
put it, “Both [poetic difficulty and public indifference] are no more than effects of that longcontinued, world-overturning cultural and social revolution… which has made the poet difficult
and the public unused to any poetry exactly as it has made poet and public divorce their wives,
stay away from church… or do a hundred thousand other things, some bad, some good, and
some indifferent.”19 To critics of the immediate post-war period, poetry’s decline could only be
understood as a thread in a bigger tapestry, that of the radical changing of society itself in an age
of technology and mass culture.

Place of Poetry: Two Centuries of an Art in Crisis (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1981), especially
30, 83-4, 118-122.
17
See Edmund Wilson, “Is Verse a Dying Technique?” in The Triple Thinkers (New York: Oxford University Press,
1948), 15-30; Delmore Schwartz, Selected Essays of Delmore Schwartz, ed. Donald A. Dike and David H. Zucker
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), esp. 3-23; and Randall Jarrell, Poetry and the Age (New York:
Vintage Books, 1959), 3-25.
18
Poet-Critics and the Administration of Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 1-16.
19
Poetry and the Age, 4. Schwartz agrees: “It is not a simple matter of the poet lacking an audience, for that is an
effect, rather than a cause, of the character of modern poetry… The fundamental isolation of the modern poet began
not with the poet and his way of life; but rather with the whole way of life of modern society” (Selected Essays 7).
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In the wake of his infamous migration to the United States, and subsequent reversion to
the Anglican faith of his childhood, W.H. Auden found himself musing over many of the same
questions regarding poetry’s place in the public sphere. His critical writings of the 1940s and 50s
are replete with reflections on the rise of mass culture, and what place (if any) the artist –
especially the poet – might find within that culture. Among the various ideas he floats in these
essays, one of the most salient is his distinction between highbrow, lowbrow, and middlebrow
art. According to Auden’s account, in most human societies there has existed a divide between
highbrow art and “popular” or lowbrow art. For Auden “lowbrow” should not be taken as an
insult; it merely refers to the art preferred by most of society. For Auden, the real problem lies in
the middle. Both highbrow and lowbrow art defy the managerial, suffocating tendencies of
bureaucratic culture; the avant-garde painting and the peasant song alike resist
commercialization and standardization. Middlebrow cultural production, however, embraces
these aspects of modern life, hoping to gain the prestige of the highbrow using only the effort of
the low.20 In his discussions of high, middle, and lowbrow culture, Auden tapped into a common
cultural anxiety of the war and post-war period, especially in his adopted home of the United
States (see Figure 1).21 At the same time, he offered a way out of what he saw as the predicament

20

One of Auden’s favorite images of the high/low divide comes from The Magic Flute, where the hero Tamino
undergoes many trials in order to win Pamina, the heroine – he is the highbrow – while his underling Papageno
refuses to be tested, but because of his self-awareness still receives a (lesser) prize: his mate Papagena, thus gaining
the reward of the lowbrow. As he describes it in his unpublished 1943 essay “Vocation and Society”: “To all of us
the gods offer a similar choice between two kinds of existence, between remaining Papageno the lowbrow, and
becoming Tamino the highbrow. What they permit none of us, is to be a middlebrow, that is, to exist without
passion and without a willingness to suffer. For the middlebrow wishes to have his cake and eat it. He is not willing
to be nobody in particular… on the other hand, he does not wish to become wise, only to be wise, to graduate cum
laude” (The Complete Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Volume II – 1939-1948, ed. Edward Mendelson [Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002], 176).
21
This infographic from Life magazine derived from the work of Harper’s editor Russell Lynes, who wrote in order
to defend the middlebrow and satirize those who would cling to the highbrow. For an overview of the development
of middlebrow culture, see Joan Rubin, The Making of Middlebrow Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1992), xi-xx. Perhaps the most famous critique of American culture in this period came from
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed., Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund
Jephcott [Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002], 94-136). Not all trenchant critiques came from exiles,
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Figure 1. Infographic from a 1949 issue of Life Magazine.
of modern culture, an escape route – originally theorized by Kierkegaard – which poetry might
help facilitate.
In the essay “The Poet & the City,” from Auden’s best-known work of non-fiction, The
Dyer’s Hand, he explicitly ties these notions of highbrow, lowbrow, and middlebrow to the idea

however. One of the most penetrating, Dwight Macdonald’s 1960 essay “Masscult and Midcult,” develops a theory
of culture parallel to Auden’s, where High Art stands in contrast to Masscult – the mass produced entertainment of
the new media, and Midcult, a form that stands between the two, sinister in its ability to mimic High Art without
achieving its actual excellence (Macdonald’s running example of midcult is Thornton Wilder’s Our Town). See
Dwight Macdonald, Against the American Grain (New York: Random House, 1962), 3-75. Though Americans
seemed most preoccupied with these divisions between “brows”, the British also had a fascination with the concepts
in this period. Virginia Woolf wrote against the middlebrow in her essay of that name (“Middlebrow,” in The Death
of the Moth and Other Essays [New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942], 176-86). Charles Tomlinson titled
his polemic against the poets of The Movement “The Middlebrow Muse,” attacking figures like Larkin and Amis in
almost Audenesque terms: “For a movement in writing which purports anti-romanticism there is at work an
unconscionable amount of self-regard, of acting up to one's mirror image of one's self. I know of no surer measure of
the lack of genuineness in art” (“The Middlebrow Muse,” 213).
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of the emergence of the Public, an abstract force, the theorization of which Auden takes directly
from Kierkegaard’s essay The Present Age. In The Present Age, Kierkegaard describes the
Public as a “phantom… a monstrous abstraction… a mirage… Only when the sense of
association in society is no longer strong enough to give life to concrete realities is the Press able
to create that abstraction ‘the public’, consisting of unreal individuals who never are and never
can be united in an actual situation or organization – and yet are held together as a whole.”22
Directly after quoting from The Present Age in describing the Public, Auden offers one of his
most damning assessments of the state of contemporary culture:
Before the phenomenon of the Public appeared in society, there existed only naïve art and
sophisticated art which were different from each other but only in the way that two
brothers are different… The appearance of the Public and the mass media which cater to
it have destroyed naïve popular art. The sophisticated ‘highbrow’ artist survives and can
still work as he did a thousand years ago, because his audience is too small to interest the
mass media… What the mass media offer is not popular art, but entertainment which is
intended to be consumed like food, forgotten, and replaced by a new dish.23
For Auden, then, the emergence of the Public, under the auspices of mass media, has eliminated
the vast cultural resources of “naïve” popular art, which has been replaced by interchangeable
instances of “entertainment”.24 While highbrow art also faces challenges, it is better equipped to

22
The Present Age and Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle, trans. Alexander Dru (New York:
Harper & Row: 1962; originally published 1939), 59-60. This later printing reproduces Dru’s original translation of
both works, which originally appeared in 1939. The Present Age is a translation of part of a longer work, Two Ages,
which starts out as a book review of a contemporary Danish novel before spinning out into broader social
commentary. This work was only available in English in Dru’s partial translation until the complete translation of
Two Ages in the 1970s. In a curious but telling move, Dwight Macdonald ends “Masscult and Midcult” with a long
quotation from Dru’s translation of The Present Age, which includes the above quote. The last line of the essay is a
simple summation from Macdonald: “This is the essence of what I have tried to say” (Against the American Grain,
74-5). Auden, meanwhile, includes the same quote in his anthology of selections from Kierkegaard (The Living
Thoughts of Kierkegaard, ed. W.H. Auden, [New York: David McKay Company, 1952], 40-1). That Kierkegaard
would prove equally important in the cultural critiques of the socialist leftist critic Macdonald and the increasingly
politically unplaceable Auden shows that Kierkegaard’s cultural theories had reach far beyond a religious or
existentialist audience.
23
W.H. Auden, The Complete Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Volume IV – 1956-1962, ed. Edward Mendelson
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 512-3.
24
He asserts in several essays that the only remaining lowbrow art is comic art, such as that of Groucho Marx,
which in its anarchic sense of play resists the standardizing demands of management. See, for example, “Squares
and Oblongs,” in The Complete Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Vol. II, 348.
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resist the lures of mass entertainment precisely because it knows its audience to be of necessity
small. In fact, poetry presents a unique mode of resistance to mass culture, since it demands a
personal response from the reader; it cannot be passed over like other forms of culture, because
the reader who seeks to consume it “like a can of soup” will find it “indigestible” – poetry must
be read, by which Auden means “entered into by a personal encounter”.25 Yet the contemporary
poet faces the great temptation to capitulate to the Public, to utter what Auden calls “a resonant
lie” in order to appeal to the changing tastes of the crowd – in other words, to become in Auden’s
dismissive shorthand (following Kierkegaard’s denunciations of the press in The Present Age) a
journalist.26
Despite these pitfalls, Auden saw in the conditions of his day a reason for poets to hope; a
very Kierkegaardian reason indeed. Buffetted by so many disjointed social pressures, poets could
no longer, as in what Auden saw as days of greater social cohesion, produce truthful works out
of the fabric of their society; the task of personal development fell squarely on the shoulders of
the individual: “The difficulty of being an artist in an age when one has to live everything for
oneself, has its compensations. It is, for the strong, a joy to know that now there are no longer
any places of refuge in which one can lie down in comfort, that one must go on or go under, live
dangerously or not at all.”27 If this sounds suspiciously like Kierkegaard’s injunction to embrace
life “out over 70,000 fathoms,” there is a reason for this resonance.28 In The Present Age
Kierkegaard, having railed against the Public and its abstraction for most of the essay, turns at

25

W.H. Auden, “A Short Defense of Poetry,” in The Complete Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Volume V – 1963-1968,
ed. Edward Mendelson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 119-20.
26
Auden, W.H., Collected Poems, 811. See also the essay “The Rewards of Patience” in Auden, The Complete
Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Volume II, 153-8.
27
W.H. Auden, The Complete Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Vol. II, 157.
28
Auden would directly reference the 70,000 fathoms in Prospero’s speech in The Sea and the Mirror (Collected
Poems, 409).
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the end to consider the possible benefits of a society built on abstraction: “No longer can the
individual… turn to the great for help… he is either lost in the dizziness of unending abstraction
or saved for ever in the reality of religion… the development is, in spite of everything, a progress
because all the individuals who are saved will receive the specific weight of religion, its essence
at first hand, from God himself.”29 What is lost numerically, be it adherence to true belief or
readership of real poetry, is gained in the intensity of individual commitment. No longer able to
fall back on inherited beliefs or methods, the religious person and the poet must alike make their
way forward through individual effort of will.
Auden, following Kierkegaard, considered this a gain for poetry; as mass culture exposed
the pretensions of middlebrow culture to easy mastery, poetry would act as a repository for what
Auden called “personal speech,” the use of language that allows for true communication between
individuals, as opposed to the impersonal communication of “codes”.30 As Kierkegaard
constantly addressed his reader as “that single individual,” disdaining bestseller status in favor of
works that would speak to readers keen enough to listen, so Auden saw in poetry the possibility
of forging personal links between poet and reader. His 1939 poem “Like a Vocation,” written
just after his emigration, imagines the task of reaching the individual reader as the most
important one a poet can perform. After warning against the temptations of trying to impress
great leaders and crowds, the poet finds his true audience: “The one who needs you, that
terrified/Imaginative child who only knows you/As what the uncles call a lie/… and is
29
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neither/Charming, successful, nor a crowd;/Alone among the noise and policies of summer,/His
weeping climbs towards your life like a vocation.”31 For Auden, then, the vagaries of the modern
poetic situation can be redeemed through reaching individual readers who will connect with the
personal speech of the poet.32
Though less voluminously or systematically than Auden, R.S. Thomas also spent time
musing on the role of poetry in contemporary society. He too distrusted mass society, a suspicion
seen most obviously in his ambiguous response to science and technology; notoriously a
technophobe, Thomas nevertheless incorporated scientific language into his poems, apparently in
an attempt to maintain poetry’s relevance amidst a shifting cultural landscape.33 Despite this
acquiescence to modern science, Thomas remained distrustful of mass culture and its potential
for distraction. Speaking of his time in a Welsh tourist hub he recalls: “The views were
miraculous, but the most common sight was the rows of cars and the motorists with their heads
in newspapers swallowing the petty news of the materialist world”; he then laments the
destruction of the remnants of medieval Wales by the ravenous demands of the twentieth
century.34 Thomas felt not only the Welsh landscape but poetry itself as under attack by an
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attempt to “Downgrade contemporary poetry to a fringe activity of the scientific-technological
and politico-economic society in England today.”35 Like Auden, Thomas felt that the dissolution
of society was a detriment to poetic communication, and, like his English compatriot, filtered his
response through his reading of Kierkegaard. In his essay “The Creative Writer’s Suicide,”
which takes its guiding vision from The Present Age, Thomas presents, in terms that echo both
Auden and Kierkegaard, the tricky situation of the poet in contemporary society: “Kierkegaard
defined a poet as one who suffers… but the sound which comes out is so sweet to the ears of the
listeners that they press him to sing again… Here we see the first temptation for the creative
writer to commit suicide, namely by writing those things which tickle the public’s fancy, in order
to secure reward or praise, rather than those things he really wants to write.”36 Like Auden,
Thomas asserts the importance of the personal vision for the artist, but recognizes the temptation
to succumb to the whims of the public, especially in order to secure a living.37
Thomas’s assessment of poetry explicitly foregrounds religious concerns that often hover in the
background of Auden’s reflections on contemporary poetry. As a working priest in the Anglican
Church in Wales throughout his adult life, Thomas was in a unique position as one whose
concerns with religion and poetry had an immediate daily relevance.38 Despite Thomas’s
somewhat unconventional – not to say unorthodox – beliefs, Christianity remained a touchstone
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for him throughout his life, and undergirded his poetry of religious questioning. The oddity of his
vocational duality prompted Thomas many times to defend the validity of both his priestly and
poetic vocations, but more interesting than this defense is the way Thomas sensed the
intermingling of the declining fortunes of Christianity and poetry in contemporary England. He
saw a direct connection between “secularism and its abstractionism” and the shrinking of interest
in religion and poetry, for secularism has at its center “the commercial element,” and reduces all
cultural objects to their “saleability”.39 Worse than this, in Thomas’s view, was the capitulation
of churches to secularist logic, leading to an aesthetic decline full of “tasteless hybrids” between
the old and new;40 Christianity’s unwillingness to stand against the modernist forces had,
according to Thomas, led to a religion “Less and less capable of sustaining that creative tension
of the intellect and the emotions out of which the good life and the good poem can be born.”41
For Thomas, then, the problem of the religious poet in the modern age lies not so much in the
loss of audience as the erosion of meaning, abstraction having robbed society of its ability to
interpret religious aesthetics.42 As the concrete materiality found in both nature and the artistic
vision of medieval Christianity gives way to the abstract materialism of the twentieth century,
the public becomes less and less able to recognize God’s presence in either nature or the church.
Thomas explores this Kierkegaardian critique of modern society in his ekphrastic poem
“Souillac: Le Sacrifice d’Abraham,” a meditation on a column in the church of the French abbey
of Souillac that depicts the Biblical account of Abraham preparing to sacrifice his son Isaac.
Reflecting on this striking medieval sculpture, Thomas – who in the poem simultaneously
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references Kierkegaard’s multiple depictions of the sacrifice of Isaac in Fear and Trembling –
thinks of the power of art in previous eras:
This is what art could do,
Interpreting faith
With serene chisel.
The resistant stone
Is quiet as our breath,
And is accepted.43
The “serene chisel” that interprets faith belongs, in Thomas’ view, to the medieval craftsman, not
the contemporary poet. In Thomas’s wistful words, this is what art could do, but can do no
longer, because the “resistant stone” is no longer accepted. According to Thomas’ evaluation, the
modern religious poet faces challenges unknown to the medieval sculptor, because society has
sacrificed imaginative unity for technological gains.44 Whereas a medieval craftsman might
spend years on a single sculpture, chipping away at the “resistant stone” – a pace which afforded
time to reflect and carve the piece with unity – the twentieth century push for a never-ending
stream of new gadgets and convenient entertainments has led to confusion and incoherence.45
Unity – in the Coleridgean sense of imaginative unity – becomes in Thomas’ schema the
goal of both poet and priest alike. For Thomas, “The poet by echoing the primary imagination,
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Figure 2. The sacrifice of Isaac, Sainte-Marie Abbey of Souillac. Photo courtesy of Pol Mayer.
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recreates. Through his work he forces those who read him to do the same, thus bringing them
nearer the primary imagination themselves… The world needs the unifying power of the
imagination. The two things which give it best are poetry and religion.”46 As difficult as the task
may be, the poet must strive to “force” the reader into a position of recreating, spurring the
reader toward the “unifying power of the imagination,” which will counteract the dissipating
tendencies of modernity. The poet must therefore stand in contradistinction to the Public, with its
nose buried in the newspapers. Though he allowed for other sources, Thomas, unlike the more
urban Auden, drew his imaginative strength primarily from nature and religion, both of which he
saw as cultivating the attention span necessary to exercise imaginative unity. Thomas’s frequent
combination of natural settings and theological ruminations sprang from his sense that both
nature and God required sustained patience, a willingness to wait, before they would reveal their
glories. In his poem “Sea-watching” Thomas connects the act of prayer with birdwatching (a
favorite hobby of his):
Ah, but a rare bird is
rare. It is when one is not looking,
at times one is not there
that it comes.
You must wear your eyes out,
as others their knees.
I became the hermit
of the rocks, habited with the wind
and the mist. There were days,
so beautiful the emptiness
it might have filled,
its absence
was as its presence; not to be told
any more, so single my mind
after its long fast,
my watching from praying.47
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“You must wear your eyes out,/as others their knees” could stand as Thomas’s motto for writing
poetry, as for seeking after God. While the Public demands the instant gratification of
technological progress (symbolized for Thomas, as for Kierkegaard, by the relentless novelty of
the newspaper page), the poetically – and religiously – inclined seek hermitage among the
difficult crags of the imagination. But the poet seeks to convey to others the same need for
patience; in “Sea-watching” Thomas invites the reader to share in his waiting through the use of
enjambment (especially in the tautological lines “A rare bird is/rare”); simple, often
monosyllabic diction; and a verse form that not only visually mimics the waves of the sea, but
creates empty space the eye must process.48 Like Auden, Thomas sensed that poetic practice of
this sort would be hard-pressed to draw in a large audience, but he too found the trade-off
worthwhile.
Art as Mirror; Poetry as Prayer
Denounce the magical charm of aesthetics – well, there have indeed been times when you
might have succeeded in coercing people. But with what result? With the result that
privately, with secret passion, they love that magic… Be the amazed listener who sits and
hears what the other finds the more delight in telling you because you listen with
amazement. But above all do not forget one thing, the purpose you have in mind, the fact
that it is the religious you must bring forward. If you are capable of it, present the
aesthetic with all its fascinating magic , enthral if possible the other man, present it with
the sort of passion which exactly suits him, merrily for the merry, in a minor key for the
melancholy, wittily for the witty, &c. But above all do not forget one thing, the purpose
you have to bring forward… the religious. By all means do this, and fear not to do it; for
truly it cannot be done without fear and trembling – Kierkegaard, The Point of View49

“Poetry makes nothing happen,” intones Auden in his conflicted eulogy “In Memory of
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W.B. Yeats.”50 Ironically, this line which disparages poetry’s power has had its own huge effect
on the critical assessment of Auden’s career. The dividing line which runs temptingly through
Auden’s corpus finds its strongest underscoring in this rejection of the influence of poetry in the
world. Gone was the politically engaged Auden of the 1930s, friend of the working class,
reformer of society; enter the withdrawn, private Auden, content to muddle around with words in
his enclosed sandbox, heedless of the world crashing down around him. Or so goes the narrative,
especially from British figures who saw in Auden’s move to America a betrayal of his roots and
a disfigurement of his legacy.51 As his most famous critic, Philip Larkin himself, put it: “At one
stroke he lost his key subject and emotion – Europe and the fear of war – and abandoned his
audience together with their common dialect and concerns.”52
While undoubtedly important, Auden’s move to America cannot be singled out as the
defining event in his poetic career, not least because it was not originally intended as a
permanent move. Though tempting to consider his move to America as a flight from reality,
since Britain would soon thereafter enter a war that America would remain neutral in for several
more years, such a belief occludes the real intellectual work that went into Auden’s change of
mind. Foremost among his intellectual influences during this period, we must consider the work
of Kierkegaard insofar as it touches on the role of the aesthetic in relation to the religious.
Though many critics have noted potential formal analogues in Auden’s 1940s poetry to the
“stages of life” identified by Kierkegaard – the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious – a surface
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level reading of these coincidences has been the norm.53 What has been missed is the intensely
personal interest Auden took in Kierkegaard’s ideas of literary vocation; Kierkegaard’s
distinction between aesthetic genius and the special religious vocation of the Apostle forced
Auden to grapple with his own notions of what purpose poetry serves, and what a poet should
think about his or her own work. As Auden said to a friend, Kierkegaard “knocked the conceit”
out of him.54 Even decades later, after distancing himself from his initial enthusiasm for
Kierkegaard, Auden would recognize the profound impact of Kierkegaard upon his own selfevaluation: “His essential warning is directed… to the gifted man, the individual endowed with
an exceptional talent for art or science or philosophy… indeed, he is a prophet, calling the
talented to repentance. No person of talent who has read him can fail to realize that the talented
man, even more than the millionaire, is the rich man for whom it is so difficult to enter the
Kingdom of Heaven.”55
The short length of Kierkegaard’s essay “On the Difference between a Genius and an
Apostle” belies its outsized influence on the Anglo-American literary tradition. It was this essay
that convinced Walker Percy to join the Catholic Church and, no less significantly, confronted
Auden with the limitations of poetry. While other works by Kierkegaard warn of the dangers of
the aesthetic life, “Genius and Apostle” specifically addresses the makers of aesthetic objects. In
essence, Kierkegaard sees the distinction between the two figures as follows:
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A genius and an Apostle are qualitatively different, they are definitions which each
belong in their own spheres: the sphere of immanence, and the sphere of transcendence…
Genius has only an immanent teleology; the Apostle is placed as absolute paradoxical
teleology… Genius is… immediateness… it is a natural qualification, genius is born.
Even long before there can be any question as to how far genius is prepared to relate its
particular gifts to God, it is genius, and it remains genius even if it does not do so… An
Apostle is not born; an Apostle is a man called and appointed by God, receiving a
mission from him… to become an Apostle is not preceded by any potential possibility;
essentially every man is equally near to becoming one. An Apostle can never come to
himself in such a way that he becomes conscious of his apostolic calling as a factor in the
development of his life. Apostolic calling is a paradoxical factor, which from first to last
in his life stands paradoxically outside his personal identity with himself as the definite
person he is… The humorous self-sufficiency of genius is the unity of a modest
resignation in the world and a proud elevation above the world: of being an unnecessary
superfluity and a precious ornament… [if] he is an author, who abolishes every
teleological relation to his environment and humorously defines himself as a poet… The
lyrical author is only concerned with his production, enjoys the pleasure of producing,
often perhaps only after pain and effort; but he has nothing to do with others, he does not
write in order that: in order to enlighten men or in order to help them along the right
road.56
I quote the essay at such great length not merely to thoroughly illustrate the contours of
Kierkegaard’s dichotomy, but also to emphasize the extent to which Auden’s very language
regarding poetry in this period comes directly from Kierkegaard. References to Apostles as the
foil to artists abound in Auden’s criticism, most notably in his discussion of two Ibsen plays,
Brand and Peer Gynt, which to his mind represent the apostle and genius, respectively.57 Beyond
this, Auden increasingly recognizes the place of poetry as the immanent sphere, unable to ascend
to the transcendent because of its natural limitations. As a “secular” activity poetry, like science,
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can only ever be “small beer” next to the demands of Christianity – a fact which Auden connects
to the perpetual discomfort of all poets who are also Christians: their genius chafes against the
limitations imposed by the transcendent sphere.58 The poet who can accept such limitations,
however, has the consolations of a self-aware superfluity. He or she regains the ornamental
nature of aesthetic creation and can take pride in a well-crafted poem without worrying over its
societal effects.59
Auden’s more vocal critics have rightly sensed the danger Auden’s adopted position
poses to Romantic and modernist conceptions of the artist; it is unsurprising that two of his most
ardent critics, Larkin and Randall Jarrell, were both practicing poets as well as critics.60 For
Auden, however, this stance was both pragmatic and principled: pragmatic because poets had
deluded themselves too long into believing Shelley’s grandiose description of them as the
“unacknowledged legislators of the World”; principled because, even if poets could attain to the
power to change the world, they would most likely use this power for ill.61 What critics have
sometimes wrongly construed as a detachment from politics in Auden’s later life is rather a
separation of the aesthetic from the political; he remained as political as ever, especially during
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the charged war years, but he no longer felt that the poet could serve political ends as poet, only
as a citizen.62
While this stance necessitates a certain skepticism toward the very idea of religious
poetry, or poetry that moves the reader toward meaningful change of any sort, Auden does not
completely discount the ability of poetry to positively affect its reader.63 The one thing the
aesthetic may do to communicate truth is to hold a mirror up to readers, reflecting their own
desires back on them. As opposed to purgative or affective theories of art, where art arouses
certain emotions in the audience – in order either to negate them or amplify them – under
Auden’s reflective vision of art, the reader “Becomes conscious of his feelings good and bad,
and of what their relations to each other are in fact.”64 Truly artistic poetry, then, reveals to its
reader the reality of the world, and his or her place in it, stripping away the illusions conjured up
by more propagandistic forms of communication like advertising and journalism. Auden became
fascinated in this period with art’s potential as a means of “disenchantment” contra the “magic”
of propaganda; this view of art as a disenchanting mirror becomes central to The Sea and the
Mirror.65 Critically, however, art can only present possibility to the reader, not force her or him
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to make the right choice. The aesthetic, then, can only present truth indirectly, as a matter of
reflection, but this indirect presentation can still have enormous impact: as Kierkegaard argues,
“An illusion can never be destroyed directly, and only by indirect means can it be radically
removed.”66 Poetry should strive, in Auden’s system, to present truth in such a way that it must
be appropriated by the individual; it functions, in other words, as literature which strips the
reader of his or her illusions.67
Thomas’s work shares with Auden’s a fascination with the image of the mirror – oddly
enough, usually in connection with the sea.68 As in Auden, the mirror presents an image that can
reveal, but must be appropriated by the individual. Thomas explicitly links the role of the
“mirror” in personal development to the writings of Kierkegaard in his poem “Fathoms” (a most
Kierkegaardian title):
Young I visited
this pool; asked my question,
passed on…
Today, thirty years
later, on the margin
of eternity, dissolution,
nothing but the self
looking up at the self
looking down, with each
refusing to become
an object, so with Kierkegaard’s
help, from bottomless fathoms
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I dredge up the truth.69

Here Kierkegaard acts as midwife at the birth of a new understanding in Thomas. Seasoned by
life and approaching mortality, he can finally appropriate his reflection in the pool to make
change in his life, dredging up the truth where once he merely passed on.70
Yet in some ways Thomas disagreed with Auden (and Kierkegaard) regarding the poet’s
prospects for communicating about truth. As noted above, Thomas held out a great deal of hope
for the poetic method of creating imaginative unity. His major criticism of Kierkegaard stemmed
from his view that Kierkegaard abandoned poetry for a religious calling, thereby possibly
tainting the poetic profession in the eyes of religious people.71 Clearly Thomas held to a much
more optimistic view of poetry’s place in the world than post-conversion Auden, for whom
poetry could never do more than hint at its own designs. Despite this optimism, however, the net
result of Thomas’s view of “religious” art looks strikingly similar in practice to Auden’s, albeit
for different reasons. While Auden upheld Christian dogma as a reliable guide to truth while
downplaying poetry’s role in discovering this truth, Thomas gave almost equal weight to poetry
and religion but, since he returned repeatedly to the idea of God’s unknowability, both methods
rely, according to Thomas, on patience, guesswork, and luck. For Auden and Thomas, then,
poetry that seeks to excavate religious truth can only do so indirectly; both thus subscribe to
Kierkegaard’s idea of aesthetic communication as indirect. The poet is one who prods the reader
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toward religious encounter, but only indirectly, through a series of maneuvers which disguise the
poet’s presence.
Flowing out of this emphasis on indirectness, both Auden and Thomas see the reading of
poetry as a discipline, which connects it to the disciplines of spirituality. They see poetry’s place
in religious life as analogous to that of prayer, because both see prayer less as a means of
requesting and receiving favors from God, and more as a means of training the mind’s attention
– an especially important discipline amidst the hubbub of modernity. Auden, drawing on Simone
Weil, calls prayer the directing of attention toward a single object – including, but not limited to,
God – and considers this discipline the key to guarding one’s personal life in a technological
society.72 He goes on to conclude that this training of attention, a secularized version of prayer,
should be the primary end of modern education. Since for Auden reading poetry involves
beholding a reflection of one’s own inner state, it would seem to provide a unique opportunity
for the practice of this secularized prayer. “Indigestible” to most readers who crave only empty
calories, true poetry will be read and reread by those who find its difficulty stimulating, and by
engaging in this careful reading the audience may come to better understand their own desires
and inclinations better than they would through focusing merely on their immediately felt
emotions.73 The difficulty of poetry allows it to be used “indirectly” by the individual as a means
of sharpening the attention. I argue, then, that Auden’s amplification of verbal excess – in
particular, his flirtations with loquacious prose style – constitutes for him a means of sharpening
the reader’s attention: the way to understanding lies through a thicket of verbal misdirection.
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Though critics like Larkin found later Auden “too verbose to be memorable,”74 this verbosity in
fact constitutes a deliberate strategy on the part of Auden – if poetry became too memorable, too
easily assimilated, it would lose its power to sting the reader into reflection.
For Thomas, poetry and prayer are alike in that they both afford the individual the
opportunity to experience the “via negativa,” the approach to God that entails a stripping away of
all false impressions – in essence a form of “indirectness” in one’s approach to God. In Christian
mysticism, the tradition of “via negativa” involves eliminating the various ideas of God that
cannot be true from one’s mind, thereby backing up into a greater knowledge of God indirectly.
For Thomas, the “via negativa” became an approach not just to life, but poetry. Critics have
noted that the turn in his poetry of the 1970s involves a questioning of language alongside his
religious questions, and the two problems are bound tightly together for Thomas. Poetry and
prayer, then, consist primarily of silence, of a waiting in the absence for some sense of presence
to emerge. Locked in prayer, Thomas echoes St. Augustine, praying to God: “Prompt me,
God;/But not yet. When I speak,/Though it be you who speak/Through me, something is
lost./The meaning is in the waiting.” Though he may speak with the official authority of the
apostolic office in his role as a preacher, Thomas cannot, as a poet, do more than hint indirectly
at the approach to God. The radical simplicity of his late style creates gaps wherein the reader
may make her or his own tentative approach to the religious sphere – just as Auden’s late poetry
forces the reader to pay attention to wade through its excesses, so Thomas’s late poetry instills
the readerly virtue of patience, its sparseness slowing down the reading process and allowing the
reader to wander through the empty spaces of the poems. Though their late poetry looks radically
different, then, both poets employ a similar, Kierkegaardian logic in their approach to
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communicating through poetry: the reader must be prompted to choose and act on her or his
own; though the poet cannot hope to control the reader’s response, they can at least create an
environment in which it is possible for the reader to become aware of her or his own inner state,
and perhaps choose to change it.
One Circumlocution: Auden, Verbal Excess, and Indirect Communication
From the point of view of my whole activity as an author, integrally conceived, the
aesthetic work is a deception, and herein is to be found the deeper significance of the use
of pseudonyms. A deception, however, is a rather ugly thing. To this I would make
answer: One my not let oneself by deceived by the word ‘deception’. One can deceive a
person for the truth’s sake, and (to recall old Socrates) one can deceive a person into the
truth – Kierkegaard, The Point of View75
One of the poems that best encapsulates the misdirections of Auden’s late style is “‘The
Truest Poetry Is the Most Feigning’”. A poem about the art of writing poetry, “Feigning”
exhibits the looseness and excess of style of Auden’s later period, pitched in the comic mode he
so often employed in the second half of his career. Ostensibly a set of precepts to others who
would become poets, the poem advocates for an indirect style, urging the poet manqué to “Be
subtle, various, ornamental, clever/And do not listen to those critics ever/Whose crude provincial
gullets crave in books/Plain cooking made still plainer by plain cooks.”76 These lines hearken
back to Auden’s critical writings, where he praises poetry for its ability to resist thoughtless
consumption in an age of mass blandness. The poem instantiates this theory of subtle
complications, inserting multiple asides in parentheses, using diction that swings from the slangy
to the hifalutin (“hullabaloo,” “hippocampi,” “panygeric,” “reticulator”) and making multiple,
slightly obscure mythological references (Endymion, Amphisboene). The poem’s greatest trick,
however, comes in its structural misdirection. For almost its entire length, “Feigning” takes as its
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subject the writing of a love poem, going through the ways in which the poet must transmute his
love for a particular individual into poetic language so it can be universalized. Only in the final
stanza does the true subject of the poem – the difficulties of communicating poetically about
religious truth – emerge:
For given Man, by birth, by education,
Imago Dei who forgot his station,
The self-made creature who himself unmakes,
The only creature ever made who fakes,
With no more nature in his loving smile
Than in his theories of a natural style,
What but tall tales, the luck of verbal playing,
Can trick his lying nature into saying
That love, or truth in any serious sense,
Like orthodoxy, is a reticence?77
Here Auden engages in a complex reworking of the entire meaning of the poem, pulling out the
rug from under the reader, who expects a conclusion that reinforces the poem’s previous
statements on the need to exaggerate in writing love poetry. Instead, what Auden delivers is a
stanza on the limits of communication, of the need for the “luck of verbal playing” in getting
across serious points. Auden brings into focus the general strategy of the poem: in expanding on
the need to avoid direct statement in describing human love, the poem in fact edges around the
very thing it cannot express – the divine love between humans and God. While love poetry is
possible because it universalizes the particular love of the poet, any attempt to universalize
religious experience will miscommunicate about the nature of that experience.78 What is left for
the poet, then, is the negative approach, the stripping away of false impressions. By unmasking
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the artifice of the poet’s art – the ways in which poets erase individual encounter in their attempt
to aestheticize love – Auden strongly demarcates the limits of poetry in talking of anything of
significance.79 What remains, after poetry has gone, is silence.
Yet significance can still be found in the poem itself. It is precisely in the sense of poetry
as a game that Auden allows for its ability to communicate. Where deliberate communication
fails, “the luck of verbal playing” allows a space for intimate connection between reader and
text. An intimate recognition of the poem’s message starts with understanding its misleading
structure – the long, loose, rambling body cut short by a brief, contradictory epilog – but it
includes other factors as well. The keen eye sees a pun in the very first line of the final stanza (as
Auden notes in the first stanza, “Good poets have a weakness for bad puns”),80 a wordplay with
theological significance: “For given man” simultaneously states the problem of evil (given man
as he is in the fallen world), and the solution (forgiven man, the gap between words closed as the
gap between humans and God). The final stanza is rife with such verbal playing, from the
repetition of variations of “made” that hint at a tension between the status of humans as created
beings and their prideful desire to make themselves (“The self-made creature who himself
unmakes/ The only creature ever made who fakes”);81 to the play on nature/natural that suggests
the dual deceptions of human emotion and poetry that embraces “theories of a natural style”.82
Such excesses of repetition preserve the poem’s comic, almost sing-song feeling, while
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simultaneously creating space for the reader to grasp, through individual interpretive effort,
Auden’s notions of artistic limitation.
Verbal excess has a vital role to play in preserving the poet, too. Again and again in his
later life Auden came back to the idea that poetic self-limitation was key for poets as a means of
remaining true in both life and art. Rejecting what he saw as the grandiose pretensions of
Romantics like Shelley and modernists like Yeats, Auden sought out examples of artistic
modesty.83 He found one in Kierkegaard, whom he describes as a genius – a clear nod to “Genius
and Apostle,” and a recognition that Kierkegaard himself realized the limits of his own ability to
communicate truth.84 He found another in Henry James, in some ways an odd role model for a
poet, but perfect for Auden’s late turn to excess. To Auden, James represented a faithfulness to
artistic vocation tied to a recognition of its limits.85 In his poetic ode to the novelist, “At the
Grave of Henry James,” Auden employs a Jamesian sense of circumlocution in his stanzas,
describing, for example, the earth as “our solar fabric,/That primary machine.”86 James’ fussy
style, which aims at extreme precision of description, leads the reader round and round, always
delaying a final reckoning with the point at hand. For Auden James’ eccentricity of style and
verbal excess mark him as one especially aware of his vocation, able to resist the temptations of
the Public, and in turn to inspire fellow artists to a similar resistance. Auden also depicts James
as someone who managed the rare trick of aligning life and art. Repeatedly in this period Auden
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denounced poets whose artistic greatness led them to presuppose their own moral greatness,
recognizing, through Kierkegaard’s influence, that the art produced by geniuses has no bearing
on the ethical struggles of their personal lives.87 James, however, managed to combine artistic
vocation and ethical conduct:
With what an innocence your hand submitted
To those formal rules that help a child to play,
While your heart, fastidious as
A delicate nun, remained true to the rare noblesse
Of your lucid gift, and for its own sake ignored the
Resentful muttering Mass…
Preserve me, Master, from its vague incitement,
Yours be the disciplinary image that holds
Me back from agreeable wrong,
And the clutch of eddying Muddle, lest Proportion shed
The alpine chill of her shrugging editorial shoulder
On my loose impromptu song.
All will be judged. Master of nuance and scruple,
Pray for me and for all writers, living or dead:
Because there are many whose works
Are in better taste than their lives, because there is no end
To the vanity of our calling, make intercession
For the treason of all clerks.88
In the middle stanza, Auden intuits a connection between a willingness to embrace an “agreeable
wrong” and an acquiescence to the editing that would cut down his “loose, impromptu song.”
The temptation to court the Public’s favor by uttering the resonant lie goes hand in hand with a
willingness to simplify personal style, reducing it down to easily digestible bits. By learning
from the “Master of nuance and scruple,” Auden hoped to tame his own ambitions, recognizing
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the endless vanity of the artistic vocation and pursuing instead the “rare noblesse” of his own gift
for elaboration and elucidation.
From the beginning, Henry James has been recognized as a key influence on the style of
“Caliban to the Audience,” the final section of Auden’s long poem The Sea and the Mirror, an
extended meditation on Shakespeare’s The Tempest.89 Here Caliban, transformed from the barely
coherent savage of Shakespeare’s play into a sophisticated orator, speaks in florid prose to the
audience come to watch The Tempest about the nature of artistic creation itself.90 This rambling
discourse, which occupies over half the space of the whole poem, addresses a variety of
“audience members” who sit on after the close of the play. Caliban speaks first to those who seek
in the play only entertainment, then to those who desire not pleasure but edification in art, then to
the general crowd, and finally to the successful among the crowd, at each turn exposing the
particular weaknesses of each group. Having concluded his ramble through these categories,
however, Caliban finds himself doubting the success of his admonitions:
I have tried – the opportunity was not to be neglected – to raise the admonitory
forefinger, to ring the alarming bell, but with so little confidence of producing the right
result, so certain that the open eye and attentive ear will always interpret any sight and
any sound to their advantage, every rebuff as a consolation, every prohibition as a rescue
– that is what they open and attend for – that I find myself almost hoping, for your sake,
that I have had the futile honour of addressing the blind and the deaf.91
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In this monstrous run-on sentence, Auden displays his propensity for circumlocution at full
strength: the breaking up of the sentence with asides, the parallel structure, the weakening of
purpose through modifiers (“almost”, “futile”) – all point to a speaker hesitant to come out and
say what he means: the people will reject his various warnings about art, and find in it what they
want. Circumlocution in Caliban’s hands returns to its very roots as a moving around the subject,
“the futile honour of addressing the blind and deaf” being an especially delicate tiptoeing around
the audience’s ignorance, stubbornness, or both.
As Caliban reflects on his own inability to enact change, he experiences something of a
crisis himself. Imagining himself and his rival/mirror image Ariel (who represents the enchanting
aspect of art) as “Sweating and shivering in our moth-eaten ill-fitting stock costumes”, Caliban
himself manages what he does not think the audience can: he owns up to the image he sees
reflected in the mirror of art. This he does in almost explicitly Kierkegaardian terms, again
filtered through the thicket of verbiage he employs:
Yet, at this very moment when we do at last see ourselves as we are, neither cosy nor
playful, but swaying out on the ultimate wind-whipped cornice that overhangs the
unabiding void — we have never stood anywhere else, —when our reasons are silenced
by the heavy huge derision, — There is nothing to say. There never has been,— and our
wills chuck in their hands—There is no way out. There never was,— it is at this moment
for the first time in our lives we hear, not the sounds which, as born actors, we have
hitherto condescended to use as an excellent vehicle for displaying our personalities and
looks, but the real Word which is our only raison d’être. Not that we have improved;
everything, the massacres, the whippings, the lies, the twaddle, and all their carbon copies
are still present, more obviously than ever; nothing has been reconstructed; our shame,
our fear, our incorrigible staginess, all wish and no resolve, are still, and more intensely
than ever, all we have: only now it is not in spite of them but with them that we are
blessed by that Wholly Other Life from which we are separated by an essential emphatic
gulf of which our contrived fissures of mirror and proscenium arch – we understand them
at last – are feebly figurative signs, so that all our meanings are reversed and it is
precisely in its negative image of Judgement that we can positively envisage Mercy; it is
just here, among the ruins and the bones, that we may rejoice in the perfected Work
which is not ours.92
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It is in this passage, which closes Caliban’s speech (and, barring a brief postscript from Ariel, the
entirety of The Sea and the Mirror) that we see Auden most delicately instantiating the idea that
“orthodoxy is a reticence” – that to speak meaningfully about the truth of the self requires
indirection, an indirection Auden achieves through loquacious hesitation. The passage contains
hints of the religious, especially in the capitalization of “Word” and “Wholly Other Life,” but
Caliban cannot directly speculate on what these terms mean. What he gains is the ability to
accurately describe his own situation “swaying out on the ultimate wind-whipped cornice that
overhangs the unabiding void”: if not quite living out over 70,000 fathoms, at least a state which
resembles that uncertain life of faith. Accompanying this is the realization that “There is nothing
to say. There never has been.” Here Auden comes closest to directly stating that art should aim at
silence – a stance he hints at in the Stage Manager’s Prologue at the beginning of the poem,
where the speaker declares that “All the rest is silence/On the other side of the wall;/And the
silence ripeness,/And the ripeness all.”93
Thus the paradox of Auden’s late style: the more he desires silence, the more he must
speak, to hide his true purpose from detection. To directly state the Kierkegaardian premises
underneath – that each individual must make a choice and leap into faith or face a lifetime of
despair – would be to destroy both the aesthetic value of the poem and the efficacy of the
religious message. So Auden’s Caliban must hide his plain pearl of wisdom under layers of
verbal excess; the “contrived fissures of mirror and proscenium arch” that constitute the artistry
of The Sea and the Mirror might be only “feebly figurative signs” but they are the best Auden as
poet can procure. So he amplifies the artifice of his faux-Jamesian monolog: rattling off
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interjections at a staccato clip, elevating his diction at key moments (“cornice,” “incorrigible
staginess,” “contrived fissures”), and indulging in a tortuous, tortured syntax that even the master
might find too fastidious. Still, there is the hope that their very fragility clears the ground for a
direct encounter between the individual reader and religious truth. By showing the ultimate
hollowness of his artistic creation, Auden hopes to convey something of the futility of all
aesthetic creation.94 By embracing the anti-Romantic conception of the aesthetic as merely one
stage of life – and the lowest, at that – Auden points the reader (and, not least, himself) away
from the temptations of genius and toward its limitations.95 He hopes, ultimately, that “among
the ruins and the bones” of empty aestheticism, the soul might find a reason to rejoice in
something other than itself.
Watching and Praying: Thomas, Kierkegaard, and the Simple Style
When a mystification, a dialectical reduplication, is used in the service of a serious
purpose, it will be so used as merely to obviate a misunderstanding, or an over-hasty
understanding, whereas all the while the true explanation is at hand and ready to be
found by him who honestly seeks it – Kierkegaard, The Point of View96
If Auden sought to communicate to the individual reader the need for silence and
reflection followed by definite choice by using outlandish verbal excess, R.S. Thomas pursued a
very different poetic means of creating silence: a style stripped down to its barest essence. Critics
of Thomas have long observed a shift in style, usually pointing to 1972’s H’m as the turning
point toward a simpler style, though in reality Thomas began working his way toward this style
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in the 1960s.97 These changes in style accompany a shift in theme, away from poems about the
Welsh countryside and its inhabitants, and toward a more abstract, metaphysical reckoning with
existence. The new poems also exhibit a marked distrust in language to convey meaning; just as
the soul watching for God must be constantly on alert, so must the poet constantly adapt to
language as it slips between their fingers. This second phase of Thomas’s career also marks the
start of his direct poetic engagement with the figure of Kierkegaard, though he had been reading
him for twenty years already. Unsurprisingly, Thomas’s poems about Kierkegaard bring together
his various obsessions of the period – religious, aesthetic, and social – as Thomas uses
Kierkegaard as a lens through which to view the struggles of the religious poet trying to reach an
indifferent public with an impossible message.
These themes come together most vibrantly in Thomas’s poem “S.K.” Painting a portrait
in miniature of Kierkegaard, Thomas simultaneously reflects on the nature of God, art, and the
Public:
Who were his teachers? He learned
his anonymity from God himself,
leaving his readers, as God
leaves the reader in life’s
book to grope for the meaning
that will be quicksilver in the hand…
He was the first
of the Surrealists, picturing
our condition with the draughtsmanship
of a Dali, but under
a pseudonym always.
The limpidity of his prose
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had a cerebral gloss
prohibitive of transparence.
His laughter was that
of an author out of the asylum
of his genius. Imagining
from his emphasis on the self
that God is not other,
we are arrested by his shadow
in which the face of the beloved
is as a candle snuffed out
in the darkness following
on the mind’s dazzling explosion…
The difficulty
with prayer is the exchange
of places between I and thou,
with silence as the answer
to an imagined request.
Is this the price genius
must pay, that from an emphasis
on the subjective only
soliloquy remains? Is prayer
not a glass that, beginning
in obscurity as his books
do, the longer we stare
into the clearer becomes
the reflection of a countenance
in it other than our own?98
Here we see the hallmarks of Thomas’s late style in action: plentiful enjambment, shortness of
line combined with close attention to verse form and shape, and a simplicity of language. All
push toward a slowing down of the reading process. Enjambment, especially when it comes with
such frequency, and with such short lines, creates gaps and hesitations that leave the reader
uncertain not just about meaning, but about whether the poem will continue at all. Lines like
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“leaving his readers, as God/leaves the reader in life’s/book” discombobulate the reader
temporarily, forcing a pause, even a rereading, before the syntax becomes clear.99
The effect of Thomas’s gaps gets amplified by both his short lines and his tight verses.
The initial two-line stanzas fragment his portrait of Kierkegaard, only gradually lengthening to
three-line stanzas, then finally to the long block of text in the final stanza. Such manic jumps fit
the mood of the poem, which finds Thomas struggling to compare Kierkegaard to others: first
Christ, then Yeats, then Dali are brought forth as analogs, but none perfectly reflect
Kierkegaard’s singular importance for Thomas. The exact meaning of this importance is itself
elusive, “like quicksilver in the hand,” since “The limpidity of his prose/had a cerebral
gloss/prohibitive of transparence.” Here again style fits content, as Thomas’s sentence takes on
the very form he attributes to Kierkegaard’s prose: in some sense clear but obfuscated enough
(here by Thomas’s rare use of elevated diction) to remain resistant to straightforward explication.
Crucially, Thomas connects Kierkegaard’s anonymous methods, which enthrall the reader
through their very indecipherability, to the methods of God, who remains shrouded enough in
mystery to provoke the spiritual seeker to continued assays. Thomas too aims at this
“anonymous” method, shearing his poetry of flashy markings, seeking to capture the reader’s
attention through its very simplicity.
Poetry is better suited for this mysterious mode than the main mode of communication in
Thomas’s other vocation of priest: the sermon. When Thomas writes about preaching in his
poems, the effect is always chilling: he captures the inability of his sermons to communicate with
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his congregation, which seeks simple answers where he would submit complex questions. Poems
like “H’m” and “The Conviction,” play up the inevitable miscommunication which occurs when
a preacher tries to communicate with a crowd about the nature of God. Poetry – like
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works – allows for a measure of personal contact between author
and reader, such that some message may be communicated, however indirectly. In his poem “A
Grave Unvisited,” Thomas – after explaining that he has no interest in visiting Kierkegaard’s
grave, posthumously co-opted as a matter of national pride by Danes who would not heed the
philosopher’s call while he lived – asserts that for him, Kierkegaard has an almost bodily, living
presence: “I go/Up and down with him in his books,/Hand and hand like a child/With its father,
pausing to stare/As he did once at the mind’s country.”100 Hand and hand, Kierkegaard leads
Thomas on, like a good midwife, towards a deeper understanding of “the mind’s country.”
In the end, however, Kierkegaard proves most influential in his advocacy of silence.
Thomas, like Kierkegaard, like Auden, embraced the paradox of writing while holding the notion
that silence would be best of all. For Thomas, the silence that meets him in prayer is not cold
comfort, but the very thing making possible a deeper understanding of God. In prayer, silence is
“the answer to an imagined request,” a lack of response that becomes a response as it strips away
the longing for false comfort. Prayer illuminates God’s presence, for Thomas, but to see the
divine through this dark glass of mortality takes unflagging effort:
Is prayer
not a glass that, beginning
in obscurity as his books
do, the longer we stare
into the clearer becomes
the reflection of a countenance
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in it other than our own?101
Here again Kierkegaard emerges as a model: in reading Kierkegaard, one must assess and
reassess to parse the obscurity – the same attention must be paid in prayer, as the one praying
pores over the glass, scrutinizing it until the image of God appears, however fleetingly. Thomas
once again marries form to function, his short, clipped lines, prolific use of enjambment, and
convoluted syntax (“the longer we stare into/the clearer becomes”) combining to create a
compact, difficult to parse stanza that only gradually releases its meaning through repeated
readings. If prayer is, as Thomas suggests in “A Bird’s Prayer,” “A trickle/of language gathering
to a reservoir/to be drawn on by the thirsting/mind in its need for meaning,” the same could be
said of poetry, which slowly gathers its meanings in a pool into which the reader may look and
gain insight.102
The actual silence of blank pages not being a viable option for a poet, Thomas seeks the
next best thing, a condition next to silence. In the Credo section of his Mass for Hard Times,
Thomas compares God’s seemingly absolute silence to the reflection of that silence found in
human restraint. Tellingly, he again invokes Kierkegaard’s presence, suggesting that God adopts
a Kierkegaardian view of the importance of indirect communication:
Almighty
pseudonym, grant me at last,
as the token of my belief,
such ability to remain
silent, as is the nearest to a reflection
of your silence to which
the human looking-glass may attain.103
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Like Kierkegaard, who paradoxically aspired to the condition of silence through his voluminous
writings, Thomas senses the true vocation of the poet to be one of creating the possibility of
silence. The almighty pseudonym, who comes to humans only in hints and guesses, indirectly,
can be illuminated in part by the poet’s repeated attempts to sit still, and create stillness for
others. Kierkegaard, discussing silence in The Present Age, contrasts it to talkativeness: “Only
someone who knows how to remain essentially silent can really talk – and act essentially. Silence
is the essence of inwardness, of the inner life… some one who can really talk, because he knows
how to remain silent, will… [talk] about one thing only.”104 Against talkativeness, a sure
manifestation of the Public, with its surfeit of interest in meaningless trivialities and absence of
attention to essentials, the poet must bring to bear a silence that nevertheless reserves the right to
speak. The alternation of silence with speech comes across visually in Thomas’s poems; the later
he gets in his career, the more he experiments with empty space in lines. He does not, like
another great priest poet, George Herbert, create discernible images with his staggered lines
(unless you consider the layout of “Sea-watching” to be evocative of the motion of waves), but
he uses empty space as a visual reminder of the silence to which his late poems point.105 An
excellent example of this comes in “Kneeling,” a poem discussed above. As Thomas transitions
from a description of the congregation waiting to hear his sermon to his inner thoughts to God,
he includes a line break of great intensity:
all that close throng
Of spirits waiting, as I,
For the message.
Prompt me, God;
But not yet.106
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Thomas ushers the reader into this moment of tense expectation, of silent waiting. Our eyes wait
along with his congregation, as Thomas struggles to share his message – but not yet. “The
meaning is in the waiting,” as “Kneeling’s” last line suggests, and in the empty space of the
poem the reader can participate in this act of waiting. The impatient reader may rush quickly
over this gap, but the attentive reader – or the one at least open to having attentiveness developed
in them – will pause and ponder the silence of the text.
A Tale of Two Churches
The aesthetical always overrates youth and this brief instant of eternity. It cannot
reconcile itself to the seriousness of age, let alone the seriousness of eternity. Hence the
aesthete is always suspicious of the religious person, supposing either that he never had
any feeling for aesthetics, or else that essentially he would have preferred to remain in
the enjoyment of it, but that time exercised its debilitating influence, and he became older
and took refuge in religion – Kierkegaard, The Point of View107

The desire of Auden and Thomas to foster silence in their poetry, in a sense to make their
vocations obsolete through the act of performing them, opens up a new perspective on the place
of both poetry and religion in the Anglo-American midcentury. On the one hand, this viewpoint
held perhaps as dim a view as “Church Going” on the prospects of organized Christianity in the
Western public sphere. On the other hand, Auden and Thomas suggested, the shrinking influence
of Christianity on society need not bring with it only troubles; it could also provide opportunities
for those forced to choose Christianity for themselves. Likewise, poets might have to abandon
the dream of widespread public influence for the more attainable – and perhaps more significant
– vocation of keeping alert those readers who wish to resist the homogenizing forces of the
Public.108 In this closing section, then, I want to suggest another way of reading the “negative
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space” of the empty church, one that diverges from Larkin’s own reading. Against his vision of
an echoing, empty place filled with the dead, I set Thomas’s vision – illustrated in a number of
poems about empty churches – of these abandoned spaces as sites where meaning can still be
actively claimed by those willing to go out alone over the fathoms.
Throughout his long career, Thomas wrote poems in which the poet sits in an empty, or
nearly empty, church. On certain occasions these poems do resemble Larkin’s “Church Going,”
as in the poem “The Chapel,” where Thomas contrasts the current state of an abandoned nonconformist chapel with the revivals that would once have been held within it.109 More often,
however, Thomas’s empty churches act not as repositories for a decayed way of life, but as sites
for present struggles of faith. The poem “In Church” presents a building as decrepit as the one
Larkin explores. But instead of Larkin’s bewilderment at the abandoned space, Thomas finds in
it opportunity:
These are the hard ribs
Of a body that our prayers have failed
To animate. Shadows advance
From their corners to take possession
Of places the light held
For an hour. The bats resume
Their business. The uneasiness of the pews
Ceases. There is no other sound
In the darkness but the sound of a man
Breathing, testing his faith
On emptiness, nailing his questions
One by one to an untenanted cross.110
Though the building itself stands as a set of “hard ribs,” devoid of the spark of life, it still
provides a space for the individual to wrestle with faith and doubt. Indeed, such wrestling would
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seem to be impossible in a more crowded church; here, the absence of any sound other than
breathing allows the individual to “[test] his faith/On emptiness.”111 The empty void of the
church building acts as a physical reminder of the 70,000 fathoms over which the individual lives
a life of faith. As so often in Thomas’s late style, enjambment runs rampant in this stanza,
creating a particular sense of waiting. “Prayers have failed/To animate,” “The uneasiness of the
pews/Ceases,” “The sound of a man/Breathing, testing his faith/On emptiness”: these line breaks
halt the reader’s momentum, forcing a slowdown in interpretation. Just as the figure in the poem
must nail his questions “one by one,” so too must the reader take each line, each thought, as a
separate consideration. Thomas again recreates the agonies of prayer in the experience of reading
the poem, rendering the poem “indigestible” to the hasty reader, but full of sustenance for those
willing to ruminate.
Finally, though, in the world of the indifferent Public, Thomas, like Auden, agrees with
Kierkegaard: each individual must take responsibility for her or his own life. While Thomas does
not turn poetry into solipsism, he seems aware of Yeats’ dictum that poetry emerges from the
poet’s quarrel with himself. In one of his final collections, the suggestively titled The Echoes
Return Slow, Thomas again finds himself contemplating the empty spaces of a church:
The pretences are done with.
The eavesdropper at the door
is a fiction. The well-bred
Amens to the formal
orisons have begun to fade…
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Have I been brought here
to repent of my sermons,
to erect silence’s stone over
my remains, and to learn
from the lichen’s slowness
at work something of the slowness
of the illumination of the self?112

Combining his two vocations, Thomas contemplates what remains when belief has gone. “The
eavesdropper” who might listen to Thomas’s sermons has departed; the social benefits to
embracing Christianity – the well-bred Amens – have gone. What remains is the poet and priest
locked in conversation with himself and with God. As he repents his sermons – those direct
attempts to convey religious truth – and erects silence like a gravestone over his body of work,
he finds inspiration in the patient crawl of nature: as lichen breaks through stone, so the gradual
worrying of the soul over its own mirror brings illumination, the sense of becoming a self that
Kierkegaard’s journey through the stages takes as its aim. Crowds may cease, publishers renege,
churches empty, but just as Kierkegaard found comfort for his rejection by Denmark’s elite, the
poet finds solace in the inward silence of having lived his vocation through to the end.
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Epilog: Concluding Unscientific Postscript to This Dissertation –
From the Maieutic to the Therapeutic in David Lodge’s Therapy
The therapy of all therapies is not to attach oneself exclusively to any particular therapy,
so that no illusion may survive of some end beyond an intensely private sense of wellbeing to be generated in the living of life itself. That a sense of well-being has become
the end, rather than a by-product of striving after some superior communal end,
announces a fundamental change of focus in the entire cast of our culture – toward a
human condition about which there will be nothing further to say in terms of the old style
of despair and hope. – Philip Rieff1
Until now, this dissertation has traced Søren Kierkegaard’s presence in mid-twentieth
century literature through the concept of maieutic literature, that which aims to develop the
single individual in an ethical or religious sense. The desire of the authors featured in the above
chapters to employ literature as a means of communicating to, nurturing, and prodding
individuals sprang in part from a series of midcentury crises: the crisis of war, the crisis of major
shifts in religious practice, and the crisis of decline in an attentive audience for literature. For
Huxley, Spark, Auden, and the other midcentury authors discussed in the body of this
dissertation, Kierkegaard proved a useful resource for rethinking the role of literature in public
life, and the relationship between author and reader. In this epilog I trace the decline of this
midcentury understanding of Kierkegaard – one rooted in the notion of Kierkegaard as an
important ethical, religious, and aesthetic author – and examine the rise of a new way of
understanding Kierkegaard’s message, an interpretation springing in part from the increased
popularity of therapeutic practice. The most significant difference between the maieutic and
therapeutic approaches to literature – at least insofar as the use of Kierkegaard is concerned – lies
in their divergent approaches to crisis. While the midcentury authors sought to use crisis to
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provoke their readers into embracing ethical and religious development, the authors examined in
this epilog see crisis as a situation to be mitigated through self-discovery – through the
revelation, rather than the development, of the authentic self.2
David Lodge’s 1995 novel Therapy serves as the main entry point to this new
interpretation of Kierkegaard. Lodge has admitted that his driving preoccupation in writing the
book was coming to terms with the prevalence of therapy in modern Britain.3 The novel’s
sustained interest in the life and work of Kierkegaard, then, cannot be disentangled from this
therapeutic framework. What makes Lodge’s treatment of Kierkegaard interesting is that
Therapy does not merely discuss details of Kierkegaard’s life and writings; the book also
imitates Kierkegaardian aesthetics in its use of multiply-authored texts woven into the main
storyline, an homage to Kierkegaard’s use of fictional authors in his early works. In both content
and style, however, the novel interprets Kierkegaard as a therapeutic figure, one ready to
diagnose problems and argue for the need for authenticity. To show that Lodge’s reading of
Kierkegaard is not eccentric, but symptomatic of an important interpretive shift, I will weave
readings of two other texts into my consideration of Therapy. The first, expanding beyond the
British Isles, comes from Jacques Derrida’s late work The Gift of Death, in which the
philosopher wrestles with Kierkegaard’s ideas of sacrifice and the gap between ethical and
religious duty. The second comes from an essay by contemporary British novelist Zadie Smith,
who utilizes Kierkegaard in her New Yorker article “Some Notes on Attunement,” to explain an
2
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aesthetic “leap” she makes in her attitude toward the singer-songwriter Joni Mitchell. Though
these two works differ from each other – and Therapy – in their emphases, Derrida and Smith
make moves parallel to Lodge’s by interpreting Kierkegaard as a figure of authenticity and selfactualization. Appropriately, both take as their central text Fear and Trembling – choices that
highlight both that book’s status as Kierkegaard’s lasting literary legacy and the ways in which
Kierkegaard’s religious emphases can be pushed in decidedly non-religious directions.
Therapy’s protagonist Tubby Passmore, recipient of a wide spectrum of different physical
and psychological therapies, encounters the work of Kierkegaard just as he experiences a midlife crisis that sees the breakup of his marriage and the frustration of his professional life as the
writer of a hit sitcom. Despite his superficially happy marriage and his financial success as a
television writer, Tubby finds himself chronically depressed. Tubby Passmore’s journey in
Therapy involves an interminable quest for the perfect therapy to cure his depression; he rotates
from acupuncture to aromatherapy to cognitive behavioral therapy, but never finds the master
key that will unlock contentment – until, that is, he discovers Kierkegaard. Driven by what he
describes as an “internal derangement,” Tubby finds in the works of Kierkegaard a voice for his
own depression and sense of aimlessness. As he explores Kierkegaard’s works, he
simultaneously embarks on a series of failed romantic encounters, attempts to make up for the
loss of sexual freedom he experienced during his long marriage. He experiences multiple
embarrassing erotic failures: with a passing acquaintance, with an employee, even with a
longstanding platonic friend. Finally he finds a sort of contentment after tracking down his first
girlfriend, Maureen. Attempting to make up for the messy end of their relationship, he seeks her
out to ask forgiveness, and ends the book by befriending Maureen and her husband, while also
enjoying occasional extramarital encounters with her.
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Throughout these various misadventures, Tubby feels the constant presence of
Kierkegaard as a guide through life. But the Kierkegaard he encounters in his reading becomes
not an aspirational figure but a reflective one, someone in history for Tubby to relate to. His
fascination with Kierkegaard resides primarily at the level of the biographical: he sees in
Kierkegaard’s failed engagement to Regine Olsen an analog to his abandonment of his first
girlfriend, Maureen, and views Kierkegaard’s depression as stemming primarily from his
unfortunate love – just as he feels he cannot escape his depression till he hunts down Maureen.
Lodge confirms that he shares Tubby’s views on this point, claiming of Kierkegaard that “Many
of his books, perhaps most of them, can be traced back to this decisive act of indecision [his
break with Regine], this perverse and self-punishing reversal of choice.”4
Tubby’s response, as he encounters Kierkegaard’s life and writings, exists primarily at
the level of affect, or the aesthetic stage of life, rather than the ethical or religious. His initial
encounter with Kierkegaard happens as he looks Kierkegaard up in a biographical dictionary:
I can’t describe how I felt as I read the titles. If the hairs on the back of my neck were
shorter, they would have lifted… they didn’t sound like titles of philosophy books, they
seemed to name my condition like arrows thudding into a target. Even the ones I couldn’t
understand, or guess at the contents of… seemed pregnant with hidden meaning designed
especially for me.5

In some ways this account sounds remarkably like the ecstatic descriptions of encountering
Kierkegaard recorded in wartime books like The Midnight Hour. Some key differences emerge
on closer inspection, however; most significantly, the fact that what rouses Tubby’s hackles is
not the content of the books, but their titles. Though like Walter Lowrie Tubby feels that
Kierkegaard speaks directly to him, his understanding of the impact is primarily diagnostic, as
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Kierkegaard “seemed to name my condition”. Contrasted with Lowrie’s assessment that
Kierkegaard’s words in For Self-Examination, which Lowrie considers aimed primarily at his
own person, “Supply us with all the buffeting we can bear or profit by,” Tubby’s diagnostic use
of Kierkegaard appears more comforting than discomfiting.6 From the first mention of his name,
Kierkegaard emerges in the pages of Therapy as another therapeutic resource for Tubby, useful
insofar as he aids in diagnosing Tubby’s “internal derangement”.7
Zadie Smith, in her essay “Some Notes on Attunement,” offers an appropriation of
Kierkegaard similar to Lodge’s in her emphasis on the affective and aesthetic aspects of
Kierkegaard’s work, an emphasis which lends itself to self-discovery rather than selfdevelopment. Smith centers the essay on her long resistance to the music of Joni Mitchell, a
resistance which she overcame suddenly one day when Mitchell’s songs finally breached her
defenses. Though the essay winds its way through many points, Smith’s central reading of this
experience processes her “conversion” to Mitchell’s music through the “Attunement” section
found at the beginning of Fear and Trembling. Comparing her sudden affinity for Mitchell to a
leap of faith, Smith paints an aesthetic picture of what attunement looks like:
With Joni, it was all so easy. In a sense, it took no time. Instantaneous. Involving no
progressive change but, instead, a leap of faith. A sudden, unexpected attunement. Or a
retuning from nothing, or from a negative, into something soaring and positive and
sublime.8
“Soaring and positive and sublime”: the aesthetic dream of transcendence linked with the
therapeutic need for positivity. Smith admits that her linking “banal” aesthetic attunement of this
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sort to Kierkegaard’s depiction of a “rare and precious” faith might prove insulting to sincerely
religious people, but she presses forward with the comparison because she senses a basic
resemblance between herself, making excuse after excuse for not liking Mitchell, and the figure
described by Johannes de Silentio at the beginning of Fear and Trembling, who retells the story
of Abraham and Isaac in several different ways, removing the offense of the paradox at the
story’s center to make Abraham’s actions comprehensible. To take a leap of aesthetic faith,
Smith must first reorient herself through attunement, a gradual stripping away of false
alternatives, a via negativa that ends in acceptance of an absurd truth. That she takes this act to
have value for more than just herself is apparent when she says that “If you want to effect a
breach in that stolid edifice the human personality I think it helps to cultivate this Kierkegaardian
sense of defenselessness… Put simply: you need to lower your defenses.”9 The end goal of
Kierkegaardian practice, to Smith, namely the lowering of your defenses and making yourself
vulnerable to beauty, resides squarely in the realm of the aesthetic.
This aesthetic goal has, in turn, a therapeutic effect. Whereas before Smith found Joni
Mitchell grating and unintelligible, post-conversion she responds to the music with a purging of
the emotions:
This is the effect that listening to Joni Mitchell has on me these days: uncontrollable
tears. An emotional overcoming, disconcertingly distant from happiness, more like joy—
if joy is the recognition of an almost intolerable beauty. It’s not a very civilized
emotion… I can never guarantee that I’m going to be able to get through the song without
being made transparent—to anybody and everything, to the whole world. A mortifying
sense of porousness.10
What comes to the fore here is not a change in the will, or a leap to embrace the paradox of faith,
but an aesthetic experience that pulls forth various strong emotions, an “emotional overcoming”
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that does not lead to deliberate ethical or religious change, but to a series of attempts to recapture
that same outflowing of emotions. Her mortifying sense of “porousness” – connected to her idea
of making herself open through a lowering of her defenses – presses on her fear of being exposed
as somehow inauthentic. What matters here is not ethical or religious development toward a
higher stage of existence, but self-discovery aimed at greater authenticity, which Smith equates
throughout the essay with the development of aesthetic taste.
Therapy similarly transforms Kierkegaard’s ethical and religious concerns into aesthetic
ones. For Lodge, as for Tubby, Kierkegaard cannot be taken at face value when he expresses a
deep concern with the isolating anxiety of faith. Lodge instead transforms Kierkegaard’s
musings on unhappiness – primarily the “aesthetic” thoughts of A from Either/Or – into a set of
meditations on living a full life moment by moment, a sort of carpe diem for the contemporary
existentialist. Kierkegaard’s life, then, was a failure insofar as he failed to put these mantras into
practice:
In particular I was impressed by Kierkegaard’s insights into the subjectivity of happiness
and unhappiness, into the perverse habits of unhappy hoping and unhappy remembering
by which we rob ourselves of contentment and fail to enjoy each moment of life for what
it is; and I was struck by the paradox that this man could see so clearly into these matters,
and yet be so incapable of putting their lessons into practice in his own case.11
Lodge’s approach suggests Kierkegaard as guru, holding insight into “contentment” wherein we
“enjoy each moment of life for what it is” – a guru admittedly unable to improve his own life
because of temperamental shortcomings. But Kierkegaard repeatedly suggests that contentment,
to the extent that it springs from complacency, holds the individual back from true development.
While the knight of faith possesses contentment, this contentment comes only through the
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greatest effort.12 What Lodge has done here is interpret Kierkegaard not as a figure demanding
difficult choices, but as a diagnostician capable of revealing habits that keep the individual from
self-actualization.
To be fair to Lodge, he recognizes the limitations of his understanding of Kierkegaard,
openly confessing his lack of expert knowledge. He admits that Therapy “Contains more about
Kierkegaard than I know, because it contains several passages quoted from his writings, the full
meaning of which has certainly eluded me,” excusing his inexpert handling on the grounds that,
“Since the whole novel is narrated by Tubby, it wouldn’t matter if he misunderstood
Kierkegaard, as long as he did so in an interesting and instructive way.”13 Tubby repeatedly
emphasizes the limits of his comprehension of Kierkegaard’s actual writing – limits set close in,
given his unwillingness to wander through the thickets of Kierkegaard’s prose searching for
meaning. He barely engages with The Concept of Anxiety, finding its talk of sin off putting and
its complex writing indecipherable, but he latches on to one particular chapter of the A section of
Either/Or, “The Unhappiest Man,” since as he reads it he feels once more as if Kierkegaard
speaks directly to him.14 This contrast is telling: the religious, difficult Kierkegaard who talks
about the concept of sin in complex prose gets pushed aside in favor of the aesthetic
Kierkegaard, who speaks of happiness and unhappiness with quasi-confessional intimacy.
Overall Tubby likens his experience reading Kierkegaard to “Flying through a heavy
cloud. Every now and again there’s a break and you get a brief, brilliantly lit view of the ground,
and then you’re back in the swirling grey mist again, with not a fucking clue where you are.”15
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This skimming method necessarily entails the shearing off of context, as Tubby picks out the bits
that seem most directly relevant to his own unhappiness and skips the rest. Because, as Tubby
admits, he himself tends toward an aesthetic approach to life, this means that he seeks out the
writings written from the viewpoint of the aesthetic and takes them as expressions of complete
thought, minus the important dialectical corrections offered by Kierkegaard’s ethical and
religious works.16 He fails to understand that these works are not merely diagnostic of emotional
states, useful primers for achieving greater authenticity. For Kierkegaard, the aesthetic works
point ultimately to the need to leap out of the aesthetic into the ethical and religious stages.
In the absence of philosophical context, what fills in the gaps in Tubby’s affinity for
Kierkegaard is biographical detail. Tubby memorizes facts about Kierkegaard’s life, fixating
especially on his failed engagement to Regine Olsen. He sees the engagement’s end as the key to
Kierkegaard’s writings, interpreting what he reads in light of Kierkegaard’s putative inability to
move past the relationship. Contrasting the early works with the later Edifying Discourses (which
he finds “a turn-off”), Tubby offers a psychological/biographical reading of their importance:
“The so-called pseudonymous works, especially the ones he wrote immediately after the breakup with Regine… are very different, and much more interesting: a kind of effort to come to terms
with his experience, to accept the consequences of his own choices, by approaching the material
obliquely.”17 He even compares the books to his own exercise, prescribed by his cognitive
behavioral therapist, of writing monologues from the points of view of various acquaintances.
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Such a reading requires simplification, and Tubby condenses his understanding of
Kierkegaard down into a carpe diem mantra. Musing on the meaning of repetition in the work of
that name, Tubby concludes that “One meaning of it is the restoration of what seems to be lost…
But another sense is the enjoyment of what you have. It’s the same as living-in-the-present… It
means being set free from the curse of unhappy hoping and unhappy remembering.”18 This
unlikely assertion of “living-in-the-present” as the main ethical lesson on display in Repetition
lines up with the general usage of Kierkegaard in Therapy. Tubby’s reading of the works
collapses the paradoxical thrust at the heart of each of them; instead of preserving the paradox,
which compels the reader into ethical or religious action, he eases the paradoxical tension and
extracts a straightforward piece of advice that promises contentment and self-actualization. The
religious Kierkegaard, obsessed with how he might be saved, has been transformed into the
psychological Kierkegaard, seeking only pleasure and a sense of well-being.
Because of this emphasis on well-being, Tubby, though he hovers on the edge of ethical
living, ultimately makes no progression into the ethical; indeed, he arguably has become less
ethical by novel’s end. At the beginning he has a stable, faithful marriage, which he ends up
sabotaging through his inability to accept his wife’s love for him. After their separation, Tubby
engages in a series of failed flings, including one with a voluptuous and willing underling at the
television studio. Taking his assistant Samantha on a trip to Copenhagen (to research an intended
television movie on Kierkegaard and Regine), he plans to sleep with her – an outcome she
encourages in a bit of careerist sexual bargaining – but at the last moment he finds he cannot:
I had the most extraordinary feeling that he was present somehow in the room, hovering
at my shoulder… And when the beautiful Samantha shamelessly offered me all the
delights of her sumptuous body, I couldn’t take advantage of it. Something held me
back, and it wasn’t the fear of impotence, or of aggravating my knee injury. Call it
18
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conscience. Call it Kierkegaard. They have become one and the same thing. I think
Kierkegaard is the thin man inside me that has been struggling to get out, and in
Copenhagen he finally did.19
This moment should represent the conquering of the aesthetic by the ethical, with Kierkegaard
providing a restraining force on Tubby, one which permanently changes his life. Instead of this
choice constituting a true leap, however, it becomes a mere blip on the radar of Tubby’s quest for
authenticity. By book’s end he has sought out his first girlfriend, Maureen. He ostensibly does
this to apologize for his callous behavior years before, an act which would constitute a real
ethical choice, but instead falls into a comfortable routine where he maintains his friendship with
Maureen and her husband Bede while also frequently sleeping with Maureen without Bede’s
knowledge. Tubby feels no compunction about his act of adultery, confidently stating at book’s
end that “My own conscience is quite clear.”20 Given that Tubby had earlier conflated his own
conscience with Kierkegaard’s hovering spirit, he has clearly either abandoned Kierkegaard as
patron, or somehow convinced himself that Kierkegaard would sign off on this act of deceit and
adultery on the grounds that it gives pleasure to both Tubby and Maureen. The latter
interpretation seems more likely, as Tubby has planned at novel’s end another trip to
Copenhagen, with Maureen and Bede in tow, to visit Kierkegaard’s grave and the Bymusuem
which houses his writing desk. The Kierkegaard who hovers in Tubby’s conscience, then,
concerns himself less with ethical or religious matters than with matters of authenticity: sleeping
with Samantha would be wrong because the encounter rests on inauthentic feelings, but Tubby’s
affair with Maureen, based on genuine affection, can only be right.
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I interpret this ending as indicative of Lodge’s reluctance to engage with the extreme
demands of Kierkegaard’s work in favor of a compromise – some unethical behavior, just not too
much. Many commentators, including Lodge himself, have identified this push for compromise
as a theme in his work.21 In his willingness to dismiss unethical behavior when done in aid of
authenticity, Lodge finds an unlikely parallel in Jacques Derrida, whose interpretation of
Kierkegaard in The Gift of Death centers largely around an attempt to excuse his own potentially
unethical behavior. As a whole, the book finds Derrida struggling over the concepts of sacrifice
and responsibility. Midway through he turns to Fear and Trembling to clarify the tensions
between ethical duty and individuality. His close reading of Kierkegaard’s text focuses at first on
the notion of the impossibility of communication, a key theme in Johannes de Silentio’s
treatment of Abraham, and naturally one of interest to the pioneering figure of language
deconstruction. Derrida hits on a quite profound reading of Abraham’s inability to tell others
what he must do. For Derrida, language itself annihilates the individual: “The first effect or
destination of language therefore involves depriving me of, or delivering me from, my
singularity. By suspending my absolute singularity in speaking, I renounce at the same time my
liberty and my responsibility… It is a very strange contract – both paradoxical and terrifying –
that binds infinite responsibility to silence and secrecy.”22 Derrida agrees with Kierkegaard: to
break silence entails entering the world of the ethical and universal, a step the individual
concerned with his or her own individuality cannot make.
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Derrida’s insistence on the importance of silence in Fear and Trembling stems in part
from his connecting the work to Paul’s letter to the Philippians, wherein the apostle writes the
words that give Kierkegaard’s book its title: work out your salvation with fear and trembling.
Derrida connects Paul’s words to the notion of an absent God, one who demands obedience
without reassurance. He finds this idea especially fruitful in Silentio’s depiction of Abraham as a
man who is “Sworn to secrecy because he is in secret.”23 Here the magnum mysterium of God as
Other prohibits any positive speech about God’s presence, or lack thereof. Derrida views this
total separateness as a key component of the true practice of the three Abrahamic religions,
which demand a confrontation with the reality that Abraham’s sacrifice entails a paradoxical,
simultaneous absolute hatred and absolute love for his son and family, a situation where “He
hates them not out of hatred, of course, but out of love.”24 Derrida ties this paradox to the
Kierkegaardian notion of the instant, that moment in time which, he argues, looks like madness
to those outside, but forms the very kernel of faith. Out of all these moving parts, Derrida
constitutes a theory of the importance of irresponsibility in the face of the demands of
responsibility: the knight of faith cannot help but act irresponsibly in the eyes of the ethical
world, driven as he or she is by a private impulse.
To this point Derrida has offered a traditional reading of Kierkegaard. Near the end of his
essay, however, Derrida adds an interpretive twist to Fear and Trembling, one that reads
Kierkegaard’s work in a mode similar to Lodge. Pushing back against the universal ethical sense
of responsibility, Derrida asserts that:
What the knights of good conscience don’t realize, is that ‘the sacrifice of Isaac’
illustrates… the most common and everyday experience of responsibility… The story is
no doubt monstrous, outrageous, barely conceivable… what mystery could be more
23
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frightful… vis-à-vis love, humanity, the family, or morality? But isn’t this also the most
common thing? what the most cursory examination of the concept of responsibility
cannot fail to affirm? Duty or responsibility binds me to the other, to the other as other,
and ties me in my absolute singularity to the other as other… but of course, what binds
me thus in my singularity to the absolute singularity of the other, immediately propels me
into the space or risk of absolute sacrifice… I cannot respond to the call, the request, the
obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other
others… I offer a gift of death, I betray, I don’t need to raise my knife over my son on
Mount Moriah for that. Day and night, at every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of this
world, I am doing that, raising my knife over what I love and must love, over those to
whom I owe absolute fidelity… By preferring my work, simply by giving it my time and
attention, by preferring my activity as a citizen or as a professorial and professional
philosopher, writing and speaking in a public language… I am perhaps fulfilling my duty.
But I am sacrificing and betraying at every moment all my other obligations: my
obligations to the others whom I know or don’t know, the billions of my fellows… who
are dying of starvation or sickness… thus also to those I love in private, my own, my
family, my son, each of whom is the only son I sacrifice to the other, every one being
sacrificed to every one else in this land of Moriah that is our habitat every second of
every day.25
To unpack the complexities of this passage would be impossible except at great length. Here I
want simply to highlight how far Derrida diverges from Silentio’s presentation of the figure of
Abraham. For Silentio, Abraham’s sacrifice must be beyond human reckoning, must present
Abraham as a figure unutterably mysterious. Unless Abraham’s sacrifice be absurd beyond
understanding, his faith amounts to nothing. The point of readers grappling with Abraham, then,
for Silentio, is to recognize their own inability, without faith, to attain such heights.26
For Derrida, though, Abraham becomes a sort of everyman, a symbol of a shared human
experience that individuals confront every day. Like Tubby, then, Derrida views Kierkegaard as
an author interested primarily in diagnosing, rather than developing, the individual: Abraham’s

25

Ibid, 67-9.
“Let us therefore either forget Abraham or learn to be terrified of the tremendous paradox which is the
significance of his life, so that we may learn to understand that men can rejoice in our times, as in all other times, if
they have faith. Unless the story of Abraham is a mere nothing, an illusion, a show and a pastime, it can never be a
mistake for a sinner to want to do likewise, but it is necessary to find out how great was the deed which Abraham
performed, in order that he should judge of himself whether he has the courage and the mission to do likewise”
(Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Robert Payne [London: Oxford University Press, 1939], 73).
26

204

situation reflects the condition of the typical reader, rather than standing in judgement over it. In
Derrida’s pungent phrase, this “land of Moriah” forces the contemporary individual to make
continual sacrifices, “gifts of death,” in choosing one sphere of action over another. The vision
Derrida presents, where each person owes the same debt to every other person, and to prefer
one’s closest relations to strangers across the globe involves a chosen act of violence, differs
strongly from the Kierkegaardian account of Abraham, which relies on the presumed uniqueness
of the father-son relation for its impact.27 In view for Derrida seems to be the increasingly
intertwined global stage of late twentieth century geopolitics, where “moralizing moralists” fill
newspapers and television programs with the unrelenting, urgent message of “ethical or political
responsibility.”28 Derrida pushes back against these moralizing moralists by recognizing the
absurdity of trying to live a perfectly ethical life; even seemingly straightforward ethical
decisions involve “sacrificing” the interests of the others, or the other others, around the world.
For Derrida, the world of private decisions will inevitably involve “irresponsibility” that
resembles Abraham’s acts of faith.
In transforming Abraham from what Silentio calls a “witness” into a “teacher,” a model
to be followed rather than a scandal to be pondered,29 Derrida also interprets Fear and
Trembling’s message as one of release from ethics. Viewed from one perspective, Derrida makes
ethical choice much more difficult than it usually appears to be, since every decision involves
sacrifice of one sort or another.30 From another angle, however, Derrida’s interpretation actually
27
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makes individual choice much easier: if every decision necessarily involves compromise, some
“gift of death” to an other, then any decision might be equally justifiable as an act of
“irresponsibility”. If Derrida’s choice to focus on academic philosophy at the expense of political
activism carries the same degree of absurdity as Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac, then
any choice might be justified as correct and courageous under the rubric of “irresponsibility.”
Derrida, in other words, begins to look indistinguishable from Tubby, even if his choice of
academic philosophy comes across as more sophisticated than Tubby’s quest for authentic sexual
experience. Given the not infrequent criticisms leveled against deconstruction as a retreat from
political engagement, Derrida’s prescription takes on the air of therapeutic reassurance.31
Abraham’s impossible decision leads, then, not to the necessity of the leap, but the potential
justification of any individual’s choices.
For Tubby and Lodge, writing constitutes a main avenue for self-discovery and selfjustification.32 Therapy itself had its genesis in Lodge’s own battles with depression, making the
text an attempt at self-therapy.33 Lodge chooses as one of the novel’s epigrams the Graham
Greene quote “Writing is a form of therapy,” and Tubby echoes this sentiment throughout the
book. Assessing the usefulness of his sitcom, Tubby points to its “therapeutic social effect,”
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since watching the “farcical trials and tribulations” of its characters allows the audience to feel
better about their own predicaments.34 Primarily, however, Tubby’s focus rests on how the act of
writing helps him, not others. Most significantly, therapy provides the motivating factor for the
book’s primary structural gambit, an homage to Kierkegaardian pseudonymity featuring the
interpellation of texts “written” by those in Tubby’s orbit, including his assistant Samantha, his
platonic friend Amy, his estranged wife Susan, and his coworker Ollie. Comprising a good
chunk of the novel’s middle, these collected texts range in their form from a barroom
conversation to a single-sided phone call, but all concern the assessment of Tubby’s behavior by
these different characters. Crucially, all come presented as straightforward instances of narration,
steps toward a more objective view of Tubby’s actions.
The novel provides a narrative jolt, then, when Tubby reveals that these interpellated
texts are in fact the product of his own hand, an exercise in therapy prescribed by Alexandra, his
cognitive behavioral therapist. Accounts of important plot events that have seemed distanced
from Tubby’s morbid introspection have actually come filtered through Tubby’s use of what are,
in fact, pseudonyms. Tubby makes clear the pseudonymous status of these authors when he
explains that “Being the sort of writer I am, I couldn’t just summarize other people’s views of
me, I had to let them speak their thoughts in their own voices”.35 Lodge, then, plays around with
Kierkegaardian concepts not simply at the level of content, but through the very form of the
novel. Known for his dabbling in meta-fiction, Lodge here gives his structural experimentation a
Kierkegaardian cast.36 But, motivated as they are by a therapeutic exercise, Tubby’s pseudonyms
differ radically from Kierkegaardian authors like Johannes de Silentio and Constantine
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Constantius. The voices of Tubby’s pseudonyms do not stand on their own, instantiating distinct
worldviews; instead, they reveal Tubby’s conception of how others see him. This is why, despite
his insistence that they all speak in their own voices, Tubby’s interlocutors circle back to the
same themes again and again: Tubby’s pretensions, his obsession with Kierkegaard, his domestic
and sexual problems. The figures never become characters in their own right, any more than they
would if Tubby had acted out their monologs in Alexandra’s office as a form of role playing.
Moving Kierkegaard into the milieu of late century prosperity, Lodge offers a
Kierkegaard acceptable to the citizens of a therapeutic society, one who challenges them to
confront their depression and ennui, but in the service of greater self-actualization, not ethical or
religious development. Here the intensely personal encounter with Kierkegaard experienced by
his first Anglophone readers remains, but gets filtered through the marketplace of therapeutic
remedies, the particularity of his ideas becoming obscured by a focus on the cathartic effect he
has on the individual. Though Kierkegaard proves more effective than aromatherapy for Tubby,
he is otherwise indistinguishable from it in his essence.
***
It is especially fitting that this new interpretation of Kierkegaard emerges most fully in a
novel written by Lodge, an author who in many ways embodies the shifting nature of religious
belief in Britain over the second half of the century. Beginning his career as a devout, if
conflicted, Roman Catholic, Lodge explored in early novels such as The British Museum Is
Falling Down the tension between faithfulness to the Church’s teaching (especially regarding
contraception) and the desire to live a life of self-fulfillment. His provocatively titled 1980 novel
How Far Can You Go? signaled a shift in attitude, as reluctant obedience to Church teaching
gave way to private moral judgement and a sense of liberation from the restrictions of the old
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way. By the time of Therapy, Lodge had begun to describe himself as an agnostic Catholic,
retaining some remnants of his belief system, but approaching it in a decidedly piecemeal way.
How far can you go? It’s a question that lingers over Lodge’s late work: how far can a Catholic
go – both theologically and ethically – and remain Catholic? The question resonates
aesthetically, too; critic Bernard Bergonzi, himself a lapsed Catholic and friend of Lodge’s,
nevertheless speculates that the “collapse of the Catholic world-picture,” while relieving
individual Catholics of anxiety, left behind “a shrunken world” where “religion seldom appears
as a mode of transcendence or transformation”.37 Contrasting Lodge’s novels with the tensioncharged books of Graham Greene and Evelyn Waugh, written when Catholicism seemed both
more repressive and more distinct, Bergonzi finds Lodge’s characters “decent and likeable” but
also “a rather mediocre lot”.38
Bergonzi senses a profound change – at the level of aesthetics – in the death of
Catholicism as a binding set of what Rieff calls “interdicts.”39 When deprived of high stakes
situations that require actual commitment, characters tend toward flatness and struggle to hold
the reader’s attention. Think of Pinkie from Brighton Rock: his awareness of his own impending
damnation brings his actions into sharper focus, and his willingness to rebel makes him a
compelling character.40 For characters in the Catholic novels of Greene, or Waugh, or even a
slightly later practitioner like Muriel Spark, the life of faith involves irreconcilable tensions,
paradoxes which act as an internal propellant for religious characters. Deprived of this inner
source of conflict, Lodge’s characters resort to an endless variety of distractions, not unlike the
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method suggested by the Aesthete in the “Crop Rotation” section of Either/Or.41 Because of this
loss of tension Lodge’s readers, no less than his characters, can expect only amusement and
distraction – not confrontation or transformation – when reading a novel like Therapy, which
reflects the reality of contemporary life without provoking readers to move beyond that life.
Then again, this desire for amusement fits naturally into the changed landscape of British
religion. Norwich Cathedral’s recent attempt to forestall plummeting attendance by installing a
fifty-foot Helter-Skelter slide inside the church building offers a contemporary twist on Larkin’s
empty church: the house of worship as house of fun. “God is a tourist attraction… God wants to
be attractive to us... for us to enjoy ourselves, each other and the world around us,” said the
Bishop of Lynn, delivering his dedicatory homily while seated halfway up the slide.42 Whether
one views this installation as innovative or sacrilegious, Norwich’s fun slide stands as a
particular monument to the upheaval of Christianity in Britain over the course of a century where
religious belief in Britain was turned, for lack of a better phrase, helter-skelter. That even the
churches themselves have adopted the language of entertainment and attraction shows how deep
the underlying changes in British society have been.
By the 1990s, Larkin’s vision of abandoned churches and a populace not so much
opposed to religion as indifferent to and ignorant of it had largely come to pass.43 The divide
between belief in God and participation in religion denoted by Grace Davie as “believing without
belonging” had reached a high point by the 1990s, when 2/3 of Britons still professed a belief in
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God, but only 15% regularly attended worship services.44 This disassociation of belief and
practice led gradually to an abandonment of Christian ethical norms, or what S.J.D. Green has
provocatively dubbed the death of Puritanism in Britain.45 The loss of a publicly shared ethics
and a rise in private morality based in a sense of authenticity has made it that much harder for
authors who wish to provoke and develop their readers into ethical change to convey their
messages.
In Philip Rieff’s analysis, the move from the social ideal of the saint (one without sin) to
the “Everyman, twisting his neck uncomfortably inside the starched collar of culture” has opened
up a literature devoted to “a symbolic act of going over to the side of the latest, and most
original, individualist,” resulting in “an endless ambiance of fun and boredom,” a literature less
aspirational and more anesthetic.46 At the empirical level, Rieff’s analysis of literary culture has
been borne out by the dramatic rise in the popularity of what we might call the self-help memoir,
as well as forms of auto-fiction, genres which stress authentic living and self-discovery,
touchstones of therapeutic practice.47 Ethically, contemporary memoirs push readers toward a
discovery of the self, rather than a Kierkegaardian development of the self. Aesthetically, the
intense personal revelation and self-discovery of the contemporary memoir stand in direct
opposition to Kierkegaard’s insistence on detachment, concealment, and indirectness.
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Despite conditions which would seem to make Kierkegaard’s demanding message of
personal development particularly unpalatable, interest in his works has survived in a Britain that
has become increasingly disinterested in the strong religious and ethical elements of his writings.
Here Zadie Smith’s transformation of religious concepts into aesthetic ones helps make sense of
Kierkegaard’s lingering appeal. Early in “Some Notes on Attunement,” Smith takes readers
along with her to yet another empty church; indeed, the most famous empty holy site in all
England: the abandoned monastery Tintern Abbey, where, echoing Wordsworth’s famous
epiphanies, she experiences her conversion to the Church of Joni. In describing the ruin’s
physical appearance, Smith employs imagery worth pausing over. Looking at the collapsed
structure, she observes:
Reduced to a Gothic skeleton, the abbey is penetrated by beauty from above and below,
open to precisely those elements it had once hoped to frame for pious young men, as an
object for their patient contemplation. But that form of holy concentration has now been
gone longer than it was ever here… Roofless, floorless, glassless, “green to the very
door”—now Tintern is forced to accept the holiness that is everywhere in everything.48
Like the Abbey, Smith finds herself penetrated by an aesthetic experience of “holiness” that she
once tried to shut out. Her vision of lowering the defenses rests on her conception of “the
holiness that is everywhere in everything” – the idea that, with the right mindset, any experience
can carry with it a transformational charge of sublime emotion. But this very practice depends
for its existence on the demise of another form of “holy concentration,” the “patient
contemplation” of the monks from ages past. Like Larkin in “Church Going,” Smith has a
complex, ambiguous response to this passing away of a mode of life. Smith retains even more
strongly than Larkin the possibility of some sort of “holiness,” even if it merely stems from the
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transcendental beauty of a ruined monastery or a Joni Mitchell chorus.49 This transformation of
holiness, from a definite object acquired via “patient contemplation” to a nebulous beauty
“everywhere in everything,” helps explain why the idea of the leap keeps its allure for Smith.
Though she cannot leap like Abraham to faith in God, she still feels something of the sensation
of being out over seventy-thousand fathoms as she lowers her defenses and leaves herself open
to beauty.
As the example of Smith shows, the rigorous demands of Kierkegaardian Christianity
hold little appeal for contemporary appropriators of Kierkegaard, but they find themselves
haunted by the very boldness and fierceness of that belief. If, as seems likely, Britain has
decisively entered a phase that can be described as both post-Christian and post-secular, then
Kierkegaard’s place in such a society – if he is to have any at all – will likely entail a change in
emphasis, away from religious individuality and toward quasi-religious individuality. Under such
an interpretation, the specific religious content of Kierkegaard’s writings will likely disappear,
occluded by a more general appeal to the depth of his conviction.50 While it is not surprising that
thinkers should have their writings reinterpreted by those that come after, it is perhaps a little
surprising that an author as thorny, difficult, and explicitly religious as Kierkegaard should
continue to fascinate and challenge people who share few of his underlying convictions.
Kierkegaard has shown himself a prophet, at least regarding his own critical fortunes. Writing in
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At the end of “Church Going” Larkin’s speaker asserts that “Someone will forever be surprising/A hunger in
himself to be more serious/And gravitating with it to this ground,” which suggests that churches will retain their
power over the imagination even when abandoned (Collected Poems [London: Faber and Faber, 2003], 35). Larkin,
however, does not seem as convinced as Smith that some real “holiness” might exist, merely that humans will
continue to feel the need “to be more serious.”
50
Smith’s interpretation of Kierkegaardian attunement has taken on an interesting academic afterlife, as it has been
adopted as a category by affect theorist Rita Felski, who finds Smith’s account “especially generative” and has used
Smith’s essay as an example in many lectures (Francesco Giusti, “Passionate Affinities: A Conversation with Rita
Felski,” Los Angeles Review of Books, 25 September 2019). Felski’s forthcoming book Hooked: Art and
Attachment, appears to develop her thoughts on attunement further.
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his journal in 1847, when he seemed destined to fade into obscurity, he nonetheless had the
confidence to make this prediction: “Therefore some day, not only my writings but my whole
life, all the intriguing mystery of the machine will be studied and studied.”51 In this he has been
proved correct; though reception of his work has shifted from an emphasis on its religious
aspects to its aesthetic implications, people continue to study and study the intriguing mystery of
the machine, drawn on perhaps less by the content of his writings than by the deep, obvious
passion with which he committed his words to paper. Because of that passion, he remains for
many who encounter him a writer not long dead, but one still living, impressed on the mind.

51

Kierkegaard, Journals, 224.

215

Bibliography
Aboulela, Leila. “Religious Faith Penetrates the Last Years of Life.” Textual Practice 32, no. 9
(2018): 1681-1687.
Adamson, Judith. Graham Greene: The Dangerous Edge. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990.
Adorno, Theodor and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid
Noerr. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Agacinski, Sylvia. Aparté: Deaths and Conceptions of Søren Kierkegaard. Tallahassee: Florida
University Press, 1988.
Alderman, Nigel. “Impossible Elegies: Poetry in Transition 1940-1960.” In British Literature in
Transition: 1940-1960 – Postwar, 52-67. Edited by Gill Plain. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2019.
Aldous Huxley: The Critical Heritage. Edited by Donald Watt. London: Routledge, 1975.
Aldous Huxley: A Memorial Volume. Edited by Julian Huxley. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
Allain, Marie-Francoise. The Other Man: Conversations with Graham Greene. Translated by Guido
Waldman. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.
Allen, E.L. Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought. London: Stanley Nott, 1935.
Arvidson, Heather. “Personality, Impersonality, and the Personified Detachment of Wyndham
Lewis.” Modernism/Modernity 25, no. 4 (November 2018): 791-814.
Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2003.
Auden, W.H. Collected Poems. Edited by Edward Mendelson. New York: Vintage, 1991.
---. The Complete Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Volume II – 1939-1948. Edited by Edward
Mendelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
---. The Complete Works of W.H. Auden – Prose Volume III: 1949-1955. Edited by Edward
Mendelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
---. The Complete Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Volume IV – 1956-1962. Edited by Edward
Mendelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
---. The Complete Works of W.H. Auden – Prose Volume V – 1963-1968. Edited by Edward
Mendelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
216

---. The Complete Works of W.H. Auden: Prose Volume VI – 1969-1973. Edited by Edward
Mendelson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
---. Lectures on Shakespeare. Edited by Arthur Kirsch. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000.
Bahlke, George W. The Later Auden: From “New Year Letter” to About the House. New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1970.
Bailey, James. “Salutary Scars: The ‘Disorienting’ Fictions of Muriel Spark.” Contemporary
Women’s Writing 9, no. 1 (March 2015): 34-52.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics. Translated by Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Ballan, Joseph. “Walker Percy: Literary Extrapolations from Kierkegaard.” In Kierkegaard Research:
Sources, Reception and Resources Vol. 12 Tome IV, 175-189.
Banned in Ireland: Censorship & the Irish Writer. Edited by Julia Carlson. Athens: The University of
Georgia Press, 1990.
Barnett, Christopher B. “Flannery O’Connor: Reading Kierkegaard in the Light of Thomas Aquinas.”
In Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Vol. 12 Tome IV, 157-174.
Beach, Christopher. Poetic Culture: Contemporary American Poetry between Community and
Institution. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999.
Bergonzi, Bernard. “A Conspicuous Absentee: The Decline & Fall of the Catholic Novel.” Encounter
Aug-Sep 1980: 44-56.
---. Wartime and Aftermath: English Literature and Its Background 1939-1960. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Bigelow, Pat. Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing. Tallahassee: Florida University Press, 1987.
Bild, Aída Díaz. “Therapy as a Subversive and Liberating Novel.” Epos XIV (1998): 463-479.
Birnbaum, Milton. Aldous Huxley’s Quest for Values. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press,
1971.
Bloom, Harold. Introduction to Modern Critical Views: Graham Greene, 1-8.
Bold, Alan. Introduction to Muriel Spark: An Odd Capacity for Vision, 7-22. Edited by Alan Bold.
London: Vision Press, 1984.

217

Booker, M. Keith. Flann O’Brien, Bakhtin, and Menippean Satire. Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1995.
Booth, Wayne C. The Rhetoric of Fiction, Second Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1983.
Bosco, Mark J., S.J. Graham Greene’s Catholic Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Brantlinger, Patrick. Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983.
British Fiction after Modernism: The Novel at Midcentury. Edited by Marina MacKay and Lyndsey
Stonebridge. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Brooks-Motl, Hannah. “Reading Poetry from The Group to the British Poetry Revival.” In British
Literature in Transition: 1960-1980 – Flower Power, 50-64. Edited by Kate McLoughlin.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Brown, Callum. The Death of Christian Britain. London: Routledge, 2001.
Brown, Dennis. The Modernist Self in Twentieth-Century English Literature. New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1989.
Brown, Tony. “‘Over Seventy Thousand Fathoms’: The Sea and Self Definition in the Poetry of R.S.
Thomas.” In The Page’s Drift: R.S. Thomas at Eighty, 148-170. Edited by M. Wynn Thomas.
Brigend: Seren, 1994.
Bruce, Cicero. “The Influence of Charles Williams on the Life and Work of W.H. Auden.” VII 16
(1999): 15-30.
Callan, Edward. Auden: A Carnival of Intellect. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
Cappeluti, Jo-Anne. “Making Nothing Happen: W.H. Auden’s Romantic Legacy.” Renascence 66,
no. 1 (Winter 2014): 3-24.
Caputo, John D. “Instants, Secrets, and Singularities: Dealing Death in Kierkegaard and Derrida.” In
Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, 216-38.
Carey, John. The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia,
1880-1939. London: Faber and Faber, 1992.
Carpenter, Humphrey. The Angry Young Men: A Literary Comedy of the 1950s. London: Penguin,
2002.

218

Carruthers, Gerald. “Muriel Spark as Catholic Novelist.” In The Edinburgh Companion to Muriel
Spark, 74-84. Edited by Michael Gardiner and Willy Maley. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2010.
Castle, Gregory. Reading the Modernist Bildungsroman. Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
2006.
Chaning-Pearce. The Terrible Crystal: Studies in Kierkegaard and Modern Christianity. London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1940.
Cheyette, Bryan. Muriel Spark. Devon: Northcote House Publishers, 2000.
---. “Writing against Conversion: Muriel Spark the Gentile Jewess.” In Theorizing Muriel Spark:
Gender, Race, Deconstruction, 95-112.
Clausen, Christopher. The Place of Poetry: Two Centuries of an Art in Crisis. Lexington: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1981.
Clissman, Anne. Flann O’Brien: A Critical Introduction to His Writings. Gill and MacMillan: Dublin,
1975.
Cobley, Evelyn. Modernism and the Culture of Efficiency: Ideology and Fiction. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2009.
Colletta, Lisa. Dark Humor and Social Satire in the Modern British Novel. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003.
Collins, James. The Mind of Kierkegaard. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953.
Conniff, Brian. “Auden, Niebuhr, and the Vocation of Poetry.” Religion & Literature 25, no. 3
(Autumn 1993): 45-65.
Conversations with Graham Greene. Edited by Henry J. Donaghy. Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 1992.
Costello, Bonnie. The Plural of Us: Poetry and Community in Auden and Others. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2017.
Couto, Maria. Graham Greene: On the Frontier. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988.
Critical Essays on Muriel Spark. Edited by Joseph Hynes. New York: G.K. Hall & Co, 1992.
Cronin, Anthony. No Laughing Matter: The Life and Times of Flann O’Brien. London: Grafton
Books, 1989.
Croxall, T.H. “Choose, Leap and Be Free.” Times Literary Supplement (London), Mar. 9, 1946.
219

Culture and Crisis in Britain in the 30s. Edited by Jon Clark, et al. London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1979.
Cunningham, Valentine. British Writers of the Thirties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
“David Lodge Interviewed by Chris Walsh.” Introduction and notes by William Baker. PMLA 130,
no. 15 (2015): 830-40.
Davie, Donald. “R.S. Thomas’s Poetry of the Church of Wales.” In Miraculous Simplicity: Essays on
R.S. Thomas, 127-139.
Davie, Grace. Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging. Oxford: John Wiley &
Sons, 1994.
Davis, William V. R.S. Thomas: Poetry and Theology. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007.
Davison, Neil R. “‘We Are Not a Doctor for the Body’: Catholicism, the Female Grotesque, and
Flann O’Brien’s The Hard Life.” Literature and Psychology 45, no. 4 (1999): 31-57.
Deane, Patrick. ““The Unmanageable Bone: Language in R.S. Thomas’s Poetry.” In Miraculous
Simplicity: Essays on R.S. Thomas, 200-24.
Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1995.
de Selincourt, Basil. “A Black Swan: The Writings of Soren Kierkegaard.” The Observer (London),
Dec. 4, 1938.
Domestico, Anthony. Poetry and Theology in the Modernist Period. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2015.
Donohue, Keith. The Writer as Self-Evident Sham: Flann O’Brien’s Comic Vision. Dissertation:
Catholic University of America, 2001.
Dotterer, Ronald L. “Flann O’Brien, James Joyce, and The Dalkey Archive.” New Hibernia Review 8,
no. 2 (Summer 2004): 54-63.
Eaglestone, Robert. “The Question of Evil in Post-war British Fiction.” In The Oxford History of the
Novel in English, Vol. VII, 53-63. Edited by Peter Boxall and Bryan Cheyette. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016.
Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996.
---. “Reluctant Heroes: The Novels of Graham Greene.” In Modern Critical Views: Graham
Greene, 97-118.
220

Eddins, Dwight. “Quitting the Game: Auden’s The Sea and the Mirror.” Modern Language Quarterly
41 (1980): 73-87.
Eliot, T.S. The Complete Prose of T.S. Eliot: The Critical Edition: The Perfect Critic, 1919-1926.
Edited by Anthony Cuda and Ronald Schuchard. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2014.
---. The Letters of T.S. Eliot Vol. VI: 1932-33. Edited by Valerie Eliot and John Haffenden.
London: Faber and Faber, 2016.
Ellis, Steve. British Writers and the Approach of World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2015.
Epstein, Joseph. “Who Killed Poetry?” Commentary 86, no. 2 (August 1988): 13-20.
Esty, Jed. A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2003.
Favret, Mary A. War at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of Modern Wartime. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010.
Feitz, Lothar. “Life, Literature, and the Philosophy of ‘As If’: Aldous Huxley’s and Lawrence
Durell’s Use and Critique of ‘Fictions.’” Aldous Huxley Annual 2 (2002): 65-102.
Fessenden, Tracy. “The Problem of the Postsecular.” American Literary History 26, no. 1 (Sept
2014): 154-167.
Firchow, Peter. Aldous Huxley: Satirist and Novelist. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1972.
Flann O’Brien: Problems with Authority. Edited by Ruben Borg, Paul Fagan, and John McCourt.
Cork: Cork University Press, 2017.
Frick, Robert. “Style and Structure in the Early Novels of Evelyn Waugh.” Papers on Language and
Literature: A Journal for Scholars and Critics of Language and Literature 28, no. 4 (Fall 1992):
417-441.
Frye, Northrop. An Anatomy of Criticism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
Fuchs, Dieter. “The Dalkey Archive: A Menippean Satire against Authority.” In Flann O’Brien:
Problems with Authority, 230-241.
Fuller, John. A Reader’s Guide to W.H. Auden. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1970.
Fussell, Paul. The Great War and Modern Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
221

Garff, Joachim. Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography. Translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007.
Gąsiorek, Andrzej. Post-War British Fiction: Realism and After. London: Edward Arnold, 1995.
Gervais, David. Literary Englands: Versions of ‘Englishness’ in Modern Writing. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Gilbert, Alan D. Making of Post Christian Britain: A History of the Secularization of Modern Society.
London: Addison-Wesley Longman Ltd, 1981.
Gill, Kulwat Singh. “Aldous Huxley: The Quest for Synthetic Sainthood,” Modern Fiction Studies 27,
no. 4 (Winter 1981-82): 601-12.
Gillespie, Alana. “In Defence of ‘Gap-Worded’ Stories: Brian O’Nolan on Authority, Reading and
Writing.” In Flann O’Brien: Problems with Authority, 204-218.
Gioia, Dana. “Can Poetry Matter?” The Atlantic May 1991. The Atlantic website. Accessed Feb. 12,
2020.
Giusti, Francesco. “Passionate Affinities: A Conversation with Rita Felski.” Los Angeles Review of
Books (Sep. 25 2019).
Gorra, Michael. The English Novel at Midcentury. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990.
Graham Greene: A Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by Samuel Hynes. Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Green, S.J.D. The Passing of Protestant England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Greenberg, Jonathan. The Cambridge Introduction to Satire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2019.
---. Modernism, Satire, and the Novel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Greene, Graham. Brighton Rock. New York: Penguin Books, 2004.
---. Collected Essays. New York: The Viking Press, 1969.
---. The End of the Affair. London: Penguin Books, 2004.
Greif, Mark. The Age of the Crisis of Man. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Haddox, Thomas F. Hard Sayings: The Rhetoric of Christian Orthodoxy in Late Modern Fiction.
Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2013.
222

Haecker, Theodor. Søren Kierkegaard. Translated with a biographical note by Alexander Dru.
London: Oxford University Press, 1937.
Hartwig, “The End of the Affair: A Modernist Conversion Narrative.” Renascence 69, no. 3 (Summer
2017): 138-149.
Hastings, Adrian. A History of English Christianity, 1920-2000, Fourth Edition. London: SCM Press,
2001.
Hepburn, Allan. A Grain of Faith: Religion in Mid-Century British Literature. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018.
Herman, David. “‘A Salutary Scar’: Muriel Spark’s Desegregated Art in the Twenty-First Century.”
Modern Fiction Studies 54, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 473-486.
Heywood-Thomas, John and Hinrich Siefken. “Theodor Haecker and Alexander Dru: A Contribution
to the Discovery of Kierkegaard in Britain.” Kierkegaardiana 18 (1996): 173-90.
Hidden Possibilities: Essays in Honor of Muriel Spark. Edited by Robert E. Hosmer, Jr. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2014.
Holmes, Charles M. Aldous Huxley and the Way to Reality. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1970.
Hopper, Keith. Flann O’Brien: A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Post-Modernist, 2nd Edition. Cork:
Cork University Press, 2009.
Horsley, Lee. Fictions of Power in English Literature: 1900-1950. London: Longman, 1995.
Hungerford, Amy. Postmodern Belief: American Literature and Religion since 1960. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010.
Huxley, Aldous. Ends and Means. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937.
---. Eyeless in Gaza. London: Chatto & Windus, 1936.
---. Letters of Aldous Huxley. Edited by Grover Smith. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
---. The Perennial Philosophy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945.
---. Texts and Pretexts. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933.
---. Time Must Have a Stop. Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998.
Hynes, Samuel. The Art of the Real. Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988.
223

Inglis, Tom. Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in Modern Ireland, Second
Edition. Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1998.
Intermodernism: Literary Culture in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain. Edited by Kristin Bluemel.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
Jackson, Tony E. The Subject of Modernism: Narrative Alterations in the Fiction of Eliot, Conrad,
Woolf, and Joyce. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994.
Jacobs, Alan. What Became of Wystan. Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1998.
---. The Year of Our Lord 1943: Christian Humanism in an Age of Crisis. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018.
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience. Edited by Matthew Bradley. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012.
Jarrell, Randall. “Freud to Paul: The Stages of Auden’s Ideology.” In Critical Essays on W.H. Auden,
23-31. Edited by George W. Bahlke. New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1991.
---. Poetry and the Age. New York: Vintage Books, 1959.
Johnson, Bruce R. “Lewis’s Aid to British Prisoners of War.” Sensucht: The C.S. Lewis Journal 12
(2018): 41-76.
Jolivet, Regis. Introduction to Kierkegaard. Translated by W.H. Barber. New York: E.P. Dutton &
Co, 1949.
Josipovici, Gabriel. “The Large Testimony of Muriel Spark.” In Hidden Possibilities: Essays in
Honor of Muriel Spark, 17-35.
Kari, Daven M. “R.S. Thomas and the Dark Night of the Soul: Song, Suffering, and Silence in a Life
of Faith.” Renascence 60, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 103-116.
Katz, Tamar. Impressionist Subjects: Gender, Interiority, and Modernist Fiction in England. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2000.
Kauffman, Michael. “Locating the Postsecular.” Religion & Literature 41, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 6873.
“Keeping It Short – Muriel Spark talks about her books to Ian Gillham.” The Listener 24 (September
1970): 411-13.
Kenner, Hugh. A Colder Eye: The Modern Irish Writers. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.

224

---. “Wyndham Lewis: The Satirist as Barbarian.” In English Satire and the Satiric Tradition,
264-75. Edited by Claude Rawson and Jenny Mezciems. New York: Blackwell, 1984.
Kercher, Stephen E. Revel with a Cause: Liberal Satire in Postwar America. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 2006.
Kermode, Frank. Introduction to Spark, Muriel, Four Novels, ix-xix. New York: Everyman’s Library,
2004.
---. “The Novel as Jerusalem: Muriel Spark’s Mandelbaum Gate.” In Critical Essays on Muriel
Spark, 179-186.
Kharpetian, Theodore D. A Hand to Turn the Time: The Menippean Satires of Thomas Pynchon.
Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1990.
Kierkegaard and Literature: Irony, Repetition, and Criticism. Edited by Ronald Schleifer and Robert
Markley. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984.
Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity. Edited by Martin J. Matuštík and Merold Westphal. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1995.
Kierkegaard, Literature, and the Arts. Edited by Eric Ziolkowski. Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 2018.
Kierkegaard on Art and Communication. Edited by George Pattison. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1992.
Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Vol. 12 Tome IV. Edited by Jon Stewart.
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2013.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Translated by
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941.
---. Either/Or, Volume I. Translated by David F. Swenson and Lillian M. Swenson. London:
Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1944.
---. Fear and Trembling. Translated by Robert Payne. London: Oxford University Press, 1939.
---. For Self Examination and Judge For Yourselves! and Three Discourses. Translated by
Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
---. The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard. Edited and translated by Alec Dru. London: Oxford
University Press, 1939.
---. The Present Age and On the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle. Translated by
Alec Dru. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
225

---. The Point of View, Etc. Translated by Walter Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press,
1939.
---. The Sickness Unto Death. Translated by Alastair Hannay. London: Penguin, 2004.
Kindley, Evan. Poet-Critics and the Administration of Culture. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2017.
Kirsch, Arthur. Auden and Christianity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
Klugmann, James. “The Crisis of the Thirties: A View from the Left.” In Culture and Crisis in Britain
in the 30s, 13-36.
Knowles, Sebastian D.G. A Purgatorial Flame: Seven British Writers in the Second World War.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990.
Larkin, Philip. Collected Poems. London: Faber and Faber, 2003.
---. “What’s Become of Wystan?” The Spectator (London), Jul. 15, 1960.
Leonard, Joan. “‘Loitering with Intent: Muriel Spark’s Parabolic Technique.” Studies in the Literary
Imagination 18, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 65-77.
Levenson, Michael. Modernism and the Fate of Individuality. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991.
Levitt, Laura. “Rereading the Postsecular from an American Jewish Perspective.” Religion &
Literature 41, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 107-118.
Lewis, Pericles. Religious Experience and the Modernist Novel. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010.
Lewis, Wyndham. Men Without Art. Edited by Seamus Cooney. Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press,
1987.
Litvack, Leon. “We All Have Something to Hide: Muriel Spark, Autobiography, and the Influence of
Newman on the Career of a Novelist.” Durham University Journal 86, no. 55 (1994): 281-9.
The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard. Edited by W.H. Auden. New York: David McKay Company,
1952.
Lodge, David. “Kierkegaard for Special Purposes.” In Consciousness and the Novel. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2004.
---. “The Novelist at the Crossroads.” In The Novel Today, 84-110.
226

---. Therapy. New York: Viking, 1995.
---. “The Uses and Abuses of Omniscience: Method and Meaning in Muriel Spark’s The Prime
of Miss Jean Brodie.” In Critical Essays on Muriel Spark, 151-173.
Lowe, Peter. English Journeys: National and Cultural Identity in 1930s and 1940s England. Amherst:
Cambria Press, 2012.
Lowrie, Walter. Introduction to Stages on Life’s Way, 3-16. Søren Kierkegaard. Translated by Walter
Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940.
---. Kierkegaard. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.
---. Translator’s preface to Søren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves!
and Three Discourses, v-vii. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1944.
Lukács, Georg. The Meaning of Contemporary Realism. Translated by John and Necke Mander.
London: Merlin Press, 1963.
Ludwig, Kathryn. “Don DeLillo’s Underworld and the Postsecular in Contemporary Fiction.”
Religion & Literature 41, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 82-91.
Macdonald, Dwight. Against the American Grain. New York: Random House, 1962.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. South Bend: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.
MacKay, Marina. “Anti-State Fantasy and the Fiction of the 1940s.” Literature and History 24, no. 1
(Spring 2015): 27-40.
---. Catholicism, Character, and the Invention of the Liberal Novel Tradition.” Twentieth Century
Literature 48, no. 2 (Summer, 2002): 215-238.
---. Modernism and World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
---. “Muriel Spark and the Meaning of Treason.” Modern Fiction Studies 54, no. 3 (Fall 2008):
505-522.
MacKay, Marina and Lyndsey Stonebridge. Introduction to British Fiction after Modernism: The
Novel at Mid-Century, 1-16. Edited by Marina MacKay and Lyndsey Stonebridge. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Mackey, Louis. Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.
Maher, Eamon and Eugene O’Brien. Introduction to in Breaking the Mould: Literary Representations
of Irish Catholicism. Edited by Eamon Maher and Eugene O’Brien. Bern: Peter Lang, 2011.
227

Malament, Elliot. “Graham Greene and the Hounds of Brighton Rock.” Modern Fiction Studies 37,
no. 4 (Winter 1991): 689-703.
Malik, Habib C. Receiving Søren Kierkegaard: The Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought.
Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997.
Martin, Augustine. “Inherited Dissent: The Dilemma of the Irish Writer.” In Bearing Witness: Essays
on Anglo-Irish Literature, 81-99. Edited by Anthony Roche. Dublin: University College Dublin
Press, 1996.
Martin, Bruce K. David Lodge. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1999.
McClure, John. Partial Faiths: Postsecular Fiction in the Age of Pynchon and Morrison. Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2007.
McDiarmid, Lucy. Auden’s Apologies for Poetry. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
---. Saving Civilization: Yeats, Eliot, and Auden Between the Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984.
McLeod, Hugh. The Religious Crisis of the 1960s. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
McQuillan, Martin. Introduction to Theorizing Muriel Spark: Gender, Race, Deconstruction, 1-31.
---.“‘The Same Informed Air’: An Interview with Muriel Spark.” In Theorizing Muriel Spark:
Gender, Race, Deconstruction, 210-229.
McRedmond, Louis. To the Greater Glory: A History of the Irish Jesuits. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan,
1991.
Meckier, Jerome. “Aldous Huxley and the Congenital Novelists: New Ideas about the Novel of
Ideas.” Southern Review 13, no. 3 (1980): 203-221.
Mendelson, Edward. Early Auden, Later Auden: A Critical Biography. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2017.
Miller, Tyrus. Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the Wars. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999.
Miraculous Simplicity: Essays on R.S. Thomas. Edited by William V. Davis. Fayetteville: The
University of Arkansas Press, 1993.
Modern Critical Views: Graham Greene. Edited by Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House
Publishers, 1987.

228

Montgomery, Benilde. “Spark and Newman: Jean Brodie Reconsidered.” Twentieth Century
Literature 43, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 94-106.
Morace, Robert A. The Dialogic Novels of Malcolm Bradbury and David Lodge. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1989.
Moskowitz, Eva S. In Therapy We Trust: America’s Obsession with Self-Fulfillment. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.
Murdoch, Iris. “Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch.” In The Novel Today, 23-31.
Murphy, Neil. “Flann O’Brien’s The Hard Life and the Gaze of the Medusa.” Review of
Contemporary Literature 31, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 148-161.
Murray, Nicholas. Aldous Huxley: An English Intellectual. London: Little, Brown 2002.
Mutter, Matthew. Restless Secularism: Modernism and the Religious Inheritance. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2017.
Newman, Daniel Aureliano. “‘Education of an Amphibian’: Anachrony, Neotony, and Bildung in
Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza.” Twentieth-Century Literature 62, no. 4 (December 2016): 403-428.
Nichols, James W. “Romantic and Realistic: The Tone of Evelyn Waugh’s Early Novels.” College
English 24, no. 1 (October 1962): 46, 51-6.
Nicodemus. Midnight Hour. London: Faber and Faber, 1942.
The Novel Today. Edited by Malcolm Bradbury. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977.
O’Brien, Flann. The Complete Novels. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.
O’Connor, Flannery. The Complete Stories. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1971.
O’Hanlon, Karl. “Antimodernism and Religious Modernity in Brighton Rock: The Divided Mind of
Graham Greene.” In Graham Greene: un écrivain dans le siècle. Edited by Vincent Giroud, 517. Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comte, 2014.
Ormond, John. “R.S. Thomas: Priest and Poet.” Poetry Wales 7, no. 4 (1973): 47-57.
Orwell, George. “The Sanctified Sinner.” In Graham Greene: A Collection of Critical Essays, 105-9.
Overy, Richard. The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilisation, 1919-1939. London: Penguin
Books, 2010.
The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard. Edited by John Lippitt and George Pattison. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013.
229

Pattison, George. “Bonfire of the Genres: Kierkegaard’s Literary Kaleidoscope.” In Kierkegaard,
Literature, and the Arts, 39-54.
---. “From Prophet of Now to Postmodern Ironist.” In Søren Kierkegaard’s International
Reception Tome I, edited by Jon Stewart, 237-270. London: Routledge, 2009.
---. Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.
---. Kierkegaard & the Quest for Unambiguous Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
---. Kierkegaard, Religion, and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
---. Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012.
Paulus, Jr., Michael J. “From a Publisher’s Point of View: Charles Williams’ Role in Publishing
Kierkegaard in English.” In Charles Williams and His Contemporaries, edited by S. Bray and
Richard Sturch, 20-41. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009.
Perkins, J. Russell. David Lodge and the Tradition of the Modern Novel. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2014.
---. “The Pilgrimages of David Lodge.” Christianity and Literature 57, no. 3 (Spring 2008): 419442.
Poole, Roger. Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication. Charlottesville: The University of Virginia
Press, 1993.
---. “The Unknown Kierkegaard: Twentieth-Century Receptions.” In The Cambridge Companion
to Kierkegaard, edited by Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino, 48-75. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Power, Mary. “Flann O’Brien and Classical Satire: An Exegesis of The Hard Life.” Eire-Ireland: A
Journal of Irish Studies 13, no. 1 (1978): 87-102.
Pyper, Hugh S. “Kierkegaard and English Language Literature.” In The Oxford Handbook of
Kierkegaard, 570-89.
Randisi, Jennifer Lynn. On Her Way Rejoicing: The Fiction of Muriel Spark. Washington: Catholic
University of America Press, 1991.
Rankin, Ian. “The Deliberate Cunning of Muriel Spark.” In The Scottish Novel since the Seventies:
New Visions, Old Dreams, 41-53. Edited by Gavin Wallace and Randall Stevenson. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1993.
230

Read, Herbert. A Coat of Many Colours. New York: Horizon Press, 1956.
Replogle, Justin. Auden’s Poetry. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969.
Riding, Laura. “Søren Kierkegaard.” Times Literary Supplement (London), Apr. 10, 1937.
Rieff, Philip. “For the Last Time Psychology: Thoughts on the Therapeutic Twenty Years After.”
Salmagundi 74/75 (Spring-Summer 1987): 101-117.
---. The Triumph of the Therapeutic. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
Riggs, Erica. “W.H. Auden’s Progress Towards Personal Speech.” English Studies in Canada 15, no.
2 (June 1989): 178-195.
Rogers, Byron. The Man Who Went into the West: The Life of R.S. Thomas. London: Aurum Press,
2006.
Rosner, Victoria. Modernism and the Architecture of Private Life. New York: Columbia University
Press, 2005.
Roston, Murray. Graham Greene’s Narrative Strategies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Rowntree, B. Seebohm and G.R. Lavers. English Life and Leisure. London: Longmans, Green and
Co, 1951.
“R.S. Thomas Talks to J.B. Lethbridge.” Anglo-Welsh Review 74 (1983): 36-56.
Rubin, Joan. The Making of Middlebrow Culture. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1992.
Ryan, Bartholomew. “James Joyce: Negation, Kirkeyaard, Wake, and Repetition.” In Kierkegaard’s
Influence on Literature, Criticism and Art Tome IV: The Anglophone World, edited by Jon
Stewart, 109-132. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013.
Saint-Amour, Paul K. Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015.
Salvatore, Anne T. Greene and Kierkegaard: The Discourse of Belief. Tuscaloosa: The University of
Alabama Press, 1988.
---. “Socratic Midwifery: Greene and Kierkegaard.” College Literature 12, no. 1 (1985): 26-32.
Salwak, Dale. Interviews with Britain’s Angry Young Men. San Bernardino: The Borgos Press, 1984.

231

Sargent, Andrew. “R.S. Thomas: The Anglican Compromise.” Renascence 67, no. 1 (Winter 2015):
41-55.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Between Existentialism and Marxism. Translated by John Mathews. New York:
Pantheon, 1974.
Saunders, Timothy. “Peripheries of Space, Self and Literary Style in R.S. Thomas’s Readings of
Søren Kierkegaard.” Scandinavica 56, no. 1 (2017): 59-95.
Schilling, Peter A. Søren Kierkegaard and Anglo-American Literary Culture of the Thirties and
Forties. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1994.
Schuler, Stephen J. The Augustinian Theology of W.H. Auden. Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 2013.
Schwab, Gabriele. Subjects without Selves: Transitional Texts in Modern Fiction. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1994.
Schwartz, Delmore. Selected Essays of Delmore Schwartz. Edited by Donald A. Dike and David H.
Zucker. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
Scott, John. “In the Movement.” The Spectator (London) 193, Oct. 1, 1954: 399-400.
Scott, Jr., Nathan A. The Poetics of Belief: Studies in Coleridge, Arnold, Pater, Santayana, Stevens,
and Heidegger. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
Servotte, Herman. “Auden and Kierkegaard.” In Multiple Worlds, Multiple Words: Essays in Honour
of Irène Simon, 275-282. Edited by Hena Maes-Jelinek, Pierre Michel, and Paulette MichelMichot. Liège: University of Liège Press, 1987.
Shakespeare, Steven. “Kierkegaard and Postmodernism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard,
464-83.
Sharrock, Roger. Saints, Sinners, and Comedians: The Novels of Graham Greene. South Bend:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
Shea, Thomas. Flann O’Brien’s Exorbitant Novels. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1992.
Shepherd, Elaine. R.S. Thomas: Conceding an Absence – Images of God Explored. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1996.
Sherry, Norman. The Life of Graham Greene Volume II: 1939-1955. London: Penguin, 1994.
Sherry, Vincent. The Great War and the Language of Modernism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.

232

Sinclair, Peter A. “Graham Greene and Christian Despair: Tragic Aesthetics in Brighton Rock and
The Heart of the Matter.” Renascence 63, no. 2 (Winter 2011): 131-146.
Smith, Zadie. “Some Notes on Attunement.” New Yorker (December 7, 2012). The New Yorker
website. Accessed 19th December 2019.
Soud, W. David. Divine Cartographies: God, History, and Poiesis in W.B. Yeats, David Jones, and
T.S. Eliot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Spark, Muriel. All the Stories of Muriel Spark. New York: New Directions, 2001.
---. “Awkward Saint.” The Observer (London) Sep. 20 1953.
---. The Comforters. London: Penguin, 1963.
---. “The Desegregation of Art.” In Critical Essays on Muriel Spark, 33-7.
---. Four Novels. New York: Everyman’s Library, 2004.
---. The Golden Fleece: Essays. Edited by Penelope Jardine. Manchester: Carcanet House, 2014.
---. Memento Mori. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1959.
---. “My Conversion.” In Critical Essays on Muriel Spark, 24-8.
Spaulding, John. “Poetry and the Media: The Decline of Popular Poetry.” Journal of Popular Culture
33, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 147-153.
Stannard, Martin. Muriel Spark: The Biography. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.
Steere, Douglas V. “Kierkegaard in English.” The Journal of Religion 24.4 (Oct 1944): 271-8.
Stewart, Jon. The Cultural Crisis of the Danish Golden Age: Heiberg, Martensen, and Kierkegaard.
Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2015.
Stonebridge, Lyndsey. The Writing of Anxiety: Imagining Wartime in Mid-Century British Culture.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Swift, Bernard C. “‘The Dangerous Edge of Things’: Mauriac, Greene, and the Ideal of the Catholic
Novel.” Journal of European Studies xxii (1992): 111-126.
Szabo, Daniel. “R.S. Thomas: Poet of the Threshold.” In Intimate Exposure: Essays on the PublicPrivate Divide in British Poetry Since 1950, 54-66. Edited by Emily Taylor Merriman and
Adrian Grafe. London: McFarland & Co, 2010.

233

Taafe, Carol. Ireland Through the Looking Glass: Flann O’Brien, Myles na gCopaleen and Irish
Cultural Debate. Cork: Cork University Press, 2008.
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2008.
Tease, Amy Woodbury. “Call and Answer: Muriel Spark and Media Culture.” Modern Fiction Studies
62, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 70-91.
Terrazas, Melania. “Wyndham Lewis’ Theories of Satire and the Practice of Fiction.” In The
Cambridge Companion to Wyndham Lewis, 61-71. Edited by Tyrus Miller. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Theorizing Muriel Spark: Gender, Race, Deconstruction. Edited by Martin McQuillan. Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2002.
Thomas, Ned and John Barnie. “Probings: An Interview with R.S. Thomas.” In Miraculous
Simplicity: Essays on R.S. Thomas, 21-46.
Thomas, R.S. “An Autobiographical Essay.” In Miraculous Simplicity: Essays on R.S. Thomas, 1-20.
---. Autobiographies. Translated by Jason Walford Davies. London: J.M. Dent, 1997.
---. Collected Later Poems: 1988-2000. Northumberland: Bloodaxe Books, 2004.
---. The Collected Poetry of R.S. Thomas: 1945-1990. London: Phoenix, 2000.
---. Selected Prose. Edited by Sandra Anstey. Bridgend: Poetry Wales Press, 1983.
---. Uncollected Poems. Edited by Tony Brown and Jason Walford Davies. Northumberland:
Bloodaxe Books, 2013.
Tomko, Helena M. “Muriel Spark’s The Girls of Slender Means at the Limits of the Catholic Novel.”
Religion and Literature 27, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 41-64.
Tomlinson, Charles. “The Middlebrow Muse.” Essays in Criticism VII, no. 2, (April 1, 1957): 208-17.
Updike, John, “Stonewalling Toffs.” In Hidden Possibilities: Essays in Honor of Muriel Spark, 182-6.
Vicary, J.D. “Via Negativa.” In Miraculous Simplicity: Essays on R.S. Thomas, 89-101.
Vitoux, Pierre. “Structure and Meaning in Aldous Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza.” The Yearbook of
English Studies 2 (1972): 212-224.
Von Hallberg, Robert. American Poetry and Culture: 1945-1980. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1985.

234

Walker, Ronald G. “World Without End: An Approach to Narrative Structure in Greene’s The End of
the Affair.” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 26, no. 2 (Summer 1984): 218-241.
Walsh, Sylvia. “Kierkegaard and Postmodernism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
29.2 (April 1991): 113-122.
---. Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics. University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1994.
Ward, J.P. The Poetry of R.S. Thomas. Bridgend: Poetry Wales Press, 1987.
Wasserman, Jerry. “Huxley’s Either/Or: The Case for Eyeless in Gaza.” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction
13, no. 2 (Winter 1980): 188-203.
Waugh, Evelyn. The Essays, Articles, and Reviews of Evelyn Waugh. Edited by Donat Gallagher.
London: Methuen, 1983.
---. “Felix Culpa?” In Graham Greene: A Collection of Critical Essays, 95-102.
---. Four Novels. New York: Everyman’s Library, 2003.
Weston, Elizabeth Anne. “The Comic Uncanny in Muriel Spark’s Memento Mori.” Scottish Literary
Review 9, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 2017): 117-136.
Westphal, Merold. Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society. Macon: Mercer University Press,
1987.
Wetzsteon, Rachel. Influential Ghosts: A Study of Auden’s Sources. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Whittaker, Ruth. The Faith and Fiction of Muriel Spark. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982.
Whyte, J.H. Church and State in Modern Ireland: 1923-1970. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971.
Widdowson, Peter. “Between the Acts? English Fiction in the Thirties.” In Culture and Crisis in
Britain in the 30s, 133-164.
Wilde, Alan. “Modernism and the Aesthetics of Crisis.” Contemporary Literature 20, no. 1 (Winter
1979): 13-50.
Williams, Charles. The Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit in the Church. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1939.
Williams, Raymond. The City and the Country. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
---. Culture and Society: 1780-1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

235

Williams, Rowan. “Suspending the Ethical: R.S. Thomas and Kierkegaard.” In Echoes to the Amen:
Essays after R.S. Thomas, 206-219. Edited by Damian Walford Davies. Cardiff: University of
Wales Press, 2003.
Williams, Trevor L. “History over Theology: The Case for Pinkie in Greene’s Brighton Rock.”
Studies in the Novel 24, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 67-77.
Wilson, Colin. The Angry Years: The Rise and Fall of the Angry Young Men. London: Robson, 2007.
---. Introduction to Interviews with Britain’s Angry Young Men, 1-11.
Wilson, Edmund. “Is Verse a Dying Technique?” In The Triple Thinkers. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1948.
Woodcock, George. Dawn and the Darkest Hour. New York: Viking, 1972.
Woolf, Virginia. “Middlebrow.” In The Death of the Moth and Other Essays. New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1942.
---. Selected Essays. Edited by David Bradshaw. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
---. To the Lighthouse. Boston: Mariner Books, 1981.
Yagoda, Ben. Memoir: A History. New York: Riverhead Books, 2009.
Yeats, W.B. The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats. Edited by Richard J. Finneran. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996.
Ziolkowski, Eric. “Introduction.” In Kierkegaard, Literature, and the Arts, 3-38.
---. The Literary Kierkegaard. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011.
Zwerdling, Alex. The Rise of the Memoir. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

236

